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‘I found the report fascinating and also disturbing in equal measure. …While state building efforts 
are rightly focused on building up structures from the ground they fail to address the primary 
need to ensure that such institutions are properly reformed to become independent and impartial 
institutions…To address these pressing issues and to maximise the positive momentum generated 
from the elections and the international focus on Southern Sudan at this time, these issues needs 
to be discussed publicly with all key states, governments and civil society stakeholders who hold 
the future of Southern Sudan in their hands. I would urge action sooner rather than later.’   
Akbar Khan, Director, Legal & Constitutional Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat   
 
‘The great strength of the report is the accuracy of its voicing of common concerns – it forms an 
excellent representation of people’s perceptions and experiences, making an important corollary 
to the current focus on high-level political negotiations and structures. As the report emphasises 
at the outset, the current focus of Sudanese governments and their international advisors on the 
technicalities and procedural aspects of planning for the referendum and its outcome needs to be 
countered by the more holistic approach advocated by this report.’  
Cherry Leonardi, Durham University
 
‘A very important and timely contribution to the current debates…The report offers an invaluable 
insight in some of the key issues and dilemma’s Southern Sudan and international actors face.’  
Jort Hemmer, Clingendael Institute
Research team led by Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen
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With Sudan’s elections over, this is the 
moment to refocus on challenges that lie 
ahead for Southern Sudan in the coming few 
months. The tremendous task of conducting 
elections as part of what was agreed in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has 
placed an emphasis on technical aspects 
and shortcomings of that process. It is likely 
that in the coming months attention will be 
concentrated on similarly technical aspects 
of the referendum on Southern Sudan’s 
independence, which is planned to take 
place in 2011.
In contrast, this report focuses on some of 
the broader and more conceptual issues. 
Its main undertaking is to deliver information 
that clarifies the reasons for increased 
intra-south violence. By reflecting on how 
people living and working in Southern Sudan 
have experienced events since the CPA, the 
report looks at ways in which intra-southern 
structures and international approaches have 
created some of the current predicaments of 
peace, and have contributed to the dynamics 
of ongoing conflict. It questions established 
narratives about the influence of the 
government of Khartoum or ‘tribalism’ being 
at the heart of the region’s problems. The 
report finds that other issues, some of which 
have been ignored or underemphasised 
– such as the lack of internal border 
demarcations – have a direct impact on local 
violence. It also identifies problems with the 
development/reconstruction/peace-building 
approach that have exacerbated tensions. 
In particular, current attempts to establish 
state institutions, notably at the local level, are 
actually making outbreaks of violence more 
likely. Above all, the report demonstrates the 
importance of moving away from simplistic 
categorisations in order to arrive at a more 
multi-faceted analysis, one that takes into 
account the complexities on the ground. 
The past five years have seen tremendous 
progress in Southern Sudan as peace 
between north and south has largely been 
maintained. Building up a government from 
scratch is an impressive achievement. Yet, 
the new government structures do not reach 
the majority of people interviewed for this 
report and violence is part of everyday life for 
many Southern Sudanese. Gains are fragile 
and will be put to the test in the coming 
months as Southern Sudan prepares for the 
final CPA milestone and the time beyond. This 
difficult period also creates an opportunity for 
a coordinated and necessary effort to put in 
place structural changes. 
ObjECtivE And 
MEthOdOlOgy
The objective of this report is to provide 
evidence that will inform key actors in 
Southern Sudan in consulting Southern 
Sudan’s citizens and in designing, 
implementing and prioritising policies and 
activities that support peace and stability. 
Three research teams, comprised of 
researchers from the Southern Sudan 
Peace Commission (SSPC), the London 
School of Economics and Political Science 
Development Studies Institute (LSE/DESTIN) 
and Juba University’s Centre for Peace and 
Development Studies (CPDS), spent a month 
gathering data in Eastern Equatoria, Upper 
Nile and Greater Bahr el-Ghazal in October 
and November 2009. The teams conducted 
close to 300 extended qualitative interviews 
with local government officials, NGO and 
UN staff as well as individual or focus group 
discussions with local leaders and residents. 
In addition, several methods were used for 
triangulation, including 354 questionnaire-
based surveys administered to randomly 
selected individuals, drawing competitions 
in schools and participatory exercises with 
women, youths and elders. In addition further 
follow-up research was conducted during the 
elections in April 2010.
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FACtuAl Findings
Despite great achievements, neither the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 
nor the international agencies working in 
Southern Sudan have achieved what they 
set out to do during the Interim Period. 
Accountable government structures on 
all levels, reliable service delivery, civic 
education, security and a coordinated 
effort among development agencies remain 
elusive goals. Serious shortcomings have 
emerged that need to be addressed. 
Major themes:
scape-goating Khartoum
A default explanation for violence is the 
interference of the Government of Sudan 
(GoS). Theories put forth by respondents 
from local government, army or civilians 
range from blaming Khartoum for bringing 
Uganda’s outlawed Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) to Western Bahr el-Ghazal, to 
assumptions that the recent increase in 
cattle-raiding is part of a northern strategy 
of destabilisation. Such sentiments ferment 
anti-north opinions and contribute to unease 
and tension in the run up to significant 
political decisions. However, testimony given 
by local authorities or civilians to support 
Khartoum’s direct involvement in local 
conflicts tends to be anecdotal, based on 
rumours and unsupported by actual events 
on the ground. One poignant example is the 
continued rumour and accusation that the 
nomadic Amborroro/Fellata are functioning 
as an armed militia of the Khartoum 
government. However, no actual violent 
incidents were known even by local civilians 
or the government which accuses the 
Amborroro of being Khartoum’s agents. 
Creating ‘tribal conflicts’
The second most common explanation 
is that ‘tribal hatred’ drives local violence. 
The ‘tribal’ label is applied to anything from 
family disputes, clashes within sub-clans 
of the same tribes, to attacks by criminal 
gangs or marauding former soldiers. As 
an explanation for violence, the term is 
meaningless, particularly as violence is 
as often intra-tribal as it is inter-tribal. It is 
simply a lazy and misleading interpretation 
of reasons for violence. This does not mean 
that many people do not assign tremendous 
importance to their tribal belonging, or 
that ethnicity cannot be manipulated by 
politicians wanting a local power-base. 
But, for peace-building programming to be 
successful, clashes between groups need to 
be more comprehensively investigated and 
explained, taking into account competition 
for resources as well as the underlying 
motivations of local leaders and other elites. 
Establishing state structures  
that support conflict
Major issues that emerged as reasons 
for local violence are either structural or 
can be found in a troubled, somewhat 
paradoxical relationship between the 
state and its citizens. The current state-
building approach emphasises the creation 
of strong institutions; an emphasis on 
decentralisation addresses Sudan’s legacy 
of marginalisation. At the same time, this 
approach works counter-productively, as 
the very same institutions lack accountability 
particularly at the local level where most 
violence is caused. In combination with 
the political manipulation of the ‘tribal’ 
label, what are meant to be accountable, 
decentralised government structures have in 
reality begun to resemble ethnic fiefdoms. 
It seems that with Khartoum’s influence on 
southern violence overestimated and the label 
‘tribal conflict’ too broad to deliver any useful 
insights, it is in the structure of the fledgling state 
that it becomes apparent that Southern Sudan 
is, in a way, at odds with itself.
dRivERs OF COnFliCt OR 
sOuthERn sudAn At Odds 
with itsElF
The period immediately succeeding the 
signing of the CPA was characterised by an 
enthusiasm for changing times in Southern 
Sudan. After five years of the CPA and 
unfulfilled expectations, war-like behaviour 
and opportunism have resurfaced. Factors 
that contribute to the increase in tensions 
and acts of aggression include the failure 
of delivering services according to what is 
commonly referred to as a ‘peace dividend’, 
combined with an intense political contest 
down to the local level, and an absence 
of institutions with the capacity to control 
violence. The process of establishing 
institutions to stem local violence presents 
opportunities for gaining positions of power 
and authority. 
Competing structural approaches
Approaches to state-building in Southern 
Sudan stand in direct competition with 
the need to control violence. Violence can 
only be reliably supressedthrough strong 
and reliable state structures yet these 
do not exist or where they do, might be 
perpetrators of violence themselves. For 
GoSS this creates a problem of deciding on 
prioritising approaches to either build the 
state or control violence. 
New government structures are being 
created while at the same time there is a 
reliance on governance systems that are 
not readily linked to a vision of Southern 
Sudan’s possible future as an independent 
state, or even as an autonomous region. 
While theoretically, Southern Sudan aims to 
be decentralised, it has in reality become an 
extremely centralised system. The Interim 
Period has fostered a certain lack of clarity 
among CPA actors, including donors and 
NGOs. A focus on CPA milestones has 
contributed to a murky understanding by 
those interviewed of the precise ambition or 
vision for Southern Sudan. This is evident in 
the vast range of ways people interviewed 
for this report described their understanding 
of the current situation.
International organisations might be clear 
about their own organisations’ goals, but 
are restricted by short-term funding cycles 
which prohibit long-term and multi-faceted 
planning. The result is a lack of depth in 
programming which fails to combine  
conflict mitigation with peace-building  
and development. 
•  State-building and controlling violence
Patronage politics and a proliferation of 
government structures have lessened 
governmental accountability and intensified 
the violent struggle over access to resources 
and political space. At sites researched, 
law enforcement was very weak. State 
actors are not held to account and thus do 
not administer punishment to those who 
commit violent acts in a transparent way. 
Violence is perpetrated either by non-state 
actors or state actors who behave in ways 
that exacerbate further violence. Personal 
political agendas support deliberate 
attempts to avoid controlling violence 
and prevent state-building, as credible 
and accountable structures may usurp 
the authority of those currently in power. 
Southern Sudan is an example of how 
difficult it is to introduce democratic models 
in a nascent state, where a monopoly on 
the use of force by that state is far from 
guaranteed. While on paper, responsibilities 
for imposing order are clearly laid out, lack 
of implementation of structures established 
in the CPA and the Interim Constitution has 
created an empty space. 
•  Citizen versus subject
A democratic state-building framework 
suggests a need for politically responsible 
citizens and this vision of integration into a 
democratic and responsible state resonates 
with those interviewed. However, current 
trends suggest that much of the population 
will be treated more as subjects.1 This is 
most evident in places where many people 
speak neither English nor Arabic. Away 
from the bigger towns, the population lacks 
political voice and is largely disconnected 
from governmental processes. Those 
interviewed generally expressed high 
expectations for what would happen after 
the referendum and indicated hopes of 
becoming engaged citizens in the future. 
It was difficult, however, to discern how 
they believed these expectations might 
be met. Views were often contradictory. 
Many respondents suggested that the 
GoSS was actually an impediment to 
state-building because resources were not 
being distributed in an equitable manner, 
something that was repeatedly highlighted 
as crucial for the establishment of a  
lasting peace. 
unclear authorities
Unclear authority structures are most often 
cited as the biggest obstacle to preventing 
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and controlling violence. The research team 
found numerous examples of situations 
where individuals appeared to act without 
reference to established conventional 
notions of social restraint, openly taking 
resources for their own personal gain, acting 
in ways that violated ideas about moral 
probity or in ways that were simply criminal 
or unconstitutional. They did so without any 
expectation of facing repercussions. 
New governance structures of community-
based administrators are implemented 
half-heartedly and aid agencies exacerbate 
the confusion by turning to ‘chiefs’ as 
default community representatives for 
programming. Yet it is not clear how 
a ‘chief’s’ position currently relates to 
government structures. Part of the reason 
for this nebulous role is that no distinctions 
are drawn between different types of 
‘chiefs’, of which there are many and whose 
authority and legitimacy among communities 
varies widely. 
•   Governmental reform versus strengthening 
     indigenous structures
A major contributor to local violence is the 
lack of accountable and reliable entities 
to deal with violence when it occurs. One 
reason why a responsibility gap has opened 
is that currently two different approaches 
attempt to establish such structures. 
While consideration of local indigenous 
structures is important and necessary in 
establishing a forum for political conflict, it 
is problematic if local indigenous structures 
are strengthened without questioning their 
political accountability in connection with 
violent conflict. In addition, linkages between 
formal government and putative traditional 
authorities have not been clarified and 
strengthened where appropriate. Currently, 
the proliferation of new government 
structures in addition to an emphasis on old 
governance systems has created a situation 
in which it is not clear where authority lies 
and ultimately who can take charge of 
dealing with violent conflict. Currently, with 
these issues undefined, responsibility for 
conflict resolution is unclear. Government 
officials refer to chiefs, but chiefs mostly 
refer back to government officials, or 
perhaps to the Southern Sudanese army, 
the SPLA. As a result, locals have started 
taking the law into their own hands and no 
one, it seems, has the authority or capacity 
to impose order.
‘tribalism’
The description of local conflicts as tribal 
in nature is ubiquitous but is in many 
respects superficial and unhelpful. To a large 
extent, it conflates symptoms of underlying 
problems with their causes. Although 
there are situations in which cattle-raiding, 
competition over pastures, or claims over 
land were found to be associated with tribal 
groupings, that was by no means always the 
case. Also, what appeared to be a localised 
dispute was usually on closer examination 
found to have links with various kinds of 
political grudges, governmental failures, or 
resource disputes which had little to do with 
assumed divisions between ‘tribes’.  
An example for this would be cattle-
raiding in Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, which 
is commonly intra-tribal and fuelled by 
increased disconnection between citizens 
and the government. 
It is no coincidence that some of the worst 
violence has occurred in drought-prone 
regions. Competition for resources in these 
areas becomes intense; young men, often 
staying together in camps, end up raiding 
each other, sometimes with a shocking lack 
of constraint. Among other things, cattle-
raiding provides a potential for immediately 
improving their livelihoods. As noted above, 
such incidents do not always relate to tribal 
divisions; rather, the adoption of tribal and 
clan affiliations may provide opportunities 
that some individuals exploit. Previously 
weak or relatively unimportant distinctions 
between social groups suddenly take on a 
new significance, and the process is also 
exacerbated and facilitated by the availability 
of small arms. These problems have, to 
some extent, been rooted in the particular 
history of groups. But matters have been 
exacerbated by the notable absence of 
benefits from the CPA and by the weakness 
of GoSS. The latter resorts to un-monitored 
decentralised administration which 
effectively encourages localised politics that 
exaggerate the notion of tribalism as the 
main source of division.
Defining violence in Southern Sudan as 
‘tribal conflicts’ has led to a pervasive 
flawed logic. This logic has informed local 
peace initiatives with their emphasis on 
‘tribal’ issues and ‘tribal’ reconciliation. 
Counterproductively, these often involve 
chiefs whose authority may be enhanced 
by emphasising the very ‘tribal’ divisions 
they are supposed to be ameliorating. In 
other words, there is a failure to address 
underlying political and structural issues. 
Some of the solutions on offer just make 
things worse.
dynamics of conflict
tensions over borders, both real and 
imagined, are escalating
The CPA refers to the 1956 borders between 
the north and south. However, the team 
was told repeatedly that county, payam and 
boma borders also need to be reverted to the 
way they were in 1956 as a way of dealing 
with disputes. Contrary to popular opinion 
in Southern Sudan, detailed maps, showing 
demarcated boundaries at such local levels 
as they were at independence, do not actually 
exist. Even if they did, using such maps to solve 
present day problems disregards the fact that 
the social and political landscape has been 
drastically changed by decades of war and 
displacement. Expectations that local border 
demarcation will bring peace are tremendously 
high. Yet internal border demarcation is far 
from being a problem-solver, but rather triggers 
conflicts as groups on all sides of boundaries 
seek the legitimisation of land rights which 
accelerates division of Southern Sudan into 
ethnic fiefdoms. 
Administrative division
The CPA and Interim Constitution commit 
to administrative, political, and fiscal 
decentralisation and devolution of power. 
However, the goal of breaking power 
down into small administrative units while 
simultaneously seeking to portray and 
build a strong central state combines two 
approaches at odds with one another, pulling 
Southern Sudan into opposite directions. 
Decentralisation, while theoretically the 
best way to govern Southern Sudan, has 
in reality often become an instrument to 
entrench ‘tribal’ lines over competition for 
resources, manifesting itself in a proliferation 
of new counties. Momentum for increased 
administrative fragmentation is developing 
while decision-making power is being 
firmly held at the centre, thus voiding 
the entire idea of devolution of power 
through decentralisation. Theoretically, 
decentralisation and localised responsibility 
are necessary in Southern Sudan; 
practically, the implications of continued 
administrative division can be dangerously 
far-reaching and damaging.
Locally, there exist two main schools of 
thought regarding this fragmentation: 
one posits that this is a natural process in 
emerging democracies, based on local-level 
power struggles both at the representative 
and at the grassroots level. The alternative 
view foresees this fragmentation as 
undermining unity in the south because it 
fosters ethnicisation of authority structures, 
and fuels populist patronage politics. While 
decentralisation could be an effective way to 
increase accountability and dilute nepotism, 
it currently mimics and reinforces damaging 
arrangements at the national level, rather 
than providing an alternative to them.  
Motivations for cattle-raiding have 
altered with changed circumstances in 
southern sudan
Cattle-raiding is mostly carried out by young 
men based at cattle camps who appear to 
have minimal respect for either governmental 
or traditional authorities. It is said this is 
because they are unschooled, grew up 
as orphans, have no employment, are just 
used to fighting, or know that that nothing 
will happen to them even if they are caught 
in the act. Compounding the problem of 
lack of authority is extreme poverty, uneven 
distribution of wealth, inflation in bride-
price, historical intergroup tensions and the 
proliferation of arms. Cattle-raiders are often 
better armed than the police or even the 
army. Modern weapons also make fatalities 
much more likely than in the past and limit 
the possibilities of using traditional mediation 
and compensatory measures to contain the 
violence. In addition, there are indications 
that in some locations armed bands of 
young men, ostensibly raiding for cattle, are 
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linked to political machinations of former 
militia commanders and other political 
figures in search of constituencies.
PREdiCAMEnts OF PEACE
some conflicts are a result of the CPA
The CPA has exacerbated certain conflicts. 
Competition involving returnees is often 
intense and bitter. A strong sense of 
victimisation is felt across all groups in 
Southern Sudan, creating a condition in 
which certain people feel justified in using 
violence to rectify what is considered an 
unfair distribution of ‘peace dividends’. 
Disarmament is exemplary of the 
widespread feeling of victimisation: almost 
every community asked about disarmament 
claimed that while they had been disarmed, 
their neighbouring community had not. 
The CPA does not address local conflicts, 
but only sets up institutions that, upon their 
maturity, are supposed to address some 
of the local drivers of conflict. Priority in 
CPA implementation, however, has been 
on maintaining a working relationship 
between north and south. This is in part 
also due to the state-building approach, 
which has prioritised building government 
capacity to deliver services in the future over 
more instant service delivery. As a result, 
communities and individuals committing 
violence feel they have little to lose through 
violent behaviour – they do not even have 
to fear punishment. In the scramble for 
resources and local political space, potential 
for violence is also readily manipulated for 
wider political interests.
Perceptions of peace
For Southern Sudanese, living in peace 
seems to come with two major expectations: 
personal security and access to resources. 
Witnessing development and experiencing 
a changed quality of life through services 
is vital, and the absence of tangible 
development in many areas has made the 
notion of peace insignificant and encouraged 
violent behaviour familiar to southerners from 
war times. Tangible development progress, 
such as building of hospitals or gaining 
access to education, are seen as vital in 
establishing peace and this realisation needs 
to be at the heart of peace-building activities. 
Peace conferences and peace 
agreements have been ineffective in 
resolving local conflicts
By framing political and resource insecurity 
as tribal conflict, peace conferences 
have focused on working with traditional 
authorities that often lack the capacity and 
credibility to resolve complex disputes. 
Usually facilitated with outside help, the 
proliferation of peace conferences has 
created a paradoxical situation for many 
local leaders in which their power is 
expressed by the ability to fundraise for a 
local conference and gather support of an 
aid agency, yet simultaneously undermining 
their own authority to solve local problems 
without outside help. By defining conflicts 
as local and tribal, peace conferences have 
neglected the broader political context. 
Indeed, one could argue that local conflict 
resolution cannot take broader politics into 
account, but this in turn requires rethinking 
of local conflict resolution approaches.  
Without able actors and clear 
implementation mechanisms, peace 
conferences often yield many resolutions 
and few results. Though there may be 
limited value in the communication channels 
that are established between groups at 
such meetings, these tend to break down 
soon after if there is no long-term strategy 
to follow up. In general, a long-term local 
peace-building strategy is needed that will 
culminate in a broadly inclusive conference 
that is a product of peace-building – rather 
than just a dominant peace-building activity 
which becomes an end in itself. 
Approaches to aid and development  
are confusing  
GoSS officially sees the country in the 
stage of development, rather than in a 
state of humanitarian emergency, and 
there is a general perception among NGOs 
that donors are now pushing for more 
engagement in capacity building of GoSS 
and local civil society organisations. NGOs 
have themselves raised concerns about 
short-term funding as it focuses on visible 
short-term interventions that might not be 
most conducive to establishing lasting peace. 
Nevertheless aid programming remains 
affected by short-term funding and funding 
mechanisms that better suit humanitarian 
assistance. There is a reluctance to move 
away from the humanitarian approach 
completely because the current political 
climate is unpredictable; there is increased 
volatility in the region; it is often easier to 
secure funding for humanitarian situations; 
and finally there are areas which are in need 
of humanitarian aid. In addition, it is important 
to keep in mind that a transition such as the 
one in Southern Sudan does not follow clear 
‘stages’ and the practical implications of 
the overlap between aspects of emergency 
assistance and the promotion of various 
forms of longer-term development needs to 
be dealt with more adequately. 
The uncertainty about what ‘mode’ Southern 
Sudan is in creates institutional confusion 
that manifests itself in contradictory 
approaches to aid and donors seem 
unable to provide much needed strategic 
direction. Due to uncertainty surrounding 
the referendum, donors are unable to share 
their political scenario planning, which in 
turn means that they are prevented from 
publicising their future development plans. 
Representatives from the donor community 
argue that there is long-term thinking within 
the donor community but due to the current 
political situation, it is not visible. 
Disharmony between donors prevents them 
from being able to coordinate effectively. 
While it was reported that donors are active 
in trying to align their approaches to ensure 
mutual accountability, the World Bank, which 
is in control of a large amount of funds, was 
perceived as unreceptive, making it difficult 
to make joint decisions. Those criticising the 
World Bank from within the donor community 
mentioned lack of capacity and political will as 
a possible reason for the World Bank’s lack of 
pro-activeness. 
It is recognised that there are downsides to 
deciding on a unified southern-wide approach 
as it might fail to take into account different 
circumstances in different parts of the country. 
However, donors need to agree on a clear 
general policy.
Although quite substantial funds have been 
allocated by donors to Southern Sudan, 
much of it has not yet been spent, and a very 
high portion has been used by GoSS for 
recurrent expenditure rather than investment. 
A consequence is that in several of the areas 
in which research was carried out, the CPA is 
viewed as a point at which assistance for the 
population declined. The withdrawal of food 
aid in particular was often mentioned.
thE wAy FORwARd
A principle finding from the research was the 
interconnectedness between conflict triggers. 
While the search to identify the most burning 
issue that would help mitigate current violence 
is pressing, the complicated and fluid situation 
in Southern Sudan does not allow for a 
straightforward prioritisation of concerns. The 
great disconnection most citizens feel from 
their government, competition for resources, 
absence of representation, a lack of credible 
social reconciliation, a perception that 
international aid is being withheld, all throw 
light on what is happening. The simultaneous 
tasks of establishing accountable government 
structures, delivering services, promoting civic 
education and providing security may have 
been unmanageable. Expectations of what 
would be possible in a short and politically 
tense time may have been too high. Ongoing 
violence will not automatically fade away and 
there is no panacea to deal with atrocities.  
Nonetheless, serious shortcomings in 
current programmes and policies urgently 
need to be addressed. There is an obvious 
requirement to clarify the overarching vision 
for Southern Sudan. There are reasons 
why that has been difficult, but with the 
referendum approaching it is ever more 
important. An aspect of that vision will be 
a more explicit recognition of the acute 
tensions between democracy and state-
building. It will inevitably take a long time to 
build the necessary accountable institutions 
for the former, but peace requires functional 
means of imposing and maintaining order 
now. That is a basic dilemma, and needs be 
openly confronted. 
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Grappling with pervasive local violence 
will require a strengthening of constructive 
– rather than divisive – local mechanisms 
and the delivery of tangible peace 
benefits. Amongst other things, this will 
mean facilitating and holding to account 
government structures and clarifying the 
responsibilities of relevant authorities. Also, 
without indications that life is improving, 
there will be a growing crisis of expectations. 
Those expectations must be carefully 
managed, or they will have seriously adverse 
consequences. One strategy for doing so 
is likely to be provision of food and other 
resources, probably in cooperation with 
international agencies. That may be  
effective in alleviating tensions, particularly in 
the many areas where livelihoods are  
very fragile.
To respond effectively and to monitor 
appropriately, an overarching vision needs 
to be related to each specific situation. 
Southern Sudan is a vast and socially 
diverse region. Searching for solutions for 
its multiple, overlapping and interrelated 
violent conflicts requires an understanding 
of the unique and idiosyncratic nature of 
each situation. General recommendations 
about broad approaches too easily gloss 
over the very issues that make problems 
so apparently intractable. GoSS, donors 
and agencies have to subscribe in earnest 
to the view that each location of upheaval 
calls for detailed and nuanced analysis, and 
may necessitate particular, even unique, 
responses. Simplistic approaches to 
pacification will either be oppressive  
and/or ineffective. 
In order to develop appropriate solutions 
that work in each specific local context, 
a renewed emphasis on working with 
the affected populations is needed. This 
requires continuous long-term programming 
and funding, committed regardless of CPA 
milestones and their outcomes. 
We recommend a focus on four main areas: 
1.   Providing a ‘peace dividend’ which 
emphasises the improvement of the 
infrastructure to bring visible and tangible 
peace benefits.
2.   Scrutinising the process of 
decentralisation which has caused 
division and ‘tribalisation’ of 
administrative units through the creation 
of ethnic fiefdoms.
3.   Addressing the lack of clarity of political 
structures and development approaches.
4.   Putting into practice an ongoing and 
inclusive commitment to make peace-
building a long-term, accountable and 
multi-faceted endeavour. 
viOlEnt COnFliCt AFtER 
thE CPA: CAsE studiEs 
ExAMinEd in thE REPORt
Eastern Equatoria state (EEs):
• ‘Resource conflicts’ in Lopit
• Border conflicts between Acholi   
 and Bari
• Legacies of violence in Budi   
 County
• International borders between   
 Toposa and Turkana
• Land disputes in Nimule
upper nile:
• The Atar/Khorflus agreements
• Dinka, Shilluk and internal borders
• Lou Nuer and Jikany Nuer
• Arms and the attack on the  
 WFP barge
greater bahr el-ghazal:
• Cattle-raiding in Mapel, Warrap   
 and Lakes States
• Strategic peace-making between   
 Dinka Malual and Rizeigat
• The presence of the Lord’s   
 Resistance Army
• The tensions between Fellata and   
      long-term WBeG residents 
• Marginalisation in Raja County
A school child’s depiction of life  
before the CPA
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With Sudan’s elections completed, it is 
necessary to refocus on challenges that lie 
ahead for Southern Sudan in the coming few 
months. In the lead up to the elections, the 
tremendous task of conducting them as part 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) placed an emphasis on technical 
issues regarding the conduct and logistics of 
elections, rather than their political significance. 
Management concerns took centre stage. In 
the coming months, the focus will inevitably 
shift towards similarly technical aspects of the 
upcoming referendum on Southern Sudan’s 
independence in 2011. The fact that this 
milestone is now so near and seems reachable 
is a tremendous achievement, and looking 
back over the last eight years since the CPA 
process began makes very clear how much 
has been accomplished in regards to largely 
maintaining the peace between north and 
south and building a government from scratch. 
The emphasis on achieved success and the 
final CPA milestone, however, is precisely why 
there is a danger that complex and long-
running issues might again be overlooked. 
This report tackles some of these broader and 
more conceptual issues. Its main undertaking 
is to deliver information that clarifies reasons 
for a puzzling development: increased 
intra-south violence, particularly since 2009. 
Everyday security has become one of the 
major challenges for Southern Sudan’s 
citizens, yet analysis has often been reduced 
to citing the more obvious reasons for local 
violence, such as the lack of state reach and 
access to rural areas, availability of small arms 
and lack of economic opportunities. This 
report urges to refocus from obvious answers 
to understanding the web of causes and 
effects of violence. The objective is to identify 
what appear to be more holistic solutions. 
In order to achieve this and to attempt 
continuous and constructive peace-building, 
it is necessary to look beyond established 
narratives and terminology, and we aim to 
reflect on how those living and working in 
Southern Sudan have experienced conflict 
and peace-building since the CPA. Looking 
at problematic intra-southern structures 
and dynamics, we identify predicaments of 
peace and dynamics of conflict and map 
how local violent processes link to broader 
structural causes.
local violence and its causes
What are the reasons for local violence? Two 
explanations are most commonly given: 
a) Southern Sudanese and their leaders are 
willing to blame the ‘hidden hand’ of Khartoum 
for all ills and unexplained local phenomena.2 
Indeed southerners credit Khartoum with the 
ability and desire to exert power over even 
the most banal of issues. The more serious 
accusations focus on weapons dissemination, 
continuing support for militias (including the 
Lord’s Resistance Army), and the buying 
of political support. Yet evidence about 
this ‘hidden hand’ is scarce to non-existent 
and this stance has become less important 
since the elections made clear that southern 
political dynamics and power struggles 
carry great potential for conflict. Even before 
elections, local violence in Southern Sudan 
seemed to be largely disconnected from 
the power politics in Khartoum. During the 
first two months of 2010, more people were 
killed in relatively small Warrap State (WS) 
than in any other state, however northern 
influence is acknowledged to be minimal in 
WS.3 During this research, many respondents 
acknowledged that within the south, there was 
great potential for people to incite hate and 
violence without encouragement from  
the north.
This leads to the second most common 
explanation: 
b) Local violence in Southern Sudan is driven 
by conflicts between tribes. The tribal label is 
applied to anything from family disputes, to 
disputes within tribes, to attacks by criminal 
gangs or marauding former soldiers. Both, 
the ‘hidden hand’ explanation and the ‘tribal 
clashes’ explanation overlook that there are 
very delicate and complicated underlying 
issues that cause local violence which are not 
driven by Khartoum or tribal belonging. 
A closer look at evidence and a more 
detailed analysis of incidents of local 
violence shows that the ‘hidden hand’ and 
‘tribal’ explanations are too simple. Major 
issues that emerged as reasons for local 
violence are either structural or can be 
found in a troubled, somewhat paradoxical 
relationship between the state and its 
citizens. On the one hand, the state is not 
strong enough to be able to suppress local 
violence. On the other, whenever state 
institutions are too strong and coercive, 
this causes renewed conflict which is at the 
heart of local violence.4 This is exacerbated 
by the development emphasis to build state 
institutions. Yet as these new institutions 
lack accountability, particularly at the local 
level where most violence is caused, the 
development-aid supported structures turn 
into a structural cause for violence. 
It seems that with Khartoum’s influence on 
southern violence overestimated and the 
label ‘tribal conflict’ too broad to deliver any 
useful insights, it is in the structure of the 
fledgling state that it becomes apparent  
that Southern Sudan is, in a way, at odds 
with itself.
Major findings in brief
This report finds that political and 
administrative developments have 
heightened tensions over territories, 
administrative units and border demarcation. 
To claim administrative units, ‘tribal’ 
identities are used and often manipulated as 
the primary marker of separation between 
groups. At the same time, economic and 
environmental change and population 
migrations have increased pressure on land 
and competition over access to resources, 
emphasising again group dynamics that 
often manifest in seemingly ‘tribal’ conflicts. 
On a broader level, these often very 
localised tensions remain unaddressed by 
a central government, creating a vacuum 
of responsibility that can only partially be 
addressed through current peace-building 
programming and development approaches 
which are in themselves struggling to 
establish continuous peace-building 
processes. Since the CPA, the GoSS has 
been unable to regulate or monitor equitable 
distribution of access to resources or 
to achieve demobilisation or systematic 
disarmament. In addition, a ‘peace 
dividend’ is manifestly lacking in the places 
where research for this report was carried 
out. Instead, a very weak administration 
has resorted to forms of decentralised 
administration that encourage ‘tribal’ 
politics, and dangerously links ‘tribal’ politics 
to holding power over specific territories. 
Some of the issues discussed in this report 
might at first seem only vaguely connected 
to local violence. One such issue is the 
importance of internal border demarcation. 
In the current period of transition, 
momentum for the formal demarcation of 
Southern Sudan’s borders at all levels is 
huge, and a key reason for ‘ethnicising’ 
conflicts. The movement toward final and 
legally defined borders, inevitably linked 
with permanently coded access and usage 
rights, is creating tension in a region where 
boundaries have tended to be contested and 
often ambiguous. While this may seem like 
a distinct issue, we argue that connections 
need to be drawn that are less than obvious. 
Despite the complexity of each issue, we 
aim to identify entry points for possible 
solutions. It is vital that measures will be put 
in place to mitigate local violence in tandem 
with preparations for the referendum. 
Establishing a solid evidence base for 
general findings is extremely challenging 
in Southern Sudan. Robust data is still 
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largely non-existent and the situation is 
so multi-faceted and diverse that for each 
point made, a counter-example suggesting 
the exact opposite can easily be found. 
However, the report draws on several 
hundred interviews in addition to existing 
scholarship on Southern Sudan (see 
Appendix for research methodology) and 
presents as general findings only issues that 
resonated in all three research sites. 
stRuCtuRE OF thE REPORt
This report is divided into three parts, each 
discussing specific issues and using local 
case studies to emphasise how these issues 
manifest themselves. 
‘Southern Sudan at odds with itself’ 
examines how ethnicity has become the 
default explanation for local violence in 
Southern Sudan and how this has created 
a simplified and misleading understanding 
of violence. The section looks at the 
tension created through current state-
building, development and peace-building 
approaches, which have essentially created 
a situation in which Southern Sudan is 
at odds with itself. The meaning of the 
referendum for the Southern Sudanese 
is examined. This section also gives 
some background as to how the current 
experience of Southern Sudan links to its 
history and what might be learned from this. 
‘Dynamics of conflict’ analyses how 
tension over administrative and territorial 
boundaries is perpetuating violent behaviour, 
particularly in areas where economic change 
is happening across such boundaries, 
manifesting itself in violent behaviour that is 
often simply labelled as ‘tribal’.
‘Predicaments of peace’ dissects the 
local experience of current peace-building 
initiatives, including some of the approaches 
that have developed as a consequence of 
issues discussed in previous sections, such 
as administrative decentralisation.  
REsEARCh sitEs 
upper nile
An oil-producing border area, Upper Nile 
was the frontline of Sudan’s civil war from 
1983-2005 as well as the fault line of 
Southern Sudan’s split into internal strife 
in 1991. Saturated with small arms and 
proxy militias during the war, Upper Nile has 
continued to be a volatile flashpoint during 
implementation of the CPA. The current 
trends in Upper Nile are troubling, and the 
state’s strategic geography, valuable natural 
resources, volatile ethnic mix, and fractured 
political landscape are likely to be catalysts 
for future conflict. The possibility of this came 
into sharp focus on April 30 2010, when guns 
were fired within the SPLA barracks as a 
result over dissatisfaction with the elections.   
The state’s capital Malakal reflects and 
reinforces the tensions that run throughout 
the state. Before the second Sudanese civil 
war, Malakal was a heavily arabised town 
with a distinctly northern and Islamic identity. 
During the war, it was a garrison stronghold 
of the northern Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) 
that served as a central funnel of arms, 
ammunition, supplies and soldiers into the 
south via military intelligence. Since the 
signing of the CPA, the northern influence 
has receded – albeit very slowly with Upper 
Nile having been governed by governors 
of the National Congress Party (NCP) until 
the elections – and created an opening 
for competition over control of Malakal’s 
resources. Since 2005, Malakal has twice 
erupted into heavy fighting between SAF and 
SPLA elements of the Joint Integrated Units 
(JIU), the hybrid troops of SAF and SPLA 
established as part of the CPA. While control 
of the town is not officially the JIU’s mandate, 
in reality control over the tense town is 
currently divided between the two factions. 
The northern side of Malakal is marked by 
tension between Shilluk, Dinka, and Nuer, 
each of which is trying to stake claim. In 
other parts of Upper Nile, the legacy of 
a ferocious intra-Nuer war continues to 
reverberate in the form of fighting between 
the Lou and Jikany. In an attempt to 
understand the conflict between the two 
groups, the research team spent time in 
Nasir, then took a boat to Akobo, stopping 
along the way at Torkech and Wanding. A 
post-CPA conflict between the Dinka and 
Shilluk over land has added a new layer of 
instability which erupted into violence in 
January 2009 and has continued into the 
elections and beyond. Currently, tensions 
between officials of the leading party, Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement SPLM, its 
supporters and those who support or hold 
office for Lam Akol’s SPLM-DC (Democratic 
Change), continue. To investigate the 
dynamic and likely trends of this conflict, 
the research team went to Dolieb Hills, Atar, 
Fangak, Kodok, Melut, and Paloich. 
Eastern Equatoria
Eastern Equatoria State is situated in a 
region that experiences chronic armed 
conflict and frequent cattle-rustling with 
weak institutional structures for imposing 
the rule of law.5 The state is bordered by 
Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya which adds 
difficult cross-border dynamics.6 Sudan’s 
second civil war devastated parts of the 
state, setting back development gains made 
during the period of regional autonomy.7  
The limited infrastructure of the state was 
destroyed by frequent aerial bombardment, 
military attacks and fighting which also 
created widespread displacement.
Administrative fragmentation over the last 
decade means that the state currently 
consists of eight counties. The region 
is experiencing increasingly harsh 
environmental conditions and reduced or 
failing crop yields. Combined with a lack 
of basic services, weak or absent state 
institutions and failing local economies, 
high levels of conflict – often over access 
to scarce resources – are not unexpected. 
Cattle-rustling has become embedded as a 
survival strategy; however, recent years have 
seen a change in the ferocity and frequency 
of raids as a result of the widespread 
availability and use of small arms as well 
as severe drought experienced in the last 
two years. Attempts to resolve conflicts and 
improve security in the region have been 
undermined by political manipulation of 
identities and few opportunities for imminent 
development because of depressed local 
economies and lack of aid.
The border town of Nimule is struggling with 
tense relations between a Dinka ‘Internally 
Displace Person’ (IDP) community and Madi 
‘returnees’ despite the ‘Nimule Agreement’ 
that supposedly solves issues of land 
ownership at the heart of this tension. The 
wider political landscape in Torit has a broad 
impact on local level conflict dynamics 
in the state, including a concern with the 
governance gap between state government 
and Monyomiji—the greater Equatoria 
governance system based on age-sets. In 
Kapoeta East County, conflict is, for example, 
fuelled by the issue of cattle-raiding between 
the Toposa and Buya in Kapoeta, Machi I and 
II, Camp 15 and Kapoeta north. Exacerbating 
factors include scarce resources, the 
presence of arms, the changing role of 
‘chiefs’, perceptions of justice systems and 
unsuccessful peace meetings. One peace 
meeting that had repercussions was the 
Lauro Conference in Budi County, held 
between the Didinga, Toposa and Buya. 
In Lafon and Lopa, intra-tribal (particularly 
between the Mura and the Tennet) and inter-
tribal (between the Lopit and Pari) tensions 
are increasing, while in Magwi County, the 
research team examined land disputes 
between the Lotuko in Palotaka and the 
Acholi in Obbo; the Panukuara and Agoro in 
Orobo and the Acholi and Bari in Kit/Ayii and 
how they are embedded in the broader socio-
political context.
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greater bahr el ghazal
Western Bahr el Ghazal stretches from 
Darfur in the north to the borders of Warrap 
State in its south eastern corner. The state 
is divided into a contentious small number 
of counties; Raja County in the north, Wau 
County in the middle and Jur River County 
in the south east. Jur River County and Wau 
County are characterised by savannah, 
planted extensively with sorghum, groundnut 
and sesame. Further north, towards Raja, 
the climate is cooler, the vegetation denser 
and larger trees, such as mahogany, more 
widespread. Western Bahr el Ghazal has 
historically benefitted economically from its 
strategic location between north Sudan and 
Equatoria. During the 19th century, Arab 
slave traders made huge profits from the 
unplundered populations in Equatoria and 
ivory from the Central African Republic.8  
Today, mahogany is felled from surrounding 
forests and sold mostly by Ugandan, Kenyan 
and Arab businessmen in neighbouring 
countries. Western Bahr el Ghazal’s second 
biggest town, Raja, depends almost entirely 
on trade with Khartoum. 
The population of Western Bahr el Ghazal 
is divided into three main groups; the Jur, 
the Fertit and a Dinka minority. Fertit is a 
term used by the Jur and Dinka to describe 
roughly 15 different groups.9 The Fertit never 
joined the SPLA in large numbers. Today, 
political affiliations among the Fertit are 
divided. The growing political and military 
divide between the Fertit, Jur and Dinka 
resulted in the segregation of the capital 
Wau into two areas – one for Fertit, one 
for Dinka and Jur – in the early 1990s. The 
SPLA eventually attacked Wau town in 1998; 
however the town remained under GoS 
control until the CPA was signed and it was 
not until 2007 that the SPLA officially arrived 
in Raja Town. 
Focussing on the political dynamics in a 
state that has divided political affiliations, 
the research team examined perceptions 
of political voice among people who feel 
marginalised in an SPLM-led Southern 
Sudan, due to their political history with the 
north. The team also spent time investigating 
the meaning of youth gangs for security. 
As the east of the state recently suffered 
from cattle-raiding, the team examined 
the dynamics of local cattle-raiding and 
the history of the peace and reconciliation 
process between the Jur, the Dinka and the 
Fertit. Following the trail of cattle-raiding, the 
team travelled to Tonj in Warrap and Cueibet 
in Lakes State to speak to cattle-keepers 
who are accused of raiding the Jur in Mapel. 
Visiting areas around Korgana, Bisselia 
and Marial Bei, the frictions between 
the residents of Western Bahr el-Ghazal 
state become clear. Grievances and CPA 
disappointments were tangible in tensions 
between the Fertit, Dinka and Jur and are 
particularly poignant in the group that has 
been one of the most maligned tribes in 
Southern Sudan in recent years: the Fellata 
(or Ambororo). The current state of the 
Fellata provided a multi-faceted insight into 
Southern Sudan’s aspirations of statehood, 
the use of scapegoats to cover government 
shortcomings and the direct impact of 
unclear administrative structures.
Raja County occupies a unique place in 
Southern Sudan, mainly because it is hardly 
connected to the rest of Southern Sudan. 
Roads to Raja Town are impassable for 
most of the year and the local community’s 
experience with both SPLA and SPLM is 
limited, having been entirely northern-run 
during the war. Facing an uncertain future as 
a border town or the centre of Sudan, Raja 
Town provided an interesting case study 
to understand the connections between 
politics of state-building and identity. In 
addition, Raja County has recently been 
under attack by the Ugandan Lord’s 
Resistance Army. 
One of the most prevalent issues in 
discussions with respondents was the 
north-south border. In Aweil North in 
Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, residents continue 
to be threatened by nomadic tribes who 
cross the contested north-south border to 
graze their cattle in the dry season. Recent 
interventions have aimed to develop a 
strategic peacemaking approach to solve 
the ongoing tension between Dinka Malual 
and Rizeigat.
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REthinKing ‘tRibAlisM’ 
‘Tribalism’ has become the default 
explanation for increased local violence in 
Southern Sudan. The description of local 
conflicts as tribal in nature is ubiquitous, but 
is in many respects misleading.10 The term 
‘tribal clash’ is applied with a broad brush, 
referring also to antipathies within a tribal 
group (such as the ongoing conflict between 
Dinka Gok and Dinka Rek in Warrap and 
Lakes States) or to a situation in which 
supposedly hostile tribes align to raid a 
common enemy. Even within those intra-
tribal clashes it is usually specific gangs that 
commit violence rather than an entire tribe. 
When interrogating the tribal label in 
connection to specific incidents of local 
violence, it seems clear that the ‘tribal’ 
affiliation is at best only one component 
of a complex web of political power, 
marginalization, competition over 
resources and unaccountable government 
structures. Although it is the case that 
there are situations in which cattle-raiding, 
competition over pastures, or claims over 
land were found to be associated with tribal 
groupings, that was by no means always 
the case. Sometimes localised disputes 
on closer examination were found to have 
links with, variously, political grudges, 
governmental failures or resource disputes 
having little to do with traditional divisions 
but more with new political realities. To 
a large extent, an emphasis on tribalism 
conflates the symptoms of underlying 
problems with their causes.
‘tribalism’ as a political tool
However, the ‘tribal’ label is extremely 
powerful, particularly for those who have 
an interest in rallying groups against each 
other to strengthen their own support base. 
Political power is an extremely scarce and 
highly valuable resource, available only 
periodically under specific conditions. In 
Southern Sudan, the Interim Period has 
provided those conditions. When particularly 
local politicians ‘tribalise’ their struggle for 
power – a phenomenon widely visible in 
the lead-up to the elections – ethnicity can 
become a contestable social resource and 
hence a possible catalyst for group strife and 
violent conflict. The sense that tribal divisions 
were deepening as politicians consolidated 
their positions was expressed in all research 
sites.11 This happens in two ways: some local 
politicians aimed to strengthen their power 
base by emphasising their tribal affiliation in 
opposition to another local tribal group. Or, 
tribal connections are used to emphasise 
direct lines to the central government. 
Groups who feel that they have lost 
out in the ‘tribal’ favouritism driving the 
government are experiencing a deepening 
sense of disconnection from what they 
expected Southern Sudan to become. This 
is compounded by an obvious and visible 
connection between power and wealth, 
which has resulted in widespread disillusion 
with some parts of the SPLM at both the 
political and population level. People who 
joined the movement with the expectation of 
being appointed to a position of power and 
failing to secure one are now returning to 
their original parties, such as NCP and USAP, 
or, as evident in the elections, attempted to 
secure power as independent candidates.12  
Fear of tribal domination and  
territorial expansion
Differing perceptions of the contributions of 
each group to the CPA cause deep divisions 
and it is easy to see how the politicisation of 
such feelings occurs. Indeed, in contested 
areas, many activities typically associated 
with Dinka identity become politicised. An 
example of this can be seen in Wau, where 
political power remains highly contested. 
Each cattle-raid that occurred in this region 
was portrayed by non-Dinka informants 
as an assertion of political supremacy by 
Dinka tribes. While this fear appears to be 
rooted in ‘tribal’ suspicion, closer analysis 
and discussion reveals that it is often driven 
by a governance vacuum and tensions over 
territory. A female leader who runs a local 
NGO in WBeG commented: 
You know, our Dinka, during the war, there 
was nothing. After CPA, they start fighting. 
I went to Mundri, there was a big farm. And 
Dinka of Bor took their cattle there. They ate 
everything. But the payam administrator said 
we have no choice. Dinka says it belongs 
to them and they have a gun. I went to Torit 
and I heard that there is now a payam in 
Nimule called Bor [Dinka town and Garang’s 
home] payam…For me I am thinking that 
they are thinking this Southern Sudan 
belongs to them. So they want to cover all 
the small tribes.13 
Among smaller tribes, fears of a Dinka-
dominated national government and Dinka 
territorial expansion are pervasive. Historical 
grievances may explain this perception. In the 
lead up to the signing of the CPA, the SPLA 
was dominated by the Dinka – despite the 
fact that prominent and rank-and-file non-
Dinka have always been part of the SPLA 
– while other militia groups were excluded 
from negotiations. This helped consolidate 
a sense of entitlement among the Dinka. A 
group of Ndogo elders in Bisselia in WBEG 
described how before the war, Dinka cattle-
keepers would request permission from the 
chief before grazing their cattle. Now they 
reportedly come and graze without asking, 
often damaging crops. The Ndogo attribute 
the change in behaviour to the SPLA’s 
dominance: ‘It was the formation of the SPLA 
that changed relations… The Dinka now 
disregard the law.’ 14 
The ‘main chief’ at Korgana in WBeG 
explained that: ‘The Dinka did not come 
here before the war. They have their own 
river, fish, and cattle. There is no reason why 
they should come here other than a pretext 
to cause ethnic tensions.’15 
Of course, a lot of tensions visible in 
Southern Sudan apparently contradict the 
idea that most ‘tribal’ tensions are the result 
of political manipulation. Even members of 
small tribes are acutely aware that a key 
element of Southern Sudan’s future is the 
ongoing tensions between, and within, the 
Nuer and Dinka populations. While this is 
a long-standing conflict that seems to be 
clearly demarcated along tribal lines, it is 
also the best example of such politisation 
of identities in which tribal belonging is 
emphasised whenever politically useful. 
Ideas about Nuer hegemony were, for 
example, enhanced when the historian 
of Southern Sudan, Douglas Johnson, 
brought back a ceremonial stick or dang 
in May 2009.16 The dang had been looted 
by British troops 80-years-ago, and 
belonged to the prophet Ngundeng Bong, 
who predicted a Nuer leader would rule an 
independent Southern Sudan.17 The dang 
is now described by some as a potent 
sign that will reinforce Nuer power. Such 
reassertion of authority is precisely the kind 
of manipulation evident on many levels and 
is cited regularly as a factor in inciting local 
violence. Jur Luo interviewed in WBeG, for 
example, expressed the belief that following 
the return of the stick, Nuer from Unity State 
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would move into Dinka territory in Warrap, 
pushing the Warrap Dinka cattle-raiders 
into WBeG Jur Luo areas. This is a fear that 
is clearly related to territory and resources, 
yet is explained with the tribal label. Some 
Nuer respondents expressed a renewed 
sense that they should be the ones leading 
the struggle. When asked, Equatorian 
respondents said that they do not believe 
in the prophecy, but they sometimes 
mentioned it as catalyst in the struggle for 
leadership, as both the Nuer and Dinka 
leaders feel entitled to lead Sudan.
‘tribal fighting’ versus ‘tribalism’
When fighting was not obviously about 
territory, those interviewed had complex and 
often contradictory ideas about the reasons for 
putative ‘tribal’ fighting. Many seemed to make 
a conceptual distinction between conflicts in 
which protagonists divided along traditional 
‘tribal’ lines and those involving ‘tribalism’. 
This distinction was not precise or consistent 
and might have at times been based on an 
individual translator’s view. Nevertheless, the 
notion of ‘tribalism’, or of tribal motivations 
being the main factor behind conflicts, 
tended to be viewed as something brought 
from outside the immediate community. In 
other words, many respondents perceived 
tribalism as a negative development that is not 
necessarily intrinsic to tribal relations.18 
The failure to build a functioning, democratic 
state was often attributed to ‘tribalism’.19 
Some of those interviewed went further and 
explicitly stated that ‘tribalism’ had become a 
political tool used by those in power. This view 
was expressed during a group discussion 
with Dinka residents of Marial Bei in WBeG: 
‘Tribalism is not for the old and illiterates like 
us in the villages but [the] educated like you 
who come from towns are the ones bringing 
tribalism.’20 When asked about relations with 
neighbouring tribes, the same respondents 
tended to base their evaluations on local group 
rather than tribal relations. 
tribal relations and views of the ‘other’
Opinions about neighbouring groups 
differed widely and were quite the opposite 
of entrenched ‘tribal’ hostility suggested 
by applying the label of ‘tribal conflict’. For 
example, a group of women in Marial Bei, 
WBeG, described their relationship with 
their neighbours, the Jur Luo, as ‘good’ 
because they had been displaced together 
and intermarriage was possible. Their 
neighbours on the other sides – the Zande 
– were also regarded as ‘good’ because the 
former Zande Minister of Agriculture often 
came to inform the women about farming.21 
However, discussion with the male elders of 
Marial Bei revealed different views. At first 
they asserted that there were really only 
two tribes: northerners and southerners. 
Any further division into tribal groups was 
understood as something introduced by 
government. As one man put it: ‘The people 
in the offices are the right people to talk 
about tribalism.’22 Yet, when asked about 
neighbouring tribes, elders seemed to 
possess certain preconceived tribally-based 
notions after all. They described the Jur 
Luo and Fertit as good people who allowed 
intermarriage but the Zande as: ‘…very bad 
people. They kill us and torture us when we 
go there.’23 Marial Bei was one of several 
places in which we found divergent opinions 
within a group.
Committing ‘tribal’ violence
Those who actually perpetrate ‘tribal’ 
violence are mostly young men.24 In several 
locations, young men were quite open 
about their need or demands for a range of 
things, from education to money, cattle and 
access to water. Occasionally they were 
disconcertingly straightforward about how 
they intended to secure such assets. 
It is thus no coincidence that some of the 
worst violence has occurred in drought-
prone regions with a scarcity of water points 
and grazing lands. Here competition for 
resources becomes intense and animals 
are concentrated. In these places, young 
men, often staying together in camps, 
end up raiding each other, sometimes 
with a shocking lack of constraint. Among 
other things, cattle-raiding is potentially an 
immediate way of improving their livelihoods. 
CAsE study: niMulE: 
A CAsE OF ‘tRibAlisM’ 
OR A lAnd disPutE? 
As a vibrant border town populated by Dinka 
IDPs, Madi returnees and SPLA soldiers, 
Nimule presents an example of the tensions 
resulting from post-war re-settlement, and 
could superficially be described as a tribal 
conflict. According to the narrative provided 
by a long time resident, Nimule fell to the 
SPLA in 1989. Before this, it had been under 
the control of Madi militias opposed to the 
SPLA. The Madi opposition to the SPLA 
reached its climax when Joseph Kebulu, an 
MP campaigning for elections, was killed 
at the Opare junction whilst travelling from 
Torit to Opare. The SPLA soldiers who 
killed Joseph Kebulu were Acholi, creating 
a division between the Acholi and Madi 
palpable to this day, particularly in Opare. 
The fall of Nimule to the SPLA in 1989 led to 
a Madi exodus into Uganda. 
During the 1990s, Dinka groups started 
fleeing Jonglei state and came to settle in 
Nimule. According to the chief of the Bor 
Dinka community, most settled from 1991-3, 
following the attacks by the Khartoum-
supported militia group ‘White Army’ under 
Riek Machar at Bor. Dinka interviewees 
stated they were told that Nimule town had 
been inhabited by Ugandan refugees from 
Idi Amin’s rule and that these had returned to 
Uganda, leaving the land unoccupied. Nimule 
became a garrison town, predominantly 
inhabited by SPLA soldiers and Dinka 
IDPs. After the CPA, Madi returnees started 
resettling in Nimule again and tensions 
increased. A common expression, explained 
a Madi elder, that is used to explain land 
disputes is that of a Madi seeing someone 
else: ‘…sitting under the mango tree I 
planted’ and harvesting its fruits.26 
Nimule is not only attractive for its cross-
border trade and a growing economy but 
also for its proximity to ‘safety’ as a strategic 
border town and access to education 
facilities in Uganda. The ‘Nimule Agreement’, 
designed to assist the return of Dinka IDPs 
(facilitated by Catholic Relief Services 
CRS and the International Organization for 
Migration – IOM), is considered relatively 
successful in soothing tensions. However, 
the Madi community feel the land issue 
has not been resolved because they are 
unable to occupy land that was historically 
theirs, as, for example, pointed out in an 
anonymous questionnaire response from 
Nimule: ‘It has not been resolved; peace for 
Madi will come only when Dinka leave. You 
have no rights if you have not fought. There 
is good business at the border, so they stay 
and trade and claim land.’27 Despite official 
statements reporting smooth transitions to 
peace, tension simmers.
Such incidents do not always relate to tribal 
divisions – as discussed in the section on 
cattle-raiding – but the adoption of  tribal and 
clan affiliations may provide opportunities 
that some individuals exploit. Previously 
weak or relatively unimportant distinctions 
between social groups suddenly take 
on new significance. The process is also 
exacerbated and facilitated by the availability 
of small arms.25  Automatic rifles were 
observed to be readily available to those who 
wanted them although in some cases they 
had to raid more cows first in order to pay for 
them. Other areas prone to ‘tribal’ clashes 
are those in which land rights remain unclear, 
for example in the town of Nimule.
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CAsE study: CAtEgORising 
COnFliCts: bEtwEEn 
gROuP idEntity, 
REsOuRCEs And Civil wAR
In southern Upper Nile, tensions continue 
to exist between the Lou Nuer and Jikany 
Nuer. On the surface, the conflict between 
the Lou and Jikany seems to be centred on 
control over resources. The towns of Nasser 
in the south-eastern corner of Upper Nile 
state, and Akobo, in the north-eastern part 
of Jonglei, are connected by the Sobat and 
Pibor Rivers, which mark the border with 
Ethiopia. Before the conflict began, Jikany 
territory extended as far south along the 
Pibor River as the village of Wanding near 
the border with Jonglei state and closer to 
Akobo than to Nasser. Traditionally during 
the dry season, with the acquiescence of 
local Jikany, the Lou took their cattle from 
Akobo north to Wanding, where water and 
grazing land were more plentiful. 
Conflict first began between the two tribes 
in 1993 as several factors coalesced. First, 
the fall of Mengistu in Ethiopia in 1991 meant 
the sudden loss of the SPLA safe haven in 
western Ethiopia. Within days, the refugee 
camps there were emptied as hundreds of 
thousands of Southern Sudanese refugees 
crossed the border. The sudden influx of 
refugees to Nasser and Akobo counties 
placed significant pressure on local land 
and local food stores. Increasing population 
pressure was compounded by a severe 
humanitarian crisis caused by drought 
in 1992 and 1993, leading to some Lou 
to attempt to settle more permanently at 
Wanding. With the Jikany under similar 
pressures, tensions escalated and eventually 
turned violent.
The split of the SPLA in 1991 also 
contributed to rising tensions between the 
two groups. The schism within the SPLA, 
combined with weak management by Riek 
Machar, Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong, led 
to insecurity in the area around the new 
faction’s Nasser headquarters. Loose 
control of local commanders helped the rise 
of local warlords, worsening the security 
situation. Once fighting commenced, the 
disintegration of authority in the area as a 
result of the SPLA split made it difficult to 
address the conflict and protect the local 
population. In the past few years, the Jikany 
have been gradually driven out of Wanding.
However, Lou population movements are 
not a straightforward land grab. The land 
south of Akobo in Jonglei state has been 
undergoing a gradual change in its water 
supply over the past several decades 
with no surface water available during dry 
season. As a result, the Murle roam widely 
in the area, pushing the Anuak into Ethiopia 
and putting pressure on the Lou. A lack of 
security also impacts traffic along the rivers 
to ‘landlocked’ Akobo. With their roads in 
poor shape or inaccessible and their river 
traffic vulnerable to problems upriver, the 
Lou feel isolated, under siege and excluded 
from the newly-built Southern Sudan. 
The issue of Wanding itself remains 
unresolved, even though its administration 
was officially returned to Nasir County 
of Upper Nile State in a January 2009 
ceremony. A multitude of issues feed into 
this conflict including population pressures, 
displacement, access to water, changing 
political loyalties and a history of warlordism. 
Compounding these tensions is a lack of 
local authority resulting from the legacy of 
conflict, a changing environment, a lack of 
infrastructure and lack of broader political 
participation in the state-building endeavour. 
The complexity and intersection of issues 
above demonstrates that classifying  
conflicts as instances of tribal or ethnic 
violence may produce an oversimplified 
understanding, and obscure issues that 
require deeper consideration. 
Using ‘tribalism’ or ‘tribal hatred’ as a simple 
explanatory device for local violence has 
a doubly damaging effect: it obscures the 
realities of conflict and shapes attempts to 
solve them. Defining violence in Southern 
Sudan as ‘tribal conflict’ has led to pervasive 
flawed logic. This logic has informed local 
peace initiatives, causing an emphasis on 
‘tribal’ issues and ‘tribal’ reconciliation, often 
with ‘chiefs’ whose authority, in turn, stems 
from emphasising such tribal divisions. 
Underlying political and structural issues that 
have evolved as a result of the space the 
CPA has opened up are not fully addressed.
COMPEting 
AdMinistRAtivE 
stRuCtuREs 
Southern Sudan’s journey from 2002, when 
CPA negotiations started, to 2010 has 
been remarkable. It has gone from being a 
full-blown war zone to a semi-autonomous 
region with achievements in creating a new 
government, building infrastructure and 
generally maintaining a state of no fighting 
between north and south. All of these 
developments took place under extremely 
difficult conditions. It is important to keep 
this in mind when addressing the numerous 
challenges ahead and analysing the reasons 
for continued local violence. In fact, one 
reason why local violence has increased 
lies in the work that is being done in 
Southern Sudan, some of which has created 
contradictions that have inadvertently 
created, rather than stemmed, violence.
Currently, Southern Sudan is experiencing 
a combination of development approaches 
and emergency aid, of state and peace-
building activities, of creating of new 
government structures while strengthening 
old governance systems. This breadth of 
activity has created competing or unclear 
ideas of what goal is to be achieved with 
each activity and ultimately over Southern 
Sudan’s future.
Such lack of clarity over the future is not 
surprising, considering that a major aspect 
of the CPA is to decide on the future. 
However, it also stems from the way the 
CPA came about. As a document, the CPA 
did not establish an identifiable way forward 
and it was signed for the southern side by 
a disunited SPLM with divergent ideas and 
under intense international pressure. In fact, 
all actors involved in the CPA, including 
donors and implementing agencies or 
NGOs, remain unclear as to what exactly the 
overarching ambition is beyond the ticking 
off of CPA milestones such as census, 
elections and the referendum.28  
There are two distinct reasons for this:  
a) the complexity of Southern Sudan puts 
an emphasis on CPA milestones as these 
are much easier to assess than more 
multifarious developmental processes and 
b) the CPA represents the lowest common 
denominator of what was acceptable 
not only between north and south but 
also within the SPLM.29 Despite Marxist 
tendencies, a lack of clear ideology has 
always been characteristic of the SPLM, yet 
Garang’s leadership infused the party with a 
semblance of a publicly unified goal.30 Since 
his death, the lack of ideology has become a 
more significant issue. Critics of the election 
process have pointed out that it brought to 
light that the SPLM’s main plan was forced 
consolidation of power, with a path towards 
democracy remaining distinctly ambiguous. 
‘government in a briefcase’
It is widely discussed in academic literature 
that the SPLM’s ideas about governing a 
civilian population in peace and democracy 
are not fully formed. ‘The SPLA was not 
planned from day one,’ said one government 
employee in the WBeG State Ministry for 
Education. ‘It was a spontaneous war with 
no proper documentations such as how they 
want the government to look like.’31 Another 
respondent, a former SPLA child soldier, 
stated that Garang’s vision had never been 
clear: ‘Dr John moved with his government 
in his briefcase. Now that he died nobody 
knows what he wanted and Salva Kiir has 
inherited little.’ 32 
The incredibly challenging transformation 
of political leadership in Southern Sudan 
is made yet more complex by the political 
history of Southern Sudan. Conflicting 
reconstruction approaches of peace and 
state-building and very difficult elections may 
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have added to a certain disconnect between 
citizens and their government. This creates 
an overwhelming sense of political volatility 
as was expressed during a focus group 
discussion with youth in Bisselia, WBeG:
During the war, the government was very 
strong. Now there’s no respect. The conflict 
between the north and the south was the 
only conflict...now you go to the next village 
and people will hassle you. Is this the way we 
will lead ourselves? Why aren’t our leaders 
leading in a good way?33 
This question is crucial to understanding 
current violence. A large majority of people 
in the three research sites believe that the 
best future for Southern Sudan lies with 
GoSS yet,there was also an overwhelming 
consensus that GoSS was struggling 
to mitigate conflict and, juggling various 
inter-party or personal tensions and donor 
relationships, might even increase volatility.34 
While government structures are being 
established, these do not necessarily reflect 
existing power relationships. 
As actual power is played out, administrative 
confusion arises, namely over which level of 
government is responsible for which kind of 
issue. The dissonance is growing between 
the government’s aspirations as the best 
representative of its citizens’ interests, as 
expressed in the Interim Constitution, and 
how Southern Sudanese experience their 
government. Most respondents expressed 
some doubt about government capacity 
and citizens were less than confident that 
their government could build peace despite 
expressing hope for improvement post-
referendum.35 Such lack of confidence 
creates space for behaviour that translates 
into increased local violence, behaviour that 
was suppressed during the war by powerful 
military leadership.
We asked 319 respondents when they 
had the best leaders compared with when 
people thought Southern Sudan was at 
peace. The data indicates that respondents 
perceived war leadership – namely John 
Garangs but also on a local level – as 
distinctly better than peace leadership. 
Despite the passage of years since the 
CPA was signed, the political leadership is 
still seen as delivering mixed messages on 
governance and broader visions. Even a 
respondent from the SSPC, the government 
authority mandated to deal with local 
conflicts, expressed little confidence that the 
government is pursuing peace and equality 
for all its citizens: ‘There is no focus on 
peace at all.’36
Contradictory approaches
The lack of focus on establishing a peaceful 
and democratic society does not necessarily 
reflect an overall reluctance of the SPLM to 
allow for a process of democratisation, as 
the approaching referendum is without a 
doubt the major motivation for consolidation 
of power. But it nonetheless adds to reasons 
for current incidents of local violence and 
several conflicting issues remain that need to 
be addressed.
Partly, the Interim Period has been and 
is treated as a time for state-building, an 
endeavour that includes establishing a new 
political democratic culture, government 
service delivery and an accountable state 
that honours the human rights it sets out in 
its Interim Constitution.37 Up to the elections, 
political appointments were naturally driven 
by personal connections, and a proliferation 
of unclear political structures has challenged 
the credibility of the nascent state. The 
elections, touted as the moment when 
Southern Sudanese citizens could voice 
their political preference, have fallen short of 
stabilising the path to democracy as state-
building measures have been largely overrun 
by power consolidation. Essential tools of an 
accountable and democratic state remain 
elusive, namely the monopoly on violence 
and means of recourse for citizens. 
This makes controlling violence near 
impossible. As concepts, both state-building 
and controlling violence should be mutually 
reinforcing. But in Southern Sudan things 
do not work like that. Southern Sudanese 
often claim that the very introduction of 
human rights as part of state-building has 
made controlling violence impossible, 
as quick capital punishment is no longer 
the ‘effective’ option it once was. During 
the war, localised random violence was 
less common because the army usually 
executed perpetrators without trial. While 
civilians suffered under army violence, the 
SPLA also protected civilians from such 
crimes as cattle-raiding. In addition, local 
violence tended to be more controlled during 
war times because people were joining 
together locally against bigger enemies. 
Today, the bigger enemy is harder to define 
and no credible actor exists to administer 
punishment in an accountable way. This 
means that violence is controlled or that 
conflicts are managed either by non-state 
actors or by state actors who do not follow 
the rules of law. 
Personal local political agendas in some 
cases support deliberate attempts to avoid 
controlling violence and in turn to prevent 
state-building as credible democratic 
structures might usurp the authority of 
those currently in power. So while state-
building and controlling violence ought to be 
two sides of the same coin, they currently 
often contradict each other. Further tension 
is created through a current emphasis 
on reform, evident in new government 
structures and democratic elections, while 
at the same time reinvigorating traditional 
indigenous structures with appointed or 
inherited leaders, commonly referred to as 
‘chiefs’.38 This is driven by a belief, grounded 
in the integration of traditional leaders into 
local government and Local Government 
Law and perpetuated by donors and NGOs, 
that structures seen as ‘indigenous’ need 
to be supported unquestionably. While this 
is partly true, it is problematic if it is done 
without challenging the accountability of 
such structures. Due to unclear governance 
structures both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
representatives can be given the same 
responsibilities, including the resolution of 
violent conflict.39 In addition, both ‘traditional’ 
and ‘modern’ leaders stand to lose if 
the attempted government reforms are 
accomplished, which has created a situation 
in which those who do hold power – from 
the very local to the state-level – are very 
reluctant to change the status quo. While 
theoretically, traditional and state authorities 
are joined in government, in reality they often 
play out as various versions of governance. 
ChARt: whEn did sOuthERn sudAn hAvE  
thE bEst lEAdERs? 
When did you have 
the best leaders?
When was Southern 
Sudan at peace?
20
05
(n=319)
20
06
20
07
20
09
20
08
0
50
100
150
200
250
Pr
ot
ra
cte
d 
wa
r y
ea
rs 
19
89
 – 
20
04
Ea
rly
 w
ar
 ye
ar
s 1
98
3 
– 1
98
8
Du
rin
g 
th
e A
dd
is 
Ab
ad
a  
Ag
re
em
en
t 1
97
2 
– 1
98
2
Note: 25 people 
answered that they 
have never had  
good leaders
28 29
The combination of ‘modernisation and 
‘traditionalisation’, change and status quo, 
has left the population confused about the 
role and boundaries of power of authorities. 
One striking example is the confusion that 
exists around judicial matters. While in some 
areas modern and traditional authorities 
are working together constructively to 
improve security, in others the lack of clarity 
regarding responsibilities has created a 
situation in which there is no credible actor 
to solve issues of local conflict and violence.
Ultimately, a combination of various 
approaches and personal interests has 
created a tension in what the GoSS 
demands of its citizens. While the 
democratic state-building framework, and 
particularly the recent call to the ballot, 
creates a theoretical need for politically 
responsible citizens, the leadership’s interest 
in maintaining the status quo degrades 
the citizens to subjects, using Mahmood 
Mamdani’s language.40 The degradation 
to subject results in a lack of political voice 
and a disconnect with the government. In 
many ways, this degradation to subject and 
government-citizen disconnect is, however, 
not an aberration of the governance system, 
it is in fact the continuation of a governance 
system that is firmly rooted in Sudan’s  
recent history. 
Southern Sudan’s more recent experience 
of political administration is one of intense 
marginalisation. With power firmly held in 
Khartoum, decision-making became a 
centralised affair and interest in the periphery 
was mainly focused on controlling the 
margins in order to avoid challenges to the 
centre’s power. This was mainly done through 
maintaining selected tight connections to 
local elites. It seems that currently, the model 
is being replicated as the southern political 
establishment solidifies an elite network in 
order to control the new periphery i.e. any 
place outside the new centre of power, Juba. 
The systematic disconnection between 
citizens and government sentiment is widely 
echoed in civil society criticism of how the 
elections were conducted, despite the fact 
that expectations of the level of accountability 
the elections could achieve were consistently 
lowered.41 It is, however, also important to 
note that election violence was a lot less than 
might have been expected locally and some 
genuine democratic processes were evident 
in which leading political figures were voted 
out of office. 
While the goals of state-building and 
controlling violence or modernisation and 
traditionalisation aim to achieve conflicting 
outcomes, they are not a matter of clear 
opposites. Nuances make each goal 
both a precursor to and a result of the 
accomplishment of the other. This highlights 
the difficulty in establishing an appropriate 
entry point for any activity that controls local 
violence and the circularity is mirrored in 
future expectations of conflict. 
Expectations of further war and conflict
Khartoum is commonly used as a scapegoat 
for explaining local conflict, including cattle-
raiding or localised violence. However, in 
contrast with allocating blame to Khartoum, 
respondents to a survey conducted in 
the three research sites had almost the 
same level of expectation of future south-
south violence as north-south violence. 
An example of why attention should turn 
to south-south dynamics was given by 
the Sudanese head of a Sudanese NGO 
struggling with cattle-raiding in Greater BeG:
Is Khartoum interested in taking the cattle? 
[The SPLA] know who is taking the cattle, 
but they are pointing the finger. If the guns 
are coming from the north, then you can 
control the borders. How can a person from 
Khartoum incite a local chief here?42
 
We asked 319 people whether they 
expected further war with the north and 
further conflicts within the south even after 
the referendum, regardless of its outcome. 
We also asked respondents whether they 
expect fighting to break out among southern 
groups after the referendum. Despite 
Khartoum being blamed for much local 
conflict, the answers indicate southerners 
are aware of their own potential for violence. 
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REFlECtiOns On thE 
REFEREnduM
Expectations of south-south conflict are 
fuelled by the fact that no unanimous 
consensus exists among southerners 
regarding what is in the best interests of their 
country. The vision of what the referendum 
ought to deliver features prominently in this 
assumption. In reality, while a majority vote 
in favour of unity is improbable, desires 
diverge with regard to secession, particularly 
in areas with strong connections to the 
north. In WBeG, concerns about continued 
northern oppression versus the perceived 
administrative weaknesses of GoSS make 
the decision increasingly complex, and 
one fifth of respondents in Greater Bahr 
el-Ghazal stated that they would vote for 
unity.43 In both Upper Nile and Eastern 
Equatoria, the vote for independence  
was clearer. 
Each scenario holds potential for intra-south 
violence and fighting among southerners 
seems widely expected. Remarkably, those 
wanting to vote for unity came from many 
different tribes, including Dinka from WBeG 
who said that they felt better in a unified 
Sudan. Interviewees in EES on the other hand, 
who are often assumed to be very critical of 
an SPLM-led unity,44 seemed convinced that 
the referendum would result in an independent 
Southern Sudan, while a negative vote on 
the referendum was locally synonymous with 
the failure of the CPA and a need to take up 
arms against the north again. This assertion 
was made consistently with a number of 
respondents stressing that if independence 
was not achieved by vote, it would be achieved 
by violence. This view is expressed, for 
example, in the following answers:
There must be an independent south, 
violently or not, otherwise we will be 
enslaved again.45 (Response on an 
anonymous questionnaire)
The referendum can bring an eruption of 
conflict. If they impose Islam, then there 
will be war.46 (Director of the Toposa 
Development Association)
The government said they collected enough 
guns; they left the others so we can use 
[them] for an eventual dispute with the 
north.47 (Kapoeta north boma ‘chiefs’)
It is thus too simplistic to assume that tribal 
allegiance or a history of alienation between 
Nilotic and Equatorian tribes dictates political 
beliefs. What seems instead to be needed 
is a reinterpretation of the meaning of the 
referendum because it is rather the case 
that the referendum is seen as a hugely 
important symbolic and dynamic event for 
Southern Sudan.
Referendum as a moment for change 
Indeed, some respondents pointed out 
that the single-issue debate, centred on the 
question of whether the outcome would be 
unity or separation, was misleading. The 
referendum is viewed as an opportunity 
to incite, push and support lasting change 
within the south. Indeed, some pointed out 
that GoSS was muffling its own support 
for separation by pitting the referendum 
debate solely against the north, rather than 
encouraging a credible and diverse political 
system to foster political debate and give a 
glimpse of a different political culture. Criticism 
about the way elections were conducted has 
made this point even more important. 
Just as expectations of violence come with 
each possible referendum scenario, some 
respondents expressed that either way 
they would lose out. Such sentiments are 
particularly strong in Raja County where 
people are very aware that they will be voting 
to be either a county in the centre of Sudan 
or on the frontier of a new sovereign state. 
Separation might escalate local conditions, 
said a UN officer in Raja Town, leading to 
closure of the borders.48 Respondents in 
Raja made clear that voting for unity or 
separation meant voting to cut off or keep 
their supply lines. As a local SPLM official 
put it, ‘If there is no separation, Raja will 
suffer. If there is separation, Raja will suffer.’49 
Yet for some, the symbolic strength of a 
clear vote for separation is more important 
than immediate economic improvement 
and development. ‘Chiefs’ in Northern 
Bahr el-Ghazal, for example, were less 
than enthused about the revival of the 
railway between Khartoum and Aweil. 
Rather than hail it as a big step towards 
establishing a transport infrastructure, in 
their minds it expresses a threat and tightens 
a connection with the North that they do 
not want – and it brings back memories of 
Rizeigat fighters riding the trains to attack 
and abduct children.50 
However, a Fertit elder in Wau pointed out 
that some Fertit felt the strict binary identity of 
north versus south was counterproductive in 
supporting the idea of a diverse Sudan, and 
indeed was simply not applicable to them 
because: ‘…many families…have members 
from the north and south’ and thus feel 
neither distinctly southern nor northern.51  
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In general, respondents saw potential for violence with each possible outcome of the referendum.
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In Raja, the most northerly town in Western 
Bahr el-Ghazal, people expressed serious 
concerns about southern secession. Four 
issues were highlighted in interviews and 
discussions: 1) Raja’s history as an NCP 
stronghold 2) the area’s close cultural and 
economic connection with the north 3) the 
perception among the population that they 
are not benefiting from the CPA and 4) the 
remoteness of the SPLM administration.52 The 
SPLA entered Raja Town for a brief period in 
2001 and were fought back by SAF. Under 
the CPA, SPLA troops only arrived in Raja 
in 2007. During a group discussion, a youth 
leader argued that by staying together with the 
north, the south would fulfil Garang’s vision: 
‘When Dr John started the movement, he 
wanted to rule all of Sudan from Nimule to the 
border with Egypt. So what is better now?’ 
asked a youth leader in Raja Town. ‘He wanted 
to liberate Sudan, not Southern Sudan. It is 
SPLA, not SSPLA. So Sudan is one, Sudan is 
unity. When your father has started something 
and he passes away, you have to finish.’53 
SPLM officials echoed that view: ‘Dr John’s 
vision is calling for unity and we are working for 
unity. If not unity, we are going on to liberate 
our people in the North. Let the Arabs agree 
with what we want. Let’s first make Southern 
Sudan independent and then we take the 
North. When those of East and West call for 
their rights, we will unite Sudan.’54 
A local religious leader pointed out that 
independence had less political meaning, 
but strong practical implications for everyday 
living: ‘Independence also means being 
independent from outside resources,’ he 
said,55 echoing what had been expressed 
by the mainly northern traders in the market: 
‘I think dividing Sudan will make us suffer 
more, there is no factory in Southern Sudan, 
so where will traders get goods from? It 
will make our life difficult. One Sudan will 
excel in business and cross-state taxes will 
not be there.’ 56 The local NCP chairman 
also emphasized the strength of a united 
economy: ‘If we don’t vote for unity, every 
single company here comes from the North, 
every business. If we will separate, where will 
we get our goods?’57 
However, others point out that this line of 
reasoning just means that the north now 
uses the systematic underdevelopment 
of the south as an argument against its 
independence. ‘My opinion is if Sudan is 
divided into two, factories are not created 
by God, they can only be created here,’ said 
one man. ‘Now they are not here because of 
northerners but it can be created.’58 
Closely connected with perceptions of 
separation and unity are issues of identity. 
In Raja, a place of close alliances with 
Darfur and tenuous connections with Juba, 
people are very aware that separation could 
possibly mean cultural isolation for them 
in a newly independent Southern Sudan 
and indeed leave them exposed without 
protection. Residents in Raja speak an 
Arabic dialect closer to the northern dialects 
and distinctly different from Juba Arabic.
‘We only take small culture from south and 
big culture from Darfur,’ explained a religious 
leader in Raja.
‘And Southern Sudan is very big. When 
people come from Juba, they think I am an 
Arab. I wear a Jallabiah and I pray in the 
mosque. Our culture is not really like southern 
culture, it is more like northern.’59 
A woman’s group in Raja lamented the 
fact that they did not see any connections 
between them and southern women and 
having only spoken Arabic until very recently, 
saw no way of bridging the divide: 
‘We can differentiate: we look like Arab 
women and even if we are called to Juba, 
we are different. We are like Arabs and we 
want to be like African women, so we need 
to have someone teach us. When we go to 
Juba, nobody insults us, but we ourselves 
are in a different culture. We are ashamed 
of ourselves. We cannot link up with other 
women because language is a problem. But 
from here to north is far. From here to south 
is far. We are in between.’60 
Because GoSS has failed to deliver services, 
hopes were high that voting for unity in the 
referendum would mean that the north, 
which is seen as having stronger government 
capacity, could no longer continue its politics 
of under-serving the south and ultimately, 
the south would benefit from unity. This view 
seemed quite separate from any personal 
opinions held about President Bashir. The 
perception was that a streamlined political 
system would mean a much stronger national 
voice for the electorate. One youth leader 
put it like this: ‘The advantage is the national 
election, so Bashir will not rule forever. Bush 
comes, Bush goes, Obama comes, and 
Obama goes.’61
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dEvElOPing gOvERnMEnt 
stRuCtuREs
The CPA gave two tasks to the GoSS: 
establish southern government institutions 
and make unity attractive. This was a 
contradictory endeavor from the start as 
these are essentially two opposing projects. 
This contradiction might have helped 
create the current government’s unclear 
structures which have a direct impact on 
local violent conflict. Current activities of 
state-building, pacification, modernisation 
and traditionalisation have created a 
transitory situation in which it is not clear 
how conflicts should be handled now or 
how they will be handled in the future. One 
problem is that actors that were set up 
to institute peace within Southern Sudan 
have unclear roles and responsibilities. An 
obvious example of this is the undefined 
relationship between two of the more 
prominent peace actors, the Southern 
Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) Peace 
and Reconciliation Committee and the 
SSPC. The lack of clear mandates and job 
descriptions has resulted in confusion of 
what the roles are. Many interviewees had 
rather abstract and idealised views of the 
SSPC’s responsibility, for example. When 
asked in a ranking exercise who the best is 
at bringing peace to Southern Sudan, many 
respondents voted for the SSPC but were 
then unable to describe what the SSPC 
really was and how it could bring peace.62 
By remaining such an abstract entity, it is 
difficult for local authorities and communities 
to support the actions of the SSPC or to 
hold it accountable. One reason for this lack 
of vision in regards to government structures 
and responsibilities might be found in a lack 
of lessons from the past. 
background: the lack of viable historical 
models for southern sudan’s future
Of models from the past that might shape 
Southern Sudan’s future, two dominate 
the discussion: an autonomous region and 
native administration. Both are frequently 
mentioned by those interviewed and both 
are imbued with a degree of mythical status.
An Autonomous Region
This more recent and perhaps more 
obvious model is derived from memories 
of what occurred after Southern Sudan 
was established as an autonomous state 
following the Addis Ababa Agreement of 
1972. A plethora of aid agencies became 
involved in what was only the second mass 
voluntary return of refugees assisted by the 
United Nations.63 At the time, international 
support for returning refugees was a 
sensitive matter due to Cold War tensions 
and the Palestine/Israel issue. So, when it 
became possible to support a mass return 
movement by allowing an ad hoc extension 
to the powers of the High Commissioner 
for Refugees, there was a great deal of 
interest in making it work. Despite problems 
with the delivery of assistance, it was 
nevertheless deployed quickly and sustained 
for several years.64 Indeed, in some parts 
of Southern Sudan, aid agencies remained 
very active right through the outbreak of 
war in 1983. This was especially true in 
parts of the Equatorias, where similarities 
with populations in Uganda and Kenya and 
large numbers of English speakers, made 
for more straightforward aid work relative to 
areas in Northern Sudan. This situation was 
not, however, without consequences.
The concentration of aid activities in 
places such as Yei, Torit and Juba during 
the l970s and early 1980s was a factor 
that fed tensions between Southern 
Sudanese groups and contributed to the 
ultimate failure of regional autonomy. On 
the one hand, educated people from the 
Equatorias enjoyed most of the employment 
opportunities afforded by NGOs and UN 
agencies and thus resented any efforts to 
redirect resources away from their areas.65 
Ambitious Equatorians complained bitterly 
about ‘Dinka’ domination in the Regional 
Assembly and there was talk of a ‘Nilotic’ 
faction allegedly dominating Southern 
Sudanese politics which was seen to be 
an obstacle to progressive change. On the 
other hand, groups in the greater Upper Nile 
region and Bahr el-Ghazal felt that peace 
benefits (which later would be somewhat 
mistakenly renamed ‘peace dividends’66) had 
largely accrued in the Equatorias.
These divisions became ever more 
intense during the late 1970s. They were 
compounded by competition for scarce 
funds, as more and more of the budget that 
was supposed to be supplied by Khartoum 
to the regional government in Juba went 
largely unpaid, year on year. By the turn 
of the 1980s, political factions in the north 
were openly manipulating conflicts in the 
south, and president Nimeri himself, who 
had pushed through the Addis Ababa 
Agreement despite intense opposition from 
many northern Sudanese politicians, was 
forced into alliances with opponents of 
southern regional autonomy and enthusiasts 
of Islamisation.67 Nimeri and his new allies 
began supporting demands from a group 
of Southern Sudanese politicians for 
division of the south into three regions. This 
group became known as the ‘Equatoria 
faction’, though members also included 
representatives of Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper 
Nile (including some Dinka representatives). 
Arguing that a more decentralised 
government would be more accountable 
and effective at absorbing aid, the Equatoria 
faction also expected that re-division would 
break the power of a particular group of 
Dinka who were seen to be exploiting the 
existing regional administration for their 
own interests. Re-division was pushed 
through, even though a majority of southern 
parliamentarians were opposed to it. Almost 
immediately, Dinka traders were expelled 
from Juba, which in part triggered the Bor 
mutiny that led to the formation of the SPLA. 
Generally, there is a tendency to blame the 
collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement on 
politicians in Khartoum and to assume that 
in the present context, full independence 
will lead to better results following the 
referendum. The failure of the regional 
autonomy experiment and the southern 
divisions that opened up at that time helps 
explain why a return to the kind of solution 
attempted in the 1970s and 1980s is now 
rarely mentioned. Yet there are indications 
that some of the issues that emerged 
during the years of regional autonomy 
are resurfacing, such as the inability or 
unwillingness of southern politicians to put 
regional interests above their own, which 
opened the space for Khartoum to work 
against southern unity. People returning from 
exile in East Africa fluent in English continue 
to secure the majority of well-paid jobs with 
aid agencies and civil service, and concerns 
about Dinka domination are commonly 
expressed.71 There are other lessons from 
the challenges of the early 1980’s, especially 
regarding the dangers of ethnic politics and 
of concentrating economic opportunities 
in certain places or among certain groups 
– namely among the elites congregating 
in Juba.72 If Southern Sudan becomes 
independent and gains recognition by the 
government in Khartoum, then a common 
hostility towards the north will no longer 
serve to ameliorate the dangers of intra-
south divisions by uniting it.73 
Native Administration
If the Addis Ababa period is not a viable 
model, can a system of administration be 
derived from the period of colonial rule, 
as has been done, with varying results, 
in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania or 
Uganda? To a surprisingly large extent, it is 
indeed to this earlier period that reference is 
frequently made, or from which ideas about 
today’s governance are drawn. To some 
extent, this is a consequence of the CPA 
itself, because it mentions borders in place 
at independence in 1956. But reference is 
now made persistently to the 1956 borders 
in ways that relate to much more than the 
demarcated ‘north’ and ‘south’ and greater 
Upper Nile, Bahr el-Ghazal and Equatoria 
regional borders, i.e., those boundaries 
specifically mentioned in the CPA. The 
boundaries and references to 1956 are 
linked to an idea that the clock has to be 
put back and everything begun again. 
Old administrative divisions are frequently 
mentioned and are associated with the 
districts once administered by British 
officials. There is an assumption that county 
and newly created sub-county boundaries 
should follow those old boundary lines. 
This perspective poses several problems. 
There are no maps available from this period to 
show where demarcations occurred at county 
and sub-county level, and conspiracy theories 
circulate about where the maps are and who 
has hidden them.74 Research indicates that 
no such maps existed for most of Southern 
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Sudan from the mid 1950s, and those 
available from the Sudan Archive in Durham 
from the 1940s were, for the most part, drawn 
much earlier and lack sufficient detail.75 
Of greater concern is the emphasis on what 
the situation was like in 1956, which evokes 
both an overly romantic version of British rule 
and links these alleged 1956 borders with 
tribal categories. It is as if there was a kind of 
stable or ‘correct’ ethnic grid that needs to be 
recovered to resolve current claims on territory 
and resources. Matters are compounded 
by an emphasis on the role that putative 
‘traditional chiefs’ should play in everything 
from resolving conflicts and disarmament to 
dealing with marriage disputes and monitoring 
the delivery of services.76 
Given the current emphasis on how 
things are thought to have been before 
independence, it is worth reflecting briefly 
on what Southern Sudan was actually like in 
the first half of the twentieth century. What 
is commonly referred to as ‘the period of 
British rule’ was technically no such thing. 
Following the demise of the Mahdist state at 
the battle of Omdurman in 1898, Sudan did 
not become a colony or a protectorate but 
rather something unique: the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium. The reason for this was that 
Egypt had laid claim to Sudan before the rise 
of the Mahdi, and the claim was recognised 
by the British in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
of 1899. Britain was to administer Sudan 
on behalf of the King of Egypt, who was 
himself under British domination.77 The 
British Governor General reported to the 
Foreign Office through its resident agent in 
Cairo, rather than to the Colonial Office in 
London. However, in practice he directed the 
condominium government from Khartoum 
as if it were a colonial administration. 
In what is now thought of as Southern 
Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian administration was 
minimal in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. British officials tried to locate 
‘chiefs’ who would make tribute payments 
to the government, and there was a good 
deal of forced conscription into the army 
in some areas. Raiding and confiscation of 
property such as cattle was punishment 
for those who resisted. One challenge was 
that some groups such as the Nuer, who 
persistently opposed British authority, did 
not have ‘chiefs’ in the way that British 
officers imagined all Africans should. Some 
of the last British African campaigns of 
violent pacification occurred as a result. In 
1917, for example, a punitive expedition was 
launched against the Lou Nuer. It is reported 
that 108 male prisoners were taken in 
addition to 4,496 cattle, 3,000 sheep and a 
large quantity of millet.78 Attacks of this kind 
continued until the late 1920s, when the Lou 
Nuer were ordered to settle in two locations, 
and all those who refused were considered 
fair game for marauding army patrols. 
Several Nuer leaders were killed, including 
the most important prophet, and the people 
were forced into submission.
From the end of the 1920s, British 
administration became more intensive 
in other parts of Southern Sudan and 
Christian missionaries were encouraged 
to extend their activities.79 British officials 
adopted a strategy to minimise Egyptian 
influence, which was formalised in 1930 
when the British Civil Secretary of the 
Anglo-Egyptian government enacted 
the ‘Southern Policy’.80 Ostensibly, the 
policy was a response to the discovery of 
clandestine slave-raiding taking place in 
Bahr el-Ghazal by northern traders. The aim 
was to ‘protect’ the African, non-Muslim 
population from their Arabised northern 
neighbours by building up: ‘…a series of 
self-contained racial or tribal units with 
structure and organisation based upon…
indigenous customs, traditional usage and 
beliefs.’81 As in other parts of Africa under 
British control, a system of indirect rule was 
set up which was commonly referred to as 
‘native administration’ in Sudan. In Southern 
Sudan this policy was taken to extremes in 
an attempt to prevent the spread of Islam 
and to allow the ‘primitive’ populations to 
adjust to the modern world gradually while 
preserving their customary way of life. The 
tension between local government and the 
‘traditional’ systems has existed ever since.82 
In the north of Sudan, efforts had been 
made to re-establish the families of those 
who held positions of authority before the 
Mahdist uprising against Turkish/Egyptian 
rule. Individuals from these families were 
recognised as ‘chiefs’ and sultans. Where 
possible, such a strategy was replicated in 
the south, but in many cases ‘chiefs’ needed 
to be ‘created’ because no such traditional 
figures existed. It was also discovered that 
‘racial or tribal units’ were both more varied 
and difficult to discern than anticipated. 
Confusingly, the Shilluk and the Azande had 
large kingdoms. If these were to be called 
‘tribes’, could they be compared with the 
many different Nuer and Dinka clan clusters? 
Is each of these clan clusters ‘tribes’? 
Was the Shilluk reth (king) the equivalent 
of a chief? And then what about all the 
numerous smaller groups, often speaking 
different languages? Was each of these a 
separate tribe? The result was the invention 
of hybrid ‘traditional’ systems, drawing 
on local customs and responding to the 
requirements of the government, which had 
to be tailored to fit local circumstances. 
Someone appointed as a Shilluk chief could 
do little without reference to the Shilluk reth 
(king) whereas someone appointed as a Dinka 
chief might have considerably more authority 
if he was accepted as a leader by his clan. In 
either case, such a figure was only accessible 
to the British officials in the dry season. He 
would migrate with the cattle during the rains 
to places that government officials could not 
easily reach. Meanwhile, particularly in what 
became the Equatorias, neighbouring groups 
could be tremendously diverse. For example, 
among some groups, those appointed as 
‘traditional chiefs’ were linked to rain-making 
and other ritual capacities, while other groups 
organised themselves along age set systems, 
and a chief’s authority might only by accepted 
by his own age cohort. In places where ‘chiefs’ 
(and the courts at which they were required 
by the government to raise taxes and impose 
fines) were accessible all year round, British 
administrators closely monitored what was 
happening. Under these conditions, mostly in 
Equatoria, increasingly complex bureaucracies 
evolved during the later decades of the 
Condominium, including local parliaments of 
elders. However, such arrangements were 
entirely absent elsewhere.
In general terms, the effects of the ‘southern 
policy’ included acute limitations on 
economic and educational development 
as compared to the north or other parts 
of British Africa. In order to ‘protect’ the 
southerners, even labour migration was 
restricted. Additionally, the use of tribal 
categories and the cooption of ‘chiefs’ 
tended to reify particular indigenous 
customs and promote practices and beliefs 
associated with selected male hierarchies. 
Certain ethnic identities were fostered, 
formalised and exaggerated. The approach 
to administration was somewhat altered 
from the late 1940s, by which time it was 
becoming apparent that the Condominium 
arrangement with Egypt might not be 
sustainable. Rumbek received a secondary 
school in 1947 and various investments 
were made in economic development 
projects. One notable example of this was 
the Zande scheme – a pilot project which 
attempted to raise tribal living standards 
by: ‘…the promotion of a ‘healthy market’ 
and the establishment of manufactures 
throughout the Southern Sudan’.83 Yet, it 
proved impossible to reverse the policy 
of effectively cocooning Southern Sudan 
before independence in 1956. 
Thus, unlike some other territories that 
have sought or achieved recognition as 
states, Southern Sudan does not have a 
historical template that can be readily evoked 
to promote a cohesive southern identity. 
Memories of regional autonomy and the 
current mythologising of the Condominium era 
do not provide an ideal starting point for the 
formation of a new nation. More readily they 
seem to provide a precedent for a system of 
localised or decentralised governance, and 
ominously, a system that could shift readily 
towards the establishment of ethnic fiefdoms 
by equating ethnicity with government 
structures and access to resources.84 
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When asked about their personal safety, 
respondents expressed two parallel 
experiences. While day-to-day life has 
generally become safer, a sense of 
increased uncertainty and continued threat 
among interviewees was noticeable in all 
three research sites.85 This threat is not 
constant but it is noticeably less predictable 
than during wartime when insecurity was 
common and respondents were prepared 
for violence. Since the CPA, a continuing 
but unpredictable threat of violent attack 
has created a permanent, low-level anxiety, 
as, for example, expressed by a group of 
women in EES: ‘We live in fear. Is it true that 
this peace will exist? There is no day that 
you do not hear gunshots.’86 
Fifty-three per cent of 319 survey 
respondents stated that they currently have 
an enemy they consider a threat to their 
personal security. This upsurge in internal 
conflict in Southern Sudan was particularly 
disturbing to many respondents because of 
the perception that the violence had taken 
a more intense form and that new trends 
were emerging. Women and children were 
more readily targeted during attacks, such 
as in Upper Nile in 2009, or attacks were 
well-planned and carried out in military style, 
such as in EES’s Lauro in 2007.87 Changes in 
the style and tactics of attacks must indicate 
that people are aware when an attack by 
their own group is impending. For example, 
it is quite unlikely that hundreds of Lou youth 
in Upper Nile could go missing from the 
Akobo area without local government and 
traditional leaders at the very least being 
aware, if not actively assisting, their activity.88 
Indeed, an INGO respondent stated that 
there are no doubts about awareness 
among community and government leaders, 
stating that ‘chiefs’ and/or commissioners: 
‘…know and also communicate with each 
other, and sometimes intervene.’89 Such 
intervention can take the form of supporting 
or trying to stop an impending attack.
Respondents also reported the perceived 
increase of outside threats, such as the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, the Fellata or the 
Kenyan army on the Eastern Equatoria 
international border. Yet most violence 
is not executed by large-scale attack by 
outside threats but is based on simmering 
local conflicts, many of which are rooted in 
challenging administrative developments. 
hOw dECEntRAlisAtiOn 
And AdMinistRAtivE 
divisiOn FuEls COnFliCt
Both of the Sudanese wars were fought over 
marginalisation of the periphery through 
political and economic centres of power; 
the CPA and many government documents 
emphasise the need for decentralisation 
and devolution of power. There are obvious 
and indisputable benefits to decentralising 
government in such a vast and diverse 
territory.90 But decentralisation is certainly 
not undisputed in its ability to stem conflict 
and in fact, evidence from, for example, 
Uganda, shows that decentralisation rather 
fuels conflict on the local level.91 The same 
is currently happening in Southern Sudan 
because decentralisation is not pursued 
convincingly and is abused for local power 
struggles which cause violent conflict. 
The strong emphasis on decentralisation has 
made the challenges in implementing it even 
more pronounced, said, for example, an 
international employee of an INGO: ‘GoSS 
was very clear about devolution…but it has 
not happened in practice.’92 
A donor representative pointed out the 
tremendous challenges in decentralising 
a fledgling government because achieving 
decentralisation: ‘…is difficult, given they do 
not even have a central government. They 
are just doing it because it is in the CPA 
and in the Interim Constitution.’ In many 
ways, the new government, having had to 
start from the centre, has created a new 
periphery within the south. 
However, theory and practice are currently 
at odds with each other as the emphasis on 
decentralisation has in many areas become 
instrumental in entrenching ‘tribal’ lines 
over competition of resources. In many 
ways, smaller counties can be seen as the 
ultimate manifestation that decentralisation 
works to devolve along political lines. Yet 
the current state of decentralising political 
powers in Southern Sudan exemplifies how 
theory and reality of politics pulls Southern 
Sudan in opposite directions. Momentum 
for increased administrative fragmentation 
is developing at the same time as decision 
power is firmly held at the centre, creating 
a situation in which decentralisation seems 
to primarily signify a localised power grip 
over resources, rather than localised political 
decision-making.94 While some county and 
state governments are more active than 
others, it was generally seen as a problem 
that state and county-level decision-making 
is not as strong yet as it could be. 
In a group discussion with a collection of 
chiefs in Wau, one representative explained 
the reality of the current situation from 
a local perspective: ‘Now everything 
starts from the top. Every law is handed 
from the President to the Governor to the 
Commissioner. Nothing is coming from 
Commissioner; everything is coming from 
the top.’95 With the tacit understanding – so 
prevalent in most of the south – that any 
real change or decision can only come 
from the President, those at the top as well 
as the bottom inadvertently boycott the 
idea of a multi-tiered government.96 For 
citizens, meaningful political decentralisation 
is invisible due to Juba’s role as power 
centre, while decentralisation has become 
synonymous with dividing up and claiming 
ownership of land of local government 
authorities who act in the interest of their 
own community. The local situation is further 
confused by competing authorities between 
government and party representatives, as an 
international officer of an INGO explained:
A major problem is that in payams there 
are two village leaders, one who is the local 
authority and another who has been assigned 
by the SPLM. This causes problems as both 
people are vying for authority and often 
times neither person has the single legitimate 
authority.97  
Two schools of thought dominate the local 
narrative on administrative division. One says 
that this is a natural process in emerging 
democracies based on local-level power 
struggles both at the level of representation 
and at the grassroots. Ultimately, this is 
seen as a settling process as groups of 
people are represented by leaders with 
whom they identify. Some respondents 
pointed out that the current divisions are a 
northern legacy and were not carried out 
along lines that make sense to local people. 
This group believes that fragmentation is 
a realisation of Garang’s vision to take the 
town to rural areas, a belief expressed, for 
example, by a group of elders in Jur River 
County in WBeG: ‘It is important to have 
new counties because we want to take 
power to the people. Everyone should have 
a responsibility in the area where they are so 
they can develop this area by themselves.’98 
The alternative view is that this fragmentation 
will undermine unity in the south and make 
it less feasible to govern Southern Sudan 
as an independent state. A Sudanese 
NGO director summed up this sentiment: 
‘everyone wants their own county, each tribe 
wants their own commissioner, Southern 
Sudan is dividing but it is unity we need.’99 
Some advocates of this position believe that 
the main driver of fragmentation is patronage 
politics from Khartoum used to secure 
support or as an extension of the ‘divide 
and rule’ policy implemented during the war. 
Others believe that it is the ethnicisation of 
politics at the local level, where counties are 
being drawn along tribal lines, that is fuelling 
nepotism and patronage in politics. 
DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT
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bORdERs And COnFliCts 
For those groups vying for political space 
by having their own defined county, having 
ill-defined and threatened borders means an 
ill-defined and threatened state of being. This 
is true on the state level, but also applies to 
borders at the local level and unclear territorial 
demarcation is creating conflict flash points.100 
Debates about undefined borderlines, 
controversial naming of territory as well as 
shifting fault lines and narratives of territorial 
besiegement infuse the everyday existence of 
many Southern Sudanese.101 
Borders have the potential to enable peace 
by providing clarity and stability over 
disputed land; but where disputed, borders 
can exacerbate conflict and foment tension. 
The pivotal role of borders is recognised 
throughout Southern Sudan. In fact, the 
majority of interviewees in this research 
expressed the need to address confusion 
about borders and clearly demarcate them. 
Varying opinions were found regarding the 
value of borders: many spoke about shifting 
territories that are being claimed by different 
groups; others described how they saw the 
border as either a valuable resource or a 
threat. Such problems are particularly acute 
in areas where water points are near the 
borders, such as along the border of Warrap 
and Lakes States. 
Border disputes are now arising on multiple 
levels – between payams, counties, states, 
and the north and south. Expectations 
that border demarcation will signal the 
end of many local problems are evident 
all across Southern Sudan. ‘Demarcation 
of the borders will bring conflict, but once 
demarcation is done there will be [rule of] 
law,’ said NBeG Deputy Governor Josephine 
Moses Lado.102 Yet, contrary to the line 
often touted by local government officials, 
internal border demarcation is far from being 
a problem-solver. Throughout the research 
sites, internal border demarcation was cited 
as a primary trigger of conflict as groups on 
all sides of boundaries seek legitimisation of 
their territories through defined border lines 
and new counties.
blurring borders between ethnic and 
administrative boundaries
The creation of new counties and drawing 
up of constituencies has fomented confusion 
regarding local administration structures, 
causing a number of problematic socio-
political dynamics.103 The issue of internal 
borders is fraught with distrust and struggles 
over power and resources. On the one hand, 
many citizens welcome the idea of dividing 
Southern Sudan into more counties in 
order to gain better political representation. 
Interviewees acknowledge that citizens feel 
they would be better represented at state 
level through tribally demarcated counties. 
Decentralisation is immediately associated 
with improved access to resources and 
development, said one Sudanese working in 
a local NGO doing peace work: ‘If you have 
your own county, you can get development. 
For this representation at the state level 
is more important than representation at 
GoSS level.’104 On the other hand, GoSS 
is seen as carving up the country in order 
to gain power. Continued fragmentation 
of administrative borders fuels fear that 
GoSS is emphasising ‘tribalism’ by creating 
counties based on tribal territories.105  
Dividing people into counties can break 
down traditional forms of kinship ties, 
which in return breaks down informal ways 
of peace-building and conflict mitigation 
techniques. Demarcating land can separate 
or unite those within the area. In other 
words, people can be brought together 
because they have a common sense of the 
‘other’ or rifts can be created as a result of 
labelling a border a division.106 
These dynamics create a two-pronged 
effect. On the one hand, GoSS has 
reinforced tribalism by equating 
administrative boundaries with ethnic 
identities – a situation which was strongly 
visible in all research areas. A member of the 
Council of Elders in Upper Nile elaborated 
on this issue: 
New administrative structures have been 
created since the CPA was signed… 
In drawing the boundaries, there has 
been confusion and some counties have 
expanded. The counties were drawn along 
tribal lines. Tribes were given counties, which 
has caused competition over resources and 
boundaries.107 
Despite the fact that many tribes support 
and even demand drawing counties along 
tribal lines, this approach does not take into 
account the manner in which local social and 
demographic aspects have evolved since the 
ceasefire in 2002. Towns, payams and bomas 
are increasingly home to a mixture of tribal 
groups, often because returnees and IDPs 
have decided to settle in areas with better 
resources, rather than automatically going 
back to their original homes. The increased 
diversity means it is more important that 
border demarcations are done in such a 
way that resources are equally distributed 
between counties and to its constituents. 
Where this is not happening, differing ethnic 
tribes are vying for their own counties. 
Political appointments can ignite political and 
ideological tension. The selection of county 
commissioners, who play a significant role 
in Southern Sudan’s decentralised system, 
has also been shaped by tribal calculations 
– a post-CPA development which obviously 
contradicts what had been promised to 
Southern Sudan’s citizens. Respondents 
in a youth focus group discussion in Upper 
Nile said: ‘Dr Garang set up an initial system 
of caretakers. He made that arrangement 
to diffuse tribalism. When he died, the 
leadership broke Garang’s arrangement…
They came with an ideology that counties 
should be based on tribes. That has led 
to tribalism and nepotism…We need to 
return to Garang’s ideology of caretaking.’108 
In Atar, an anonymous response on the 
questionnaire read: ‘They should mix 
administrators and governors. They should 
make them administer other people – 
Garang had that policy. Now they bring sons 
of the soil to administer their own areas’.109 
Creating ethnic fiefdoms
Another administrative policy, which has 
exacerbated divisions, is GoSS’ unofficial 
preference that county commissioners have 
a military background or close connections 
to the military, ostensibly to give them 
greater authority. This monopolisation of 
power through local leaders who gain power 
through military connections was seen as 
extremely problematic, especially by the 
younger generation.110 The two approaches 
translate into a militarily-controlled tribal 
local administration. This has created a 
situation in which county commissioners 
with a military background may preside over 
ethnic fiefdoms, often criticised for acting 
out of personal rather than public interests 
in community development. Students at 
Western Bahr el-Ghazal University also 
added that this has entrenched the military 
government on the local level and put 
military loyalists with low literacy rates in 
positions of leadership.111 In Upper Nile, 
representatives of youth pointed out that 
the position of commissioner was often self-
serving: ‘County commissioners just think 
about their own safety and disregard the 
community. If Southern Sudanese want to 
protect what they fought for, they need to go 
back to Dr Garang’s manifesto and focus on 
freedom, liberty, and self-determination.’112 
Lastly, the issue of border demarcation, 
county creation and county administration 
has caused doubt in GoSS’s leadership, 
decision-making, and vision. Students at 
Western Bahr el-Ghazal University described 
it as an authoritarian policy. Upper Nile’s 
SSRRC director said that this policy needs 
to be countered by standardising the rules 
for every county position in the Constitution: 
‘The problem is that when the government 
takes a position, people don’t see it as 
the government position. They see it as a 
personal decision made along tribal lines 
or based on party politics.’113 According 
to youth in Kodok: ‘When the SPLA went 
into the bush, the north recognised that 
the south had an agenda to fight for. Our 
relatives sacrificed their own children for 
the sake of freedom. Now, south Sudan 
is divided by tribalism, and each group is 
divided into its own county.’114 For many, 
GoSS has both created the problem of 
tribal counties and lacked the political will 
to address the issue before the referendum. 
As stated by a local government official 
in Upper Nile: ‘Some intellectuals and 
politicians are creating hatred between the 
tribes in the south…I blame the government 
even though I am part of the government’.115 
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Finally, it can be seen that internal border 
demarcation is a politically thorny and 
ethnically sensitive process. Indeed, internal 
border disputes are a festering problem.  
The issue will likely get worse as groups 
seek to secure territorial claims before a 
likely secession. 
CAsE study: An ExAMPlE 
OF ‘EthniC’ AdMinistRAtivE 
divisiOn in EEs
Until relatively recently, EES comprised of 
two districts: Torit and Kapoeta. However, 
Greater Kapoeta is now divided into four 
counties. Initially, it was split into Kapoeta 
and Budi, separating the Toposa (Kapoeta) 
and Buya-Didinga (thus the name BU-DI 
was coined). Then Kapoeta itself split into 
three counties: Kapoeta North, Kapoeta 
south and Kapoeta Eastern. The people 
of Kapoeta Eastern are Toposa and 
Nyangatom, while the people of Kapoeta 
south and north are Buya and Didinga. In the 
former Torit District, first Magwi (Acholi and 
Madi) broke away, then Ikotos (Dongotona 
and Lango), and finally Lafon/Lopa (Lopit 
and Pari). This process looks set to continue 
as the Acholi and Madi, Lopit and Pari, and 
Buya and Didinga have all made applications 
to split their counties.116 
County headquarters tend to be located 
in the main town of the dominant tribe 
of each county, thus the proximity of the 
county capital is seen to be accompanied 
by improved disbursement of funds for 
basic services. Access to affordable food 
and available medical services and schools 
are seen to be a product of having the 
‘government’ nearby, exacerbating feelings 
of marginalisation among other groups. 
There is a strong perception among people 
that the provision of basic services in villages 
is directly correlated to the degree of their 
tribal representation within local government. 
As such, people associate a lack of services 
not with a failure of accountability but 
rather a failure of political representation 
and access to political power. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that government 
authorities are usually recruited from their 
home communities. The reasons for this 
are obvious; they have local knowledge 
and speak the local language. However, 
the downfalls are clear and reiterate why 
John Garang’s vision had been to recruit 
local government staff from outside the 
community to be administered: having local 
staff contributes to fragmentation along 
group identities.
Theoretically, the argument for 
decentralisation remains a strong one, 
particularly considering the damaging 
history of the heavily centralised government 
model which located power exclusively in 
Khartoum. Yet certain measures may need 
to be put into place to disconnect local 
government staff from their personal local 
networks in order to improve representation 
and accountability. Both would be 
improved with democratic decentralisation. 
However, the current reality of a process of 
fragmentation, which models ‘one county, 
one tribe’ in a bid for representation, is 
unsustainable. For example, within counties 
dominated by a single tribe, there are 
still those who feel marginalised, causing 
divisions along sub-tribe or clan lines to 
begin to emerge. In situations of inequality 
or limited access to resources, people 
assert whatever aspect of their identity 
differentiates them from those competing to 
access resources. As a result, the process 
of fragmentation has the potential to be 
divisive. Nevertheless, respondents were 
overwhelmingly in favour of fragmentation 
and, in most cases, could not imagine a 
viable alternative. Yet what does it mean 
to have centralisation of power alongside 
fragmentation of administrative units? In 
reality, it is unclear what kind of financial 
resources local administrations have 
to implement changes for citizens, and 
resources differ vastly depending on how 
active a county is engaged in trade. Despite 
this, as long as local structures remain 
weak and gain their legitimacy from their 
relationship with GoSS and line ministries, 
the peripheries will remain upwardly 
accountable in order to compete for power. 
CAsE study: COuntiEs 
CAusE COnFliCt in 
EAstERn EquAtORiA
The current conflict between the Lopit and 
the Pari highlights access to services as 
a driver of fragmentation. While it initially 
appears that the conflict is over the name of 
the county, ultimately the issue is the location 
of the county headquarters. The name is 
important because the name of the county 
would indicate where the headquarters 
should be located – if the county is Lafon, 
then the administrative centre should be in 
Lafon, if it is Lopa then it can be argued that 
the headquarters should be in Imehejek. 
Some voices from Eastern Equatoria: 
Almost everyone knows about the 
headquarter issue…It is an issue of power 
sharing.117 (Youth chairman in Lafon)
People are very angry that the headquarters 
were taken there. The Lopit and Pari cannot 
speak to each other. If Imehejek were to 
become the head quarters, it will bring 
war. People will fight. There is already a 
plan. We will not accept Imehejek to be 
headquarters.118 (Pastor in Torit)
The then-Governor informed the research 
team that the county is Lopa (from Lopit 
and Pari) and its capital is Imehejek;119 
however at a conference several weeks 
later, he stated that the county is Lafon and 
the capital is Lafon. Thus, the ambiguity 
and confusion at the local level is replicated 
among government officials. The Pari argue 
that a 2004 resolution signed by Garang 
identifies Lafon as the county name and 
headquarters while the administrative 
buildings of the county are situated 
in Imehejek. At the time of writing, an 
application had been submitted to the local 
government board to establish two separate 
counties. This motion is strongly supported 
by both communities and the Governor as 
the two communities are deemed unable to 
co-exist peacefully within a single county. 
The issue has been so divisive that cross-
cutting ties encompassing kinship and 
marriage, friendship, and trade between 
the two groups have been completely cut 
off. This is to the great disadvantage of 
the both populations for their subsistence 
and survival, yet no serious effort for 
reconciliation has been made.120 
tAblE: REsPOndEnt PERCEPtiOns OF PROs 
And COns OF AdMinistRAtivE divisiOn
PERCEivEd AdvAntAgEs PERCEivEd disAdvAntAgEs 
Division of work capacity; increased em-
ployment opportunities
Capable personnel may be divided or lost 
Expands representation within the state The creation of a county without meeting 
the proper criteria creates more problems 
(forcing the process induces conflict)
Promotion of trade between counties
Safeguards cultural heritage (each county 
speaking own language and maintains  
own traditions)
Division of people; relationships are cut; 
people will become selfish with their ideas 
and resources. ‘We are going to lose some 
of our friends’
Increases autonomy and justice Risk of corruption and decreased service 
provision capacity
Allows for resource sharing Some counties lose resources  
(particularly at the border)
CAsE study: 
intERnAtiOnAl bORdERs 
bEtwEEn tOPOsA 
And tuRKAnA
Over a decade ago, journalist Peter Kamau 
referred to the border area of Sudan, Kenya 
and Ethiopia as: ‘the border area that 
defies security’.121 Since then, little along the 
Sudan/Kenya border has changed. At the 
time of research, the situation was so tense 
that the County administrators used the term 
‘entry point’, explaining: ‘These days we 
can’t even call it a border, the situation is too 
volatile, so we are calling it the entry point.’122 
Due to the difficulty of reaching the border 
and analysing the understanding of events 
according to the Turkana, only the version 
of events espoused by the Toposa is here 
below presented.
 
the toposa version of events
Tensions along the border began mounting 
in the months leading up to September 
2009 for several reasons. For one, the 
Kenyan Government began to ask Toposa 
for passports and travel permits to cross the 
border in July 2009.123 Heightened tension is 
also based on the belief that in August 2009 
a Kenyan Minister, having been refused entry 
to Sudan because no high level official was 
at the border to meet him as is deemed 
customary, returned to Lokichoggio and:  
‘…ordered the army and police to arrest and 
beat any Sudanese in the market...many 
people were badly beaten.’124 
During the period of research, the border 
between the Toposa and the Turkana 
was particularly contentious with fighting 
reported between the Toposa and the 
Kenyan Government on 18, 23 and 24 
October, resulting in the closing of the 
border-crossing for a number of days. This 
specific period of fighting is believed by 
community leaders to have been provoked 
by the Kenyan Army erecting a Kenyan 
flag in Nadapal because: ‘…this was an 
act of war, they came with their army and 
their flag to take our land’125 The Toposa 
say they issued the Kenyan Government 
with an ultimatum to withdraw and sent 
word to Juba to alert GoSS that if the 
situation was not remedied within five days, 
they would attack the Kenyan Army.126 
The community leaders believe that the 
Kenyan Army refused to withdraw and that 
no response was received from GoSS. 
Thus on 23 October, a number of Toposa 
launched an attack on the Kenyan Army 
barracks in Nadapal. Reports about the 
number of casualties and on which side are 
inconsistent, with reports in Narus relayed 
by the Diocese that: ‘…the Toposa killed 16 
Kenyan soldiers and captured a machine 
gun with only two injured’127 while news 
outlets were reporting that the Kenyan 
Government was claiming no casualties. 
Regardless of the veracity of the numbers 
reported injured and killed, what is clear is 
that there was a conflict between Toposa 
nomadic pastoralists and the army of a 
sovereign state over what is considered, at 
least by the Toposa, to be a disputed border. 
Ultimately, this is an issue that has been 
playing out over a long period of time 
between the Toposa of Sudan and the 
Turkana of Kenya, two groups bound by 
ethno-linguistic ties and practising nomadic 
pastoralism as their main livelihood activity. 
The crux of the issue is that because 
nomadic pastoralism is their main livelihood 
and they live in regions increasingly prone 
to drought, these groups need to share 
dry season pasture and water points.128 In 
times of severe drought, or in order to meet 
bride-price requirements, there has been 
habitual raiding of one another’s cattle, 
which occasionally resulted in the death 
of the person or persons guarding the 
herd.129 Local people are frustrated because 
historically these conflicts were managed by 
the Toposa and the Turkana. 
The movement of people and cattle from 
one affected area to another is a recipe 
for tension. While conditional agreements 
used to be reached among the groups 
for temporary sharing, as the frequency 
and duration increase the strains become 
much greater. According to the Toposa 
interviewed, the involvement of the Kenyan 
Government has changed this relationship. 
The gravity of the issue was transformed, 
from being perceived as a localised struggle 
between two communities over access to 
land and water points, as was explained by 
locally based staff of the SSPC: ‘Civilians 
should know that they cannot attack another 
country’s army but the Kenyans should 
come with a civilian administration, the 
Toposa saw it as an occupation.’130 This 
has had implications for Toposa/Turkana 
relationships as before the escalation of this 
conflict there was intermarriage, dry-season 
reciprocal arrangements and high levels of 
cross-border trade. At present all of these 
activities have been suspended with Toposa 
reporting no contact with family across the 
border for a number of months as a result 
of this conflict and the ceasing of trade 
between the two tribes. 
As opposed to an occupation, one aspect 
of the situation seems to be that GoSS 
made an arrangement with the Government 
of Kenya that they could move their 
customs post to Nadapal to facilitate the 
administration of customs duties. However 
the Toposa were not consulted about 
this, nor were they informed after the fact. 
Thus, they saw the establishment of official 
Kenyan structures on what has traditionally 
been their land as evidence of the Kenyan 
Government supporting the Turkana in the 
ongoing struggle over access to grazing 
land and water points. In addition, there 
was a perception among a number of 
respondents that this conflict, and other 
similar ones, have escalated of late because 
of a commercialisation of cattle-raiding. A 
number of respondents believe that local 
politicians and/or businessmen are funding 
raids as a commercial enterprise. 
Opinions about the role of GoSS in this 
conflict tended to be polarised and 
somewhat contradictory. In one respect 
the Toposa were disgruntled that they had 
not been involved or notified of changes 
in cross border arrangements: ‘There was 
an a agreement signed that customs post 
should be moved closer to Nadapal but the 
Toposa were not consulted or informed, 
they think the government does not mind 
about them.’131 Toposa youth at Narus 
expressed the impatience felt by some of 
the community towards GoSS, explaining 
that: ‘…people of Nadapal and locals say 
‘it is better for Kenyans to finish us then to 
wait until we’re dead and then for GoSS 
to come.’132 On the other hand there is a 
sense locally that this historical conflict 
over access to scarce resources is being 
exploited by politicians with a strong belief 
that the Government in Khartoum had a 
hand in escalating the tensions to this level. 
There are many questions surrounding the 
militarisation of these conflicts with some 
hypothesising that NCP is ‘the invisible force’ 
fomenting tensions between groups. While 
some respondents expressed frustration 
that GoSS were not engaging more heavily, 
or at least more visibly, others believed that 
GoSS were strategically avoiding becoming 
involved in an international border dispute in 
the run up to elections and the referendum. 
A group of young men in Naurs market 
said: ‘The GoSS are refraining from action 
because they know it is a strategy to distract 
them from elections’133 
Regardless of the impetus for this border 
dispute, it is an extremely volatile and 
potentially explosive issue for GoSS. 
Inhabitants of the region are feeling insecure 
and it is believed locally that there has 
been an increase in the number of civilians 
carrying arms, as expressed by a group of 
Madi women: ‘This thing, it is making us feel 
so insecure, the gunshots are reminding us 
of Sudan some time ago, when we were 
running, sometimes naked, from the war.’134 
Along with others, this weakly defined 
international border represents a serious 
challenge for GoSS.
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Relying on an illusion?  
the 1956 borders135 
As previously discussed, communities often 
disagree on the location of their ethnic and 
administrative borders. Yet there remains a 
misinformed consensus that the CPA calls 
for internal border demarcation to be based 
on the boundaries created by the British 
that existed at Sudan’s independence on 
1 January 1956. The CPA refers to these 
borders only with respect to demarcation 
of the north/south border. Respondents, 
however, refer to 1956 borders as the 
tool that could be used when settling 
local territorial disputes or separate two 
competing groups today – for example in 
the case of Agar and Gok in Lakes State. 
The response given by a group of ‘chiefs’ 
in Korgana in Western Bahr el-Ghazal 
was echoed all across the south: ‘People 
should stick by the 1956 boundaries. This 
shows the boundaries between states, 
counties, boma, and payam.’137 Elders in 
Eastern Equatoria felt that the ongoing 
problem of cattle-raiding needs to be: ‘…
solved according to pre-independence tribal 
boundaries’, claiming that tribal boundaries 
were clearly laid out during colonial times 
and that the only way to make peace now is 
by returning to previous boundaries.138 
Borders are important for consolidating 
power and presenting the impression that 
all entities within this boundary are unified. 
This was particularly evident in Upper 
Nile; for most state officials interviewed in 
Malakal and Juba, the only border issue 
that needs to be addressed before the 
referendum is demarcation of the north/
south ‘1956 border’. In July 2008, the county 
commissioners of Melut, Maban, and Renk 
counties held a conference in Paloich to 
discuss internal borders. The main resolution 
of the conference was to postpone dealing 
with the issue until after the referendum. 
The logic is clear: GoSS’s main goal is to 
keep the south united by a common desire 
for independence and a collective fear of 
the north long enough to make it to the 
referendum and achieve statehood. 
The widespread perception that a reversion 
to the 1956 borders is the solution to local 
territorial problems is problematic; both in 
terms of applicability and legal validity, as 
it is based on a particular interpretation of 
the CPA that was not intended to refer to all 
borders. The major problem, however, is that 
these historical boundaries may not exist.
Applicability
It is not clear where detailed, useful maps 
of the 1956 borders within Southern Sudan 
could actually be found.139 In addition, all 
known information seems to point to the fact 
that before 1956 the vast majority of internal 
Sudanese boundaries were never marked 
on the ground or defined by administrative 
text. The mapping conducted under British 
administration is probably the most coherent 
definition of boundaries, but while parts of 
Sudan have been mapped in great detail, it 
was not applied consistently all over Sudan. 
Geographical data used was gathered in the 
1920s and 1930s. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the ‘1956 maps’ 
have not been consulted is seen by some 
local officials as proof of a conspiracy, 
rather than lack of existence. In addition, 
the legal validity of maps as evidence in 
boundary disputes is not always clear-
cut. Maps simply reflect administrative 
realities, so boundaries need to be defined 
in more legally-binding sources such as 
administrative records and reports. However, 
in the absence of other documentation a 
map can be very influential, so much so 
that the ‘1956’ historical map has shaped 
people’s opinions on where new boundaries 
and administrative capitals should lie in 
present day Southern Sudan and what area 
each tribe would be allowed to call home.140  
Using past maps or past boundaries to solve 
present day problems, however, disregards 
that the social and political landscape has 
been drastically altered by decades of war 
and displacement. Many people no longer 
live where they used to live in the 1920s 
when the data was collected, and those in a 
better position with respect to the amount of 
land they occupy and the amount of natural 
resources to which they have access share 
a vested interested in maintaining the status 
quo rather than reconstructing an illusory 
past. How difficult it is to adjust to current 
realities is evident, for example, in the  
Lou-Jikany conflict in Upper Nile. In addition, 
GoSS has created an array of payams and 
counties within the south that did not exist 
in 1956. Therefore, GoSS’ motivations and 
method of implementation of these divisions 
need to be held to account. It underlines 
the fuzziness of definition of what Southern 
Sudan is that the boundary issues remains 
undefined, despite the fact that it is at the 
heart of numerous local conflicts. 
School buildings, Upper Nile
CAsE study: thE AtAR/
KhORFlus AgREEMEnts
The conflict between neighbouring Dinka 
groups now resident in Atar and Khorflus 
of Upper Nile has been addressed at two 
conferences. The fighting between Dinka 
sub clans has focused on the location of 
an administrative centre for, and the name 
of, a new county. At a conference held in 
December 2008, the dispute was resolved 
when the two communities of Atar and 
Khorflus ‘unanimously agreed after lengthy 
and consultative discussions’ to relocate the 
county headquarters away from Khorflus 
to Wunaruop, located between the two 
communities.141 They also agreed to call 
the new county ‘Canal’. At the end of the 
meeting ‘the two communities’ thanked 
various facilitators of the meeting, including 
the United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS), for facilitating it. They also formally 
expressed thanks: ‘…to themselves for their 
commitment to peace and willingness to 
settle their differences’.142 
Despite these assertions, outbreaks of 
fighting have reoccurred and cattle-raiding 
persists. A further meeting was therefore 
called and funding sought from various 
agencies, including Pact Sudan. Various 
problems arose over support for this second 
meeting, which took place in April 2009, 
and the text of the agreement has not been 
widely circulated. It is omitted from the 
Upper Nile Consolidated Peace Conference 
Resolutions, compiled by Pact Sudan and 
published in September 2009. The main 
reported difference from the first meeting 
was that the name chosen for the new 
county was ‘Pigi’.
The research team visited Atar on 4 
November and a focus group was carried 
out with a group of seven young men, all of 
them working for the payam administration 
or at the dispensary. All of them were Dinka, 
and had settled in the area since the CPA. 
They explained that they will build homes 
at Atar permanently. When asked what had 
happened to the Shilluk who were living in 
the area in the 1980s, it was explained that: 
‘The Shilluk have moved to the west bank 
of the Nile due to the war. Some may come 
back, but that will not be a problem.’143 
The young men claimed that they had no 
conflicts with the Shilluk and that fighting 
that had occurred in Malakal town and 
elsewhere had no affect on them. As far 
as current enemies were concerned, they 
explained that: ‘We are enemies among 
ourselves. Our neighbours are our enemies, 
but it is just about cattle…They are Dinka 
like us. It was (also) about the name of the 
county.’ They admitted that cattle theft 
continues on a small scale.
On 8 November, a few days after the 
research team’s visit, fighting took place in 
Atar between resident Dinka and a group 
of Shilluk, resulting in several deaths. An 
article, published on 14 November made the 
following comments: 
The recent clashes which broke out at 
seven o’clock in the morning on Wednesday 
between Shilluk from Upper Nile and Dinka 
who are at Jonglei State’s territorial borders 
caught both State governments by surprise 
as there had never been tribal fight between 
Padang Dinka in Jonglei and Shilluk in Upper 
Nile State. A group of armed men reportedly 
identified as members of Shilluk tribe from 
Upper Nile State attacked a Dinka village of 
Pigi county in the extreme east of Malakal 
town on Wednesday on the other side of 
Jonglei. The attackers killed a teacher with 
two policemen and wounded two other 
members of Southern Army forces, said 
the SPLA in the area. Eight, from attackers 
reportedly identified by the tribal marks on 
their heads as members of Shilluk tribe, 
got killed while two other Dinka gunmen in 
the same village were also killed late in the 
evening of Wednesday in an ambush.144 
On November 15, the Sudan Tribune 
published a response from a Shilluk writer 
who was convinced that the interpretation 
of these events was biased by the alleged 
Dinka loyalties of the author. According to 
the respondent, the report was misleading 
because: ‘Pigi is not and will never be a 
Dinka village of Jonglei state because it has 
been and it will always be a Shilluk area 
according to 1956 administrative territorial 
maps.’ The Atar area was: ‘…one of the 
major fishing points for the Shilluk before the 
Dinka started fishing here as well.’145 
The response goes on to make similar points 
to those heard by the research team from 
Shilluk people interviewed in Upper Nile. It 
explains that the provocation for the Shilluk 
attack was the Dinkas’ abuse of power: 
‘Part of what ignited the fight that took place 
on Wednesday in Canal area (Pigi) was the 
brutal abuse of a Shilluk fisherman by some 
Dinka elements in police uniform stationed 
in a post there. They stopped his boat and 
tried to take his fish by force without pay. 
When he protested, they shot him dead on 
the spot.’146 
This is not the place to discuss the veracity 
of these claims, or the counter claims that 
have been made in subsequent articles. 
However, it is important to note the reference 
to the ‘1956 administrative territorial maps’. 
Also, it is not disputed that Shilluk lived in the 
area of Atar in the early 1980s. The current 
Dinka population has settled recently, 
and it would appear that an aspect of the 
two peace conferences – at which there 
were no Shilluk representatives – was to 
provide an official imprimatur for permanent 
Dinka occupation. Whatever the value of 
the meetings in resolving Dinka sub-clan 
disputes, they were obviously antagonistic 
to nearby Shilluk. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that local political activists were 
seeking to draw UNMIS and later Pact 
Sudan into the process. Pact Sudan has 
wisely distanced itself.
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The remains of Atar Senior Secondary School, Upper Nile
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CAsE study: thE lEgACy 
OF thE ‘1956 bORdER’ 
bEtwEEn AChOli And bARi 
There is a belief throughout much of Eastern 
Equatoria that the ‘1956’ borders must be 
reverted to solve these border issues despite 
complex, convincing and entirely contrasting 
local opinions of where these borders are. 
The disputed border between the Acholi 
and Bari at Kit, or Ayii on the Juba to Nimule 
road is an example of this. The contrasting 
historical narratives, dating back to the British 
era, are extremely powerful and expressed 
passionately by Acholi and Bari locals in a bid 
to legitimise ownership of the land. 
According to the Bari chief at Kit, the 
main road (passing through Kit from Juba 
to Nimule) was dug in 1949 by a British 
engineer named Mujaranga. As the nearest 
people to the road were Bari, Mujaranga 
employed Bari headmen. The Acholi came 
after the road was opened, in the mid 1950s; 
their population increased with the growth of 
services offered by the British (schools and 
a hospital). The Bari chief stated: ‘The Acholi 
ran and came to Bari land and stayed here…
now they are saying it is theirs?’147 This 
unlawful ‘grabbing’ of land by the Acholi – as 
seen by the Bari -began with the Acholi chief 
instigating support among the Acholi to send 
Bari returnees to settle on different land. 
The Acholi history holds that the land up 
as far as the border with Central Equatoria 
State has always been Acholi land and in the 
1930s or 40s the Acholi chief married a Bari 
woman. She gave birth to two brothers with 
one child staying with the Acholi family and 
the other moving to stay with the Bari after 
the mother’s death. Both these sons then 
laid claim to the Acholiland for their clan. 
This was exacerbated locally by the British 
saying that the border was the road, which 
is believed by the Acholi to be deep in their 
land, rather than the border. The Acholi call 
the area ‘Ayii’, saying that this is the Acholi 
age-old name for the river running through 
the region, a river that the Bari call ‘Kit’ river: 
‘This is our [Acholi] place, the landlord is still 
alive and has been recognised before by the 
Bari people…everyone knows this is Acholi 
land, there can be no fight over the border, 
everyone recognises it’148 The Bari chief, 
however, countered that:
We can tell you because we’ve been here 
longer. A long time ago, there was nothing 
called Ayii here. It was called Kit. The name 
of the river is Kit. It comes from ‘Kiteru’ 
which means something like ‘sweeping all 
the dirt away from the river’ (when it rains it 
becomes dirty).149 
The Acholi trace the Bari claim of the land to 
a prominent senior local politician, a Bari and 
the speaker of the south Sudan Legislative 
Assembly – allegedly making statements 
about the piece of land and erecting 
signposts to state that the land is part of 
Labone Payam. It is believed that he wants 
this piece of land to be included in Juba 
County to boost the number of Bari in his 
constituency, increasing the likelihood of his 
election success. In addition, it is believed 
that the ultimate goal is to create a separate 
Bari-dominated county. In this respect, Igga 
has supposedly been making speeches 
declaring the area part of Juba County 
and fomenting a sense of marginalisation 
among the Bari at the hands of the Acholi. 
Regardless of the competing histories and 
entrenched views of where the land belongs, 
the area is currently being administered 
under Magwi County.
The strength of belief in each of these 
opposing histories with each group stating 
that the other is welcome to stay on ‘their’ 
land as long as they respect the other, is 
potentially explosive and as an issue has 
been exacerbated through the emphasis on 
ethnically divided administrations. This belief 
enables each group to vindicate violence if 
necessary to assert their ownership over the 
land. Diametrically opposed interpretations 
of the border, which are supposedly rooted 
in historically-legitimate accounts, have 
caused a number of violent clashes between 
the two communities. This has resulted in a 
souring of relations among some groups of 
Acholi and Bari with one Acholi compound 
reported to have been demolished by 
some Bari last May, the beating of the 
former Acholi boma Chief and another 
violent conflict resulting in the continued 
hospitalisation of a local man. The new 
boma Chief has been moving throughout 
the community and reports that the majority 
are: ‘…living peacefully together, most are 
knowing this is an issue of the politicians’.150  
The land dispute dividing the Acholi and 
Bari escalated in May of 2009 when two 
households fought over one plot, leading to 
the burning of a hut and violence between 
youth. The tension between the Acholi and 
Bari also came to the fore in an ongoing 
dispute over the signpost resulting from the 
identification of the name as Kit or Ayii.151 
Currently, the land dispute lies at a standstill 
as the communities wait for the response 
of the government since the meeting that 
was held to discuss the land dispute in April 
2008, which involved the commissioner and 
governor of both Eastern Equatoria (Magwi) 
and Central Equatoria (Juba). Hope for 
solving this local land dispute is based on an 
illusion of the clarity of the 1956 border, as 
the Bari chief reiterated:  
They [politicians] say they will bring that old 
map to show old border lines from British, 
but they are saying it belongs to Bari. If 
they change that map and make different 
borders, there will be continued conflict in the 
community.152 
It is evident that within the Bari community, 
there is a strong assumption that a careful 
analysis of history and an objective study of 
the map will provide clarity to the communities. 
50
CAsE study: diFFEREnt 
MEMORiEs: dinKA, shilluK 
And intERnAl bORdERs
The Dinka and Shilluk in Upper Nile have 
diametrically opposed recollections of where 
the border between the two communities 
was in 1956. According to many Dinka 
political and traditional leaders, the middle 
of the Nile River is the boundary between 
the Dinka and Shilluk; while the Shilluk 
unwaveringly state that they have historically 
occupied both banks of the Nile and that the 
border is east of the river. As Shilluk began 
returning from northern cities, mainly Kosti 
and Khartoum, after 2005, they found Dinka 
occupying areas east of the Nile. Tensions 
as a result of land occupation seethed 
slowly until they were sparked by the clash 
on January 9 2009 over competing claims 
of ownership of Malakal town. The Shilluk 
claim that the Dinka are using their dominant 
position in the government and military to 
consolidate territorial expansions made 
during the war. ‘The problem started in 
1991,’ claimed Kodok’s payam administrator. 
‘The current Minister for Information and 
Communication used to have a SAF-aligned 
militia around Binthieng. Shilluk ‘chiefs’ told 
him to stay there, allowing Shilluk civilians to 
fall back to the other side of the river. Now 
the Dinka are refusing to leave these lands 
and claiming them as their own.’153  
The impression that a cabal of Dinka 
politicians is instigating violence in an 
orchestrated strategy to drive Shilluk from 
their historical homes is rooted in a deep 
sense of marginalisation and victimisation 
among the Shilluk. Socially, the Shilluk 
occupy a distinct space in Southern Sudan’s 
social fabric. With a clear, hierarchical social 
structure anchored by a quasi-divine king, 
the Shilluk have a firmly rooted sense of 
collective identity, social order, and historical 
ancestry. Unlike the Dinka and Nuer, the 
Shilluk are not a semi-nomadic, acephalous 
society of cattle-keeping pastoralists. The 
Shilluk also occupy a physical landscape 
that is conducive to centralised social 
and political organisation. Protected by 
mountains to the west and rivers to the east, 
the Shilluk kingdom enjoys high population 
densities in a favourable geography of fertile 
soil and easy access to waterways that 
facilitate communication and trade. 
Politically, Fashoda County, the centre of 
the Shilluk kingdom, has not been an SPLM 
stronghold. Shilluk areas were controlled by 
SAF for most of the war. While the Shilluk did 
not form proxy militias armed by Khartoum, 
like the Murle or Toposa, they sat on a 
geographic and strategic fence for most of 
the war. Located along the border between 
oil-producing Upper Nile and the north, 
the Shilluk area is also the home of Lam 
Akol, architect of the SPLM split in 1991, 
subsequent SAF affiliate and recent founder 
of the political party SPLM-DC.
In contrast, peace has not brought 
prosperity or development to Kodok, the 
headquarters of Fashoda County. As 
opposed to Melut, a mainly Dinka area that 
produces oil and has witnessed substantial 
growth since 2005, Kodok does not even 
have a functioning mobile phone network. 
The disparity in development has bred 
resentment among many Shilluk, creating 
an opening for SPLM-DC. As residents of 
Kodok said: ‘The leadership of GoSS has 
increased tribalism and is not favouring 
the entire community. We the Shilluk are 
very marginalised. The community has no 
political say. Our political representation is 
low. We are being intimidated by security 
apparatuses’.154 Consequently, many Shilluk 
interviewed expressed the view that they 
feel territorially besieged, developmentally 
undermined, and devoid of a political voice. 
‘If we cross the river, we will be killed,’ said a 
Shilluk chief in Kodok.155 
lAnd And OthER 
REsOuRCEs
Access to land is one of the most common 
triggers of local violence. In Southern Sudan 
the problematic nature of access to land 
and its link to the exacerbation of hostilities 
manifests itself in issues regarding new 
administrative boundaries, local borders or 
clashes between residents and IDPs. The 
access issue manifests itself in various ways: 
in creating new administrative boundaries, 
as discussed above, in contesting local 
borders or in clashes between residents and 
IDPS. Land is now often in possession of 
those who stayed at home during the war, 
and did not join the SPLA, or, as in the case 
of Nimule, where land is occupied by former 
SPLA soldiers who feel that their struggle 
to ‘liberate the land’ gives them the right to 
occupy and own it. The hopes hinged on 
the Land Act, which reiterates community 
ownership of land, are extremely high. It is 
viewed as the panacea for all land disputes, 
with the expectation being that once land 
officially belongs to the ‘community’, all 
problems will be resolved, as an SSPC staff 
member said.156 This is problematic as each 
‘community’ in the administrative sense 
is rather diverse. In addition, this is likely 
to magnify conflict as land administration 
demands solid community administration 
structures in order to prevent conflict. These 
remain entirely unclear and the struggle over 
access to land continues. In Ayii/Kit, EES, 
despite a peace meeting being held in 2008 
where resolutions were drafted, the Acholi 
and the Bari are still struggling over access 
to land. A group of elders and community 
leaders were despondent: ‘…it’s under the 
GoSS assembly, it’s almost one year now 
but we have no power, we just have to wait 
for them.’157 
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CAsE study: lOPit: hOw 
A ‘REsOuRCE COnFliCt’ 
sPREAds intO POlitiCs
In Lopit villages in Eastern Equatoria, 
conflict erupted when it was reported that 
the Logonwati attacked Lehinyang around 
Christmas day of 2008 over a tract of 
fertile land that both communities claim. 
A message was sent to the neighbouring 
Mura community by the people of Lehinyang 
for help and resulting in a number of Mura 
running to their aid. This culminated in 
the shooting dead of one Mura man while 
another was seriously injured. The following 
day, people from Mura village attacked the 
Commissioner’s convoy coming from the 
village of Tennet, as it was said that injured 
Logonwati were being transported in one 
of the cars. On inspection, this was found 
not to be the case and 10 men were killed 
in this attack resulting in the arrest of twelve 
Mura who were imprisoned in Imehejek. 
These individuals attempted to escape so 
they were moved to a ‘container’ in the 
town, an action that is believed to have been 
sanctioned by the Commissioner as he was 
present during this period. The prisoners 
were kept in this shipping container for a 
number of weeks resulting in the deaths of 
five of the detainees over the course of a 
week. The eight surviving prisoners were 
then moved to Torit and were reported, 
as the payam administrator said, to have 
been released without trial at the end of 
October.158  This issue has been politically 
disastrous for the current Commissioner 
who is believed by the payam administrator 
to be on: ‘…an island of trouble’159 as the 
Mura are annoyed about the deaths of the 
five prisoners while the Tennet are also 
annoyed that the remaining eight have 
been released without charge. In addition, 
it is believed by the acting paramount 
chief that there is strong anti-SPLM (the 
commissioner’s party) sentiment in Mura 
and that the NCP are now targeting Mura: 
‘…when they (NCP) see this insecurity 
they will capture these areas, this is an 
opportunity for them.’160 Thus a conflict 
seemingly based on resource access has 
implications for regional security as local 
issues became increasingly politicised. 
54 55
CAttlE-RAiding As A 
REsOuRCE COnFliCt?
Cattle represent both a source of livelihood 
and a symbol of prestige for many Southern 
Sudanese.161 Dinka Gok cattle-keepers in 
Cueibet described their cattle as: ‘…the 
same thing as life. We eat from them and 
we get married from them. They are our 
property.’162 In recent years, cattle have also 
become one of the major catalysts for intra-
south conflict. Cattle-raiding has become 
synonymous with what are often termed 
‘tribal clashes’, a euphemism which does 
little to explain the reasons for cattle-raiding. 
To understand cattle-raiding, one needs to 
examine the social and economic context.163 
Cattle-raiding is not a new phenomenon 
in Southern Sudan; Burton described 
cattle-raiding as characterising ‘inter-tribal’ 
relations before the British administration.164  
Many cattle-keepers talked about how 
cattle-raiding has become more intense and 
violent, but many also referred to the conflict 
between groups as long-standing. To 
quote youth in Narus: ‘The Turkana/Toposa 
conflict over cattle-raiding is historical.  
Our people have been fighting for a long 
time. We will have peace today, and 
tomorrow you will see they are fighting 
again’.165 South of Tonj in Warrap State, the 
Dinka Thony described the ongoing cattle-
raids between them and the Dinka Apuk/Yar 
as historical tensions, which had continued 
throughout the war and until today. Thus, 
it is likely that some groups are more likely 
to raid old enemies in an attempt to survive 
drought and poverty. 
However, not all conflicts have such historical 
roots. In many cases the war caused a 
change in relations between groups, which 
is now manifesting itself in the form of cattle-
raiding. It is widely reported that, since the 
signing of the CPA, the incidence of cattle-
raiding in certain areas has increased. For 
example, in Lakes State, the Cueibet county 
vet commented that: ‘Between 2005 and 
2009, cattle clashes increased and became 
serious, more intense.’166 ‘Chiefs’, elders 
and administrators of Jur River County in 
Western Bahr el Ghazal described 2009 as: 
‘…the worst year… We have experienced 
rape, killing, stealing cattle in thousands.’167 
Similarly, respondents in EES felt that the 
frequency and ferocity of cattle-raiding was 
increasing. In Greater Bahr el Ghazal, 56 per 
cent of the attacks since the CPA reported 
by interviewees were cattle-raids. 
It is not surprising that people feel there 
has been an increase in cattle-raiding 
since the end of the war, since during the 
war, movement was restricted, raiding was 
punished by the army, and more crucially, 
many of the youth were in the SPLA and did 
not stay in cattle camps. Nonetheless, it is 
difficult to establish whether the incidence 
of cattle-raiding since the CPA is higher 
than before the war. What is more easily 
substantiated is that the nature of the 
violence associated with cattle-raiding has 
changed. For one, the proliferation of guns 
makes raiding easier and more violent. With 
the availability of guns, smaller numbers 
of people can execute a large cattle raid; 
before the arms proliferation, victory was 
based on male strength. 
Furthermore, there is a noticeable disregard 
for certain rules of engagement, namely 
that fighting should take place outside the 
village and women and children should not 
be targeted. Cattle-raiders are beginning 
to use what could be described as guerrilla 
terror to spread fear among rival cattle 
camps. According to women from Jonglei 
state: ‘It used to be they wouldn’t kill women 
and children, but now they do’.168 This could 
also be due to the fact that cattle-raiding is 
carried out by gangs, that sometimes form 
across ‘tribal’ divisions, and which award 
respect and honour on the basis of courage 
shown during a raid. Dinka Gok youth in 
cattle camps in Cueibet County, Lakes State, 
described the new tactics being employed 
by Dinka Rek cattle-raiders: ‘The raiding 
nowadays happens at night. They come and 
kill people in their sleep.’169 Similar types of 
violence were reported in cattle camps in 
Eastern Equatoria’s Budi County where in 
October 2009, two boys aged 12 and 13 had 
their throats cut as they slept in their corral. 
As a Budi County official explained: ‘They 
slaughtered those two young boys in cold 
blood, as if they were chickens’.170 It is likely 
that war experiences and the breakdown of 
social norms are also contributing to changes 
in the type of violence being carried out 
during cattle-raiding.
Examining the causes of cattle-raiding 
Opinions vary widely on the ‘root causes’ 
of cattle-raiding and associated increase in 
violence. However, many felt that addressing 
such a complex and multi-layered issue is 
inappropriate during a time when focusing 
on a single-issue approach better serves the 
interest of the future of Southern Sudan. 171 
The idea that Southern Sudanese problems 
need to be on hold until the big problem – 
the relationship with the North – is solved is 
omnipresent and this approach is advocated 
for by the state-building element of current 
developments. As an SPLM official in 
Raja Town insisted: ‘People with cattle 
are a second problem, let us solve our big 
problem and then solve this from inside. We 
can sit on that one’.172 A closer look at the 
issues related to cattle-raiding reveals the 
possibility that cattle-raiding may partially 
be a product of weaknesses in the building 
of Southern Sudan, possibly also a lack of 
services and a disregard of the role of young 
men in Southern Sudan. 
Poverty 
For nomadic pastoralists, cattle represent 
units of wealth. In the aftermath of war, those 
desperate to survive understandably target 
these units of wealth in the community. In 
Cueibet County in Lakes State, Dinka Gok 
youth remember having good relations with 
the Dinka Rek before and during the war: 
‘Before the war, the Rek came and reared 
their cattle here and we had our cattle 
there. We intermarried. During the war, we 
intermingled. We went to Aweil and fought 
together there’.173 Dinka Gok youth attributed 
the outbreak of continuous raiding between 
the groups after the war to the actions 
of desperate ‘robbers’: ‘It was robbers 
that started the raids. Robbers increased 
because of a lack of things, lack of food.’174 
In Eastern Equatoria, hunger was most often 
cited as the main cause of cattle-raiding 
and in both Eastern Equatoria and Lakes 
it was reported that raided cattle are often 
transported to the large town markets and 
sold as quickly as possible. With prices per 
head of cattle around $300 and sometimes 
much higher, a successful raid can be worth 
thousands of dollars to the participants. 
In Upper Nile, residents of Dolieb Hills and 
Fangak respectively explained that those who 
raid do so for money and food. ‘They want 
money. They take the cattle they’ve raided 
to sell them.’175 Others in Fangak state that: 
‘Cattle-raiders are not enemies… They are 
thieves and they are forced by hunger’.176 
It is tempting to arrive at the conclusion 
that economics explain cattle-raiding. 
Indeed, a group of interviewees at Machi, 
Eastern Equatoria asserted: ‘When there 
is food, there is no cattle-raiding’.177 
However, the increase in cattle-raiding 
is more than a simple correlation with 
an increase in poverty. In NBeG, people 
suffered comparable levels of poverty after 
the war, and, despite the preponderance 
of cattle-keepers in the state, there is a 
notable absence of cattle-raiding. A key 
difference between NBeG and other states 
is that NBeG is more homogenous. It is 
thus possible that the pressure of poverty 
is played out along existing fault lines; i.e. 
divisions between groups. 
Bride-price
Many interviewees related the increase 
in cattle-raiding to the increase in bride-
price; bride-price has been cited as one 
of the reasons for raiding for at least the 
past century. Before the war, interviewees 
in Greater Bahr el-Ghazal reported that 
bride-price ranged from 10 cattle to 30 
cattle. In 2009, the highest price that 
interviewees had heard of was 300 cattle, 
with the average seemingly closer to 70. 
Young cattle-keepers in Cueibet County, 
Lakes State thought that to get a ‘good’ 
bride, one had to pay 150 cattle. They also 
estimated that young men on average own 
about 50 cattle each. As such, it is easy to 
jump to the conclusion that young men must 
raid in order to secure a suitable marriage 
partner. However, the dowry system is 
not simply a form of payment: it is more a 
system of circulation of cattle through the 
camp. Young men wait until their sisters 
get married before using her bride-price 
to make a proposition for their marriage.178 
Dinka Gok cattle-keepers emphasised that 
not everyone can participate at the highest 
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levels of this system: ‘This kind of marriage 
is not for everyone. It is done by competitors 
who want to show off their wealth.’179 During 
this research, when young Dinka Gok men 
were asked if they felt pressure to raid to 
pay the current high prices, they answered: 
‘We don’t raid cattle for brides’. In another 
conversation, the young men explained: ‘In 
the process of loving you will collect your 
relatives to help you. We do not raid for 
bride-price.’180 Unfortunately, it is likely that 
the tradition of shunning raided cattle for 
bride-price has come under some strain 
with a general breakdown in structures 
and prescripts. It is thus easy to imagine 
how some youth break the rules and raid 
to quickly increase their wealth and enable 
them to participate in the higher-end market 
for wives. 
Weak governance and policing 
Compounding the problem of poverty, 
uneven distribution of wealth and historical 
intergroup tensions, is a weak government 
that has demonstrated little to no capacity 
for punishing the perpetrators of cattle-raids 
or the taking of women without bride-
price. Though there were some instances 
of county commissioners181 attempting to 
return cattle, and an example of the Shilluk 
king reportedly jailing some of his soldiers 
for raiding 30 goats before providing 
compensation to their Dinka owners,182 
there is no systematic attempt to address 
cattle-raids. Thus, revenge-raiding has 
become widespread across the region. 
Dinka youth in Western Bahr el-Ghazal 
commented that: ‘Other people are also 
settling old grudges by doing bad things 
to the people they had problems with. The 
raids and counter raids have become a big 
source of conflicts’.183 Part of the problem, 
of course, is the powerlessness of punitive 
systems in the face of modern weapons. In 
addition, in some areas such as Lakes and 
Warrap State, respondents commented that 
the ‘chiefs’ were implicitly complicit in the 
raiding because they were instrumental in 
negotiating high bride-price for their relatives 
in some communities.
Social change, war legacies and lack  
of future perspectives
Many respondents agreed that most serious 
forms of violence occur in cattle camps with 
youth who reportedly do not respect either 
civilian or traditional authorities. Illiteracy, 
lack of religious teaching and lack of other 
economic opportunities, were seen as 
exacerbating violent raiding practices. For 
many of these youth, cattle-keeping and 
increasing their cattle are the only visions 
they have for their own future and indeed 
the only things to do. Going to school or 
getting an income elsewhere is a far-fetched 
notion for most and no infrastructure exists 
that could offer them different perspectives. 
Raiding, which is also seen as a competition, 
is also a way to stave off boredom and have 
an adventure.
In addition to these factors, animosity among 
certain groups has been exacerbated by 
the changing use and function of the local 
environment resulting from the war. For 
example, elders in Mapel talked about a lake 
that people from Lakes and Jonglei used to 
share, before fighting in the area. During the 
war, the presence of the northern militia of 
the Public Defence Force, forced those who 
had used the lake to search for new sources 
of water; this is turn caused pressure further 
west in Warrap and Lakes States.184 
Cattle-raiding has also become entangled 
with territorial expansion, as a woman leader 
from Mapel explained: ‘They came to Mapel 
from Tonj and they say Mapel belongs 
to them… Now they say Luo of Mapel, 
this belongs to us.’185 The Toposa make 
similar complaints about the Turkana, while 
numerous other Equatorian tribes complain 
that the Toposa use raiding to displace 
people and occupy the land, as is believed 
to have occurred in Lauro. 
Raiding and politics
Many respondents implicated high-
level politicians and businessmen in the 
proliferation of local cattle-raiding. The 
intricate connections between guns, cattle 
and politics are at the heart of the challenge 
to tackle the problem.186 In WBeG, local 
‘chiefs’ drew a connection that links their 
own experience of cattle-raiding to the 
highest level of government where they feel 
tensions between Dinka and Nuer cattle-
keepers are not addressed: 
The people who work in government, some 
were soldiers and are now in government, 
they will collect guns and take their cattle. If 
government is working they should collect 
guns, even from Nuer, people are now 
running from Nuer… What happened now 
in Dinka area, some people do not work in 
government, but they only have cows, but 
somebody who works in government can 
take all the cows, that is why the Dinka now 
run away.187 
Youths in Marial Bei in Western Bahr 
el-Ghazal pointed out that since there is 
an overlap between military and political 
power, cattle-raiding is not only closely 
linked to high level military, but also political 
actors. One young man pointed out that the 
involvement of army generals in the raiding 
by way of supplying guns and ammunitions 
to their people intensified the conflicts.188 
After the recent spate of attacks, there 
has been a growing perception that these 
may be part of an ‘invisible insurgency’. 
Kenya’s The Nation reported that: ‘…people 
are beginning to see the attacks as not 
merely tribal, but as a result of a sinister 
political motive aimed at, as the leaders 
often say, presenting Southern Sudan as 
ungovernable.’189 Many people embraced 
this view. For example, a Dinka man in 
Melut in Upper Nile said in an anonymous 
questionnaire response: ‘As long as the 
south stays with the north, the north will 
continue instigating conflict. They want 
to show that southerners aren’t capable 
of being independent’. Yet some believe 
problems originate closer to home, echoing 
the idea that most violence in Southern 
Sudan is home-grown. 
A number of respondents attribute the 
escalation of conflict in places such as 
Lauro to the commercialisation of cattle-
raiding. These posit that local politicians 
and/or businessmen are funding raids as a 
commercial enterprise, as a national staff 
member of UNMIS explained: 
Our leaders try to knock communities’ 
heads together. This raiding does not end, 
because these leaders have cattle in villages 
and they are willing to give arms to grass 
roots to go and retrieve the cattle. I think the 
government has a hand in the violence of the 
youth. We suspect the hands of politicians 
are there. We hear people saying, ‘We fight 
because our leaders are the ones who are 
fuelling us.’191 
POlitiCs OF CAttlE 
hERdERs vERsus FARMERs
Although raiding is the most obvious 
problem in connection with cattle, the most 
common problem is the clash of lifestyles 
between cattle-keepers and agriculturalists. 
The challenge of harmonising land usage 
so that farmers and cattle-keepers can 
peacefully co-exist is a recurring problem 
reported each year towards the end of dry 
season, when cattle are taken to graze on 
planted fields. Clashes are also reported 
at water sources, where people and cattle 
share the same access and cattle-keepers 
and fishermen compete for the best spots.192 
The resolution of this problem is intimately 
connected to issues of land and political 
influence. Many agriculturalists believe that 
the government does not want to take on 
cattle-keepers in order not to upset Dinka 
leaders, thus allocating less importance to 
farmers. Some respondents assumed that 
senior Dinka leaders encourage cattle-
driving towards the farms because: ‘Warrap 
state is very dry grazing site,’ explained 
one respondent in Mapel. The problem 
persists despite, as a Wau SSRRC official 
explained: ‘...a written agreement between 
governors.’193 Farmers who have only seen 
inactivity from the government mentioned 
the possibility of taking up arms as they 
cannot see who might protect them. 
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CAsE study: A nEw 
ExPERiEnCE OF CAttlE-
RAiding in MAPEl
Mapel is a town in the far south east corner 
of Western Bahr el-Ghazal inhabited mostly 
by Jur-Luo (known as Jur Chol to Dinkas). 
The Jur-Luo are mainly cultivators but some 
also keep small herds of cattle. During the 
war, Mapel was a target for aerial bombing 
and horse raids by northern Sudanese. 
With the signing of the CPA in 2005, the 
people of Mapel looked forward to peaceful 
times. They describe the good things 
about the peace: ‘There is no army, no 
bombing, no mistreatment, we can move 
now.’194 However in 2005, cattle-keepers 
from the states of Lakes and Warrap 
started to raid cattle, loot food and rape 
women. The attacks took the Jur-Luo by 
surprise and caused outrage in the town 
and surrounding villages. The raiding and 
looting have continued each dry season 
since then. The Jur-Luo blame the Dinkas, 
including the Luoch, Muak, Yar, Rek, Apuk 
and most importantly the Gok. The Gok 
came in March 2009 and carried out what 
Mapel elders called the worst raiding. The 
women at Mapel described a raid as follows: 
‘The raiders tie the male members of the 
household with ropes. After that they drive 
away the goats, cows, and rob any food they 
can find. There are many that come, maybe 
40 or 60. They come at night.’195 
The problem of cattle-raiding in Western 
Bahr el-Ghazal’s Mapel where the Jur live is 
actually linked to a breakdown of relations 
between the Dinka Gok and Dinka Rek 
from Lakes and Warrap State after the 
war. The tension between the two groups 
meant that neither could graze their cattle 
on each other’s land. This resulted in a 
shift in their seasonal movements; the Rek 
Kongor started bringing their cattle to Mapel 
to take advantage of the good grass which 
grows there during the dry season and the 
Gok started moving their cattle towards 
Western Equatoria. It is likely that the Rek 
were responsible for some of the raiding 
and looting that started in Mapel in 2005. 
However, in March 2009, according to 
Gok youth, the Rek Kongor crossed from 
Mapel into Lakes, raided 300 head of cattle 
belonging to Gok and killed seven young 
men.196 The Gok followed the Rek back to 
Mapel where they raided, looted and raped 
women in ‘revenge’ for the actions of the 
Rek. Gok claim that they only attacked the 
Rek and were not interested in stealing from 
the Jur-Luo. Despite their claims, Mapel 
became a secondary battle ground for a 
conflict in which the residents were not 
originally involved. 
PROtECtiOn
In Southern Sudan, the monopoly on 
violence by the state, deemed by Weber to 
be the core characteristic defining state, has 
not been achieved.197 Protection agencies – 
such as the police and the army – have not 
been sufficiently strengthened, an issue now 
contributing to the very same violence these 
agencies ought to prevent. In the case of 
the army, an ill-prepared DDR programme 
and half-hearted military transformation have 
reinforced perceptions and realities that 
soldiers present the greatest threat. In fact, 
in most of the research sites, the greatest 
local violence experienced was committed 
by soldiers against the civilian population. 
Furthermore, the broader security sector 
reform programme has been weak and 
somewhat scattered. 
Protection of civilians from violent crime was 
somewhat counter-intuitively more effective 
during the war, because of the relatively 
tight control exerted by army and state 
authorities, as a Sudanese coordinator of a 
local NGO explained: ‘During the war, we 
had a very strong law. You do [something 
bad] and you will be penalized. But now after 
the peace, the army is not in one place and 
everybody has a gun and nobody respects 
anybody.’198 The protracted process 
of establishing judicial structures has 
expanded the vacuum of law and order that 
is ubiquitous in Southern Sudan. This has 
necessitated local power structures taking 
charge according to their own rules, often 
to the detriment of civilians because: ‘when 
there is no law, somebody will apply law by 
their own hands.’199 
ChARt: institutiOns PROviding PROtECtiOn 
And PROblEM sOlving in sOuthERn sudAn
The chart below shows the institutions that Southern Sudanese turn to for protection and  
for problem solving.
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The two most cited institutions offering 
protection were the ‘police’ (p=35 per cent) 
and the government (p=13 per cent). While 
police is clearly defined as uniformed ‘police 
officers’, it is not clear what exactly is seen 
as ‘government’. Community/family and 
‘chiefs’/elders are considered a source of 
protection by a much smaller percentage 
of the population (p=9 per cent). This result 
indicates that people perceive the state as 
providing more protection than the older 
community-based structures. However, 
conclusions drawn from this data should 
be qualified by the observation that many 
people who said they would go to the 
police also commented that the police are 
ineffective, despite the fact that they are 
the largest body of public officials. Neither 
the SPLA nor the UN feature as major 
institutions for protection in the responses.
In contrast, 46 per cent of respondents 
reported that they go to their chief/elders for 
help in solving other problems such as family 
and community disputes. This indicates 
that such structures still play a role in the 
resolution of smaller disputes, but are not 
considered significant in providing protection. 
It should be noted that the responses to 
the question on protection are more widely 
distributed than the responses on problem 
solving. Furthermore, eight per cent of 
respondents responded that nobody offered 
them protection, whereas only three per cent 
of respondents thought that nobody could 
help solve their problems. These results 
show that there is more disagreement among 
people as to who provides the best protection, 
indicating an underlying sense of uncertainty 
about who should be providing protection. 
The lack of reliable protection structures 
creates a cycle of violence that is hard 
to break. As the state does not establish 
security, groups act to ensure their own 
safety, often sparking a cycle of attacks 
and counterattacks. For example, there is a 
clear logic of proportional justice in what the 
Lou term ‘collective revenge.’ After a group 
has committed enough small-scale attacks 
and cattle-raids, the Lou mobilise into large 
groups and inflict a single attack in retribution. 
In the absence of the rule of law and justice, 
community justice mechanisms of revenge 
and retaliation are likely to proliferate.
Police, wildlife authority and the SPLA
A striking result of the survey was that the 
vast majority of interviewees said that they 
turn to the police when they feel unsafe. 
They said this even if they feel the police 
are ineffective or unresponsive. While there 
have been efforts to improve the capacity 
of the police force,200 in most cases police 
lack weapons, communication equipment, 
transportation, and basic training. Outside 
of the larger population centres, police 
presence is generally nonexistent. Lack of 
education and widespread illiteracy among 
the police forces are frequently cited as 
major institutional weaknesses. Although 
the police are popularly viewed as the 
foundation of community security, in practice 
they are largely absent or incompetent. For 
example, a priest in Imehejek stated: ‘There 
are 70 police in this county, that’s nearly how 
many villages we have and the presence of 
police alone cannot create security.’201 
To counter this ineffectiveness, GoSS has 
increasingly infused the police force with 
generally older SPLA soldiers who simply 
swap fatigues for uniforms. While this short-
term strategy provides a much-needed 
surge in numbers, it comes with costs. 
Militarising domestic law enforcement by 
relying on soldiers obscures the important 
distinction between police and army, which 
is the cornerstone of any state’s security 
infrastructure. Its absence highlights the 
structural tension in Southern Sudan. 
In stand-offs between police and army, 
respondents generally reported that 
the army has the upper hand, making it 
impossible to pursue legal recourse against 
members of the army. Furthermore, the 
SPLA’s respect for human rights, training, 
command and control have all come under 
scrutiny, both during and after the war. 
There is no reason to believe that changing 
uniforms will cast off questions about the 
levels of professionalism.
The role of the SPLA in most citizens’ 
views remains unclear. There is confusion 
as to whether they are a government 
army, a national army, the armed wing of 
a political party, the de facto police or a 
loosely bound collection of local militias with 
local allegiances bound to fracture under 
pressure. The close relationship between 
the army and the ruling party makes 
distinctions blurry and creates discomfort. It 
is problematic that neither SPLM nor SPLA 
tend to refer to the army as a national army 
for Southern Sudan, which reinforces the 
uneasy relationships between the army 
and civilians that have prevailed since the 
founding of the SPLA. It is also worth noting 
that the SPLA is seen primarily as a ‘Dinka-
army’. While this perception is somewhat 
skewed as the actual numbers do not seem 
to confirm a Dinka majority in the SPLA, 
the perception might still mean that a policy 
that shifts soldiers to the police force risks 
alienating non-Dinka populations from both 
security apparatuses. 
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CAsE study: thE sPlA, 
sECuRity And lEgACiEs 
OF unsOlvEd viOlEnCE 
in budi COunty
In Budi County in EES, the legacy of the 
‘Lauro Massacre’ and recent responses 
highlight the challenges of protection and the 
role of the SPLA. The attack was allegedly 
carried out, said a group of community 
leaders, to either: ‘…displace the Didinga 
and gain access to local resources (pastures 
and gold)’ or as a: ‘…revenge attack due 
to the Didinga’s refusal to join a political 
alliance with the Toposa and Buya.’202  An 
army barracks was established in Lauro as 
an inducement for the community to return 
from living in the hills, yet the involvement of 
the SPLA as a protection force in a volatile 
environment has led to a security trade-
off for local residents. A group of Didinga 
women drew out the true nature of the 
military-civilian relationship: ‘We are safe 
in one way, from the Toposa, even though 
they still tried to come with the army. But 
now there is the worry of having the boys in 
green here.’ In addition to regular beatings of 
local men by soldiers, the primary concern 
was the sexual assault of young women, 
which has made the women flee to the 
mountains: ‘When there is a dance, the girls 
will be going back and they [the soldiers] 
waylay. This was regular. Look now and 
you see no girls here; they have all gone to 
the mountains because they are fearing.’203   
The army commander denies any form of 
tension: ‘Relations between the community 
and the army are good. They live together 
without any problem.  If anything happens, 
they raise a complaint and we address it.’204
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Several dynamics directly challenge the 
security situation and the SPLA’s capacity 
to protect the population. Firstly, the SPLA 
must integrate former foes that have 
become ambiguous allies and have the 
potential to challenge the SPLA’s southern 
army monopoly. The integration of powerful 
commanders can only happen if credible 
incentives are offered – such as high ranks, 
prestigious positions or good pay – which 
in turn has alienated long-standing SPLA 
members who are not offered incentives. 
Secondly, the SPLA must create a national 
army that includes a mosaic of militias 
primarily concerned with the narrow 
interests of their home community. ‘If the 
SPLA had to fight a war tomorrow we 
estimate that only 30 per cent of their forces 
would answer the call to mobilise,’ said an 
international UNMIS official.205 
Weakened by its own ‘ethnic divisions’, 
the SPLA must tread carefully into local 
violence. ‘The SPLA is caught in the middle 
and they’re afraid of being associated 
with certain tribes,’ said an employee of a 
local NGO in WBeG.206 This may explain 
the government’s reluctance to involve the 
SPLA at the local level as it could prove 
counterproductive for the army by exposing 
SPLA’s inner tension. An international UN 
security officer explained: ‘Salva Kiir has 
smartly avoided interfering in tribal clashes 
because he knows that this will cause the 
SPLA to break along tribal lines. Instead, 
the SPLA is coming in after the fighting to 
secure the area and act as a buffer.’207 
The role of the wildlife authority is equally 
problematic. Mandated to preserve wildlife 
and protected areas, in some areas the 
wildlife authority clearly stick to this mandate 
while in others, there is little distinction 
between police and wildlife authorities. 
During the elections, wildlife authorities were 
dispatched as police. Furthermore in some 
areas the wildlife authority seems to have 
developed into a praetorian guard for county 
commissioners. The county commissioner in 
Fangak, for example, was observed to have 
his compound protected by heavily armed 
wildlife authority personnel. 
CAsE study: ARMs And 
thE wFP bARgE AttACK 
An example of the complex effects of the 
proliferation and use of arms – widely 
documented in recent research – was the 
events that occurred in June 2009, when a 
convoy of WFP barges was carrying food 
aid from Malakal to Akobo along the Sobat 
River in Upper Nile. The barges needed 
to pass through the Jikany town of Nasir. 
Officials in Nasir say that they were tipped 
off that some of the boats were carrying 
ammunition sent from Dr Riek Gai, a Lou 
Nuer presidential advisor to Omar Bashir. 
When the boats arrived, they were guarded 
by a large contingent of SPLA from Dolieb 
Hills, which was apparently not standard 
operating procedure for humanitarian relief 
convoys. When officials in Nasir checked the 
waybill for the convoy, they found that three 
boats were not officially listed but did bear 
WFP flags.
A group led by the local SSRRC official and 
including some local youth attempted to 
search the boats: ‘We started checking the 
boats, but the SPLA commanders stopped 
us. …I think the WFP logistics people were 
given money to allow the boats to carry WFP 
flags, and some SPLA commanders were 
given money to ensure that the boats went 
through uninspected. This was the first time 
that the SPLA guarded a WFP barge.’208 
The leader of the youth group who had 
inspected the boat claimed that: ‘I checked 
the barge…the first boat we checked had SAF 
military uniforms. We were unable to check 
the rest. People on board were trying to bribe 
us not to check the boats… We got seven 
boxes of ammunition from the boat, and we 
used these to fight the SPLA. The SPLA sunk 
the suspected boats. We also found tents and 
blankets aboard the boats.’209 
The barges were released from Nasir after 
being detained for a week. Nasir County 
officials were reportedly ordered by Dr. Riek 
Machar, the GoSS Vice President, to allow 
all the boats to pass. Many of the SPLA who 
were on the barges in Nasir disembarked 
and followed on foot along the river, fearing 
that the boats would be ambushed as soon 
as they departed. The boats were attacked 
and sunk soon after leaving Nasir, and at 
least 50 SPLA were killed.
Whether the boats were actually carrying 
ammunition has not been confirmed, 
although UNMIS did send divers to search 
the wrecks. According to UN officials, the 
water was too cloudy to determine whether 
there were any crates of ammunition 
or other military supplies on the barge. 
In May, Lou had attacked Torkech and 
killed 75 Jikany women and children, and 
many in Nasir were not predisposed to 
sit by passively while they perceived the 
international community to be assisting and 
strengthening a group they see as hijacking 
their land and massacring their people. 
Niggaz and Outlaws posing for the camera
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OthER ARMEd gROuPs 
And OutsidERs
Militias
As with weapons inflows, it is hard to verify 
claims of renewed militia activity as the 
reason for local violence. Nonetheless, the 
perceived threat that stems from militias 
– current or former – is palpable. When 
investigated, most reports are based on 
loose conjecture and weak evidence. Even 
if there aren’t large mobilised militias active, 
there are suggestions that the legacy of 
militia activity continues to make individuals 
and communities feel threatened. 
In Upper Nile, a host of former militia leaders 
– Gordon Kong, Tanginya, Lam Akol, Simon 
Gatwich, Ismael Konye, and others – create 
a general apprehension that old northern 
proxy militias who are now part of the JIU 
in Malakal could be rapidly reactivated to 
destabilise the region. Gordon Kong, the 
former SSDF commander who joined SAF 
after the Juba declaration and is currently 
based in Khartoum, told sources that he was 
responsible for ordering the attack on the 
WFP barge.210 In remote areas, local SPLA is 
often comprised of former militia groups who 
are still loyal to their old commanders. This 
is the case for example in Boro Medina near 
the Darfur border where residents are very 
aware that the SPLA sent for their protection 
is only loosely connected to any central 
SPLA command.211 
The state of other personal militias is unclear. 
The forces of the former leader of the SPLA 
Bahr el-Ghazal faction, Karabino Kuany Bol, 
are said to be: ‘…basically spent in Abyei’ 
although concrete evidence is missing. The 
Al Fursan militia along the Darfur border is 
supposedly integrated into the SPLA, but 
at times reports suggest otherwise.212 The 
proximity to the border causes concerns 
among residents there, as was expressed 
during a group discussion with local leaders: 
‘We fear those people because they might 
be friends of those with horses.’213 
Almost everyone questioned in WBeG 
about the state of ‘Quart Salam’, the militia 
formerly commanded by Major General 
El Tom Anour, expressed doubt that the 
force had given up its weapons and fully 
demobilised.214 Only the governor himself 
was adamant that with a presidential 
declaration ordering Quart Salam to align, 
the bulk joined the SPLA after a public rally 
in Wau’s Freedom Square.215 The UN tells 
the story of the Quart Salam’s disarmament 
quite differently because demobilisation 
happened under SAF auspices without UN 
involvement or verification. Several other 
sources, including a government official, 
confirmed that Quart Salam: ‘…went home 
with their guns.’216 While only few former 
Quart Salam fighters are known to be in the 
SPLA or SAF, the general story is that, as 
told by Sudanese staff in a local NGO: ‘Tom 
Anour was able to be convinced to send half 
his forces to SPLA and half to SAF, but they 
are still branded as NCP or Jellabahs.’217  
The fate of militia members who went to 
neither SPLA nor SAF is entirely unclear; 
they were described by international UN staff 
as being merely: ‘…a fatigued non-Dinka, 
non-Luo force.’218 Most Wau residents asked 
did not seem comfortable talking about 
them, emphasising the conclusion of UN 
staff that the Quart Salam ought not to be 
written off too quickly.219  
Militias operating under the guise of ‘youth 
groups’ seem to be present in Upper 
Nile, where SPLM-DC, state government 
officials, and several county commissioners 
are all reported to have their own armed 
groups. When a group of youth in Akobo 
were asked whether they used to be part of 
the white army, one replied: ‘…no, we are 
white army…but we don’t have weapons 
anymore’.220 Interestingly, the same youth 
explained that a group of 26 Lou youth 
purchased weapons from an unknown 
source in Malakal to collectively conduct 
revenge attacks on other groups. 
youth gangs
Several youth gangs are emerging in 
Southern Sudan; the ‘Niggaz’ and ‘Outlaws’ 
are two of the best-known youth gangs in 
Southern Sudan, with the term ‘Niggaz’ 
describing both members of a specific 
gang as well as generally bad behaviour by 
groups of young people. Members of the 
gangs model themselves on US-rap stars 
such as Jay-Z, 50 Cent, Lil Wayne and 2Pac. 
They wear baggy trousers, loose t-shirts 
and sunglasses and are said to be drunk 
and lascivious at parties they organise in the 
bush.221 A large proportion of the members 
are reportedly women who wear short 
skirts, tight jeans and have been accused 
of killing.222 The older generation decries the 
activities of the groups (likened by a Wau 
SSRRC official to ‘Sodom and Gomorrha’)223 
and criticise the dress style. The reverend of 
the Diocese of Torit laments: ‘The trousers 
down the buttocks, is it a good dress? 
They are copying the black Americans who 
move half naked around the streets killing 
people.’224 Seen as major threat, the Niggaz 
and Outlaws are accused of owning guns 
and committing crimes.225 There are also 
allegations linking the Niggaz to the SPLA – 
or rather criminal activities carried out under 
SPLA guises, as voiced by a large group of 
chiefs in Wau. The ‘chiefs’ from Wau County 
believed that: ‘Some soldiers are supporting 
the Niggaz and guns are not collected from 
there.’226 Others echo the use of ‘youth 
groups’ by militia leaders and suspect that 
the Niggaz and Outlaws also answer to a 
military or political leader, as expressed by 
a Wau correction officer: ‘One reason why 
[the judges] don’t prosecute [Niggaz for their 
crimes] is there might be something political 
behind it.’227 
The formation of the Niggaz and Outlaws 
in the years following the end of the civil 
war can be interpreted in several ways. On 
one level, they are a symptom of the drastic 
social change within Southern Sudanese 
society as it struggles to return to a state 
of peace modelled on Sudan before the 
war whilst embracing and incorporating 
its citizens who do not remember the old 
Sudan. Many youths have experienced 
another type of life, either in the army or 
abroad as refugees and do not wish to 
return to an old way of life. Members of the 
Niggaz in Korgana explained: ‘We just want 
to lead our lives, not be forced to marry 
who your parents says… we just want 
to be modern.’228 At the same time, they 
expressed concern regarding the manner 
in which they were treated by the chief who 
is: ‘…very hard on us. We do not get to do 
anything or else the chief will lock us up in 
an abandoned house.’229 
At another level, the Niggaz and Outlaws 
could be interpreted as a result of the vacuum 
produced by a breakdown in social structures 
combined with a weak state that fails to 
monopolise force. According to a prison 
officer in Wau, 32 Niggaz were arrested in 
October 2009 for: ‘…collecting young ladies, 
pitching tents by the riverside and using the 
ladies there.’230 All members were able to 
arrange the required SDP1,000 (£270) to post 
bail.231 Similar arrests and posting of bail have 
occurred in Torit and Juba. Such groups of 
alienated and unoccupied youths are easily 
manipulated and mobilised and thus could 
pose a serious threat to urban and rural 
stability in Southern Sudan. 
the lord’s Resistance Army (lRA)
The LRA has been present in Sudan for 
close to 20 years now; EES has particularly 
suffered from a legacy of distrust, violence 
and LRA movement. From 2006 onwards, 
the location of the LRA shifted to Western 
Equatoria. The year 2009 marked another 
significant development. The LRA is now 
scattered across Sudan, DRC and Central 
African Republic (CAR) by the ill-fated 
‘Operation Lightning Thunder’, a joint military 
operation launched, after peace talks failed, 
by the Ugandan, Congolese and US armies 
and, to some extent, the SPLA.232 The LRA 
has since continued to attack civilians in the 
DRC, the CAR and Sudan.
The current strength of the LRA and the 
exact whereabouts of LRA leader Joseph 
Kony remain unknown. Some reports 
suggest that troops have moved into Chad 
and Darfur, others point out that there are no 
troops left to speak of. In the lead-up to the 
Sudanese elections, the SPLA announced 
that it was expecting large-scale attacks in 
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Greater Bahr el-Ghazal, but there seemed 
to be no hard evidence for this. Based on 
eyewitness accounts of civilians who have 
suffered through attacks, the number of 
Sudanese commanders in the LRA seems 
to have increased tremendously. UN staff 
commented that the perception is that high-
ranking Sudanese are in the LRA by choice, 
rather than by force.233 
The lack of reliable information and 
comprehensive military strategies have 
brought a few things to light that are 
important for understanding some of the 
security and conflict perceptions shaping 
Southern Sudan today. WBeG recently 
regularly reported LRA movement. The 
validity of the information is impossible 
to verify, but the content of the reported 
movement is in itself telling. After the attack 
on Boro Medina on October 21 2009, the 
state government initiated a visit to the area 
on October 30 to investigate. Even though 
three policemen were killed in the attack, 
the police commissioner declined to join 
the investigation. During the visit, facilitated 
by the UN, the government delegation 
was controlled by the SPLA which did not 
allow the delegation to talk to people who 
had witnessed what happened. The army 
only supplied its own information to the 
delegation, including the SPLA’s success in 
freeing those abducted, although the army 
was not clear whether it had killed or rather 
captured three LRA.234 
None of the people involved in the attack 
interviewed for this report had provided 
information about the attackers to anyone 
else or had been interviewed by government 
officials or the army. The lack of interest 
displayed by authorities to pursue detailed 
information about LRA attacks is striking. 
Overall, the SPLA kept a very tight lid on 
information, presumably because details 
about attacks might expose SPLA behaviour 
and whereabouts as well as expose failures in 
Southern Sudan’s protection mechanisms.
Fellata 
Similarly shrouded in mystery are the 
nomadic Ambororo, or the Fellata, a name 
often used interchangeably for a group 
about which little is known, yet many 
suspicions have been circulating for years.235 
Numerous respondents cited the Ambororo 
and Fellata as the biggest threat to peace 
and this sentiment is certainly echoed in 
the Sudanese press. Currently, accusations 
about the Ambororo and Fellata are 
creating a backlash, with the groups being 
blamed for uncounted conflicts and violent 
incidents,to the extent that communities 
in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr 
el-Ghazal use violence to prevent the 
Ambororo and Fellata from passing through 
or settling in the area. In the Nile region of 
Sudan, ‘Fellata’ is used by Arab groups as a 
derogatory term associated with ignorance, 
disease and shiftiness. 236
Over the last few years, numerous public 
allegations have been made specifically 
against the Ambororo, following a campaign 
by the GoSS to remove the Ambororo 
from Western Equatoria State. The thinly 
veiled suspicion of external support in the 
media was often openly aired in interviews 
conducted by the research team. An SSRRC 
official at Wau reported that the Ambororo 
are being used by the North to terrorize the 
people in Southern Sudan.237 A coordinator 
of a local peace-building NGO commented 
that people think that the Fellata are 
janjaweed.238 Again and again, interviewees 
reported that the Fellata were armed and 
that they carried satellite phones, signifying 
the need for communication with outsiders. 
International UNMIS staff confirmed that 
the Ambororo are: ‘…considered a high 
security risk on the higher political level, 
yet local reports seem to suggest that 
there are actually very few problems. So 
the question is: why is this such a political 
issue?’239 Indeed when asking those who 
blamed the lack of peace on the Ambororo 
to name a specific violent incident involving 
the accused groups, only one UN official 
could refer to two incidents.240 One answer 
why the issue is so politicised could be 
that the Fellata are a welcome scapegoat 
for local authorities who accuse the Fellata 
of violence in order to cover up their own 
administrative shortcomings or failure to 
prevent LRA attacks.241 
For the Fellata, life in Southern Sudan is 
challenging, as explained by a Fellata elder 
in Wau: 
There is peace, but not for everyone. We 
do not benefit from it. We have no school, 
no water. We cannot move out from here 
or we will be killed…We need to be home 
by 7pm, otherwise it is dangerous, even 
walking to the cattle camp is now dangerous 
in a group, we cannot even take motorbikes 
because the motorbike owners will tell 
somebody we are taking the motorbike 
and they will betray us and attack us…
The government wanted to open schools 
but were told by other people ‘if you 
allow Fellata to go to school, there will be 
problems…We are not bad people, we have 
not killed a single Fertit. If they say we are 
unapproachable that is a lie. But so many of 
our people are killed.242 
At the community level in WBeG, perceptions 
of the Fellata were more positive. It was 
noted that they were no longer bringing 
their animals to town, thus causing less 
destruction.243 One chief from the Wau area 
pointed out that dealing with the Fellata 
regarding cattle on the fields was much less 
complicated than dealing with the Dinka: 
The Ambororo, the Fellatas, they are also 
cattle-keepers, but they have a good 
understanding if you talk to them, they 
understand. The most destruction comes 
from those people of Warrap State.242 
The Fellata interviewed for this report were 
clear about their aspirations. In Korgana, 
their message for GoSS was ‘the Fellata 
in Korgana are Southern Sudanese. We’re 
blacks. In the north, that’s how we are 
looked at.’245 The Fellata settled in Wau 
reported more problems than those at 
Korgana and expressed more uncertainty 
about their position. As participants in one 
focus group put it: ‘We are afraid of the 
government because they discriminate us. 
We don’t think there is a government.’246 
It is difficult to conclude whether there is 
any truth in the allegations made against 
the Fellata or indeed to understand the 
connection between the settled Fellata 
and the nomadic Ambororo. It is clear 
that the Fellata that look after cattle in 
the bush carry guns as the Fellata elders 
openly talked about it – although the group 
in Korgana claimed to have no guns – 
and even those suspicious of the Fellata 
confirm that: ‘In the bush you cannot walk 
without a gun.’247 The allegation that they 
are carrying out subversive activities on 
behalf of the Khartoum government is hard 
to corroborate. Information on the Fellata 
is so sketchy that all understanding is 
rather limited, leading to accusations and 
misinterpretations. The broader implications 
of this are important as there are several 
groups in Southern Sudan who are already 
extremely vulnerable because little is known 
about them. As a result, they are less likely 
to benefit from government in the future, 
regardless of whether they will live in a united 
or divided Sudan. 
Fellata women
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The functionality of peace based on peace 
agreements is a contentious issue. This 
is particularly important in Sudan, where 
peace agreements form the basis of many 
levels of government from the national to the 
very local. Despite the prevalence of positive 
achievements since the CPA, it is clear that 
for many interviewees ‘living peacefully’ is 
a remote concept. Because violence can 
happen at any point, people do not perceive 
their environment as peaceful. Women 
representatives in Wau noted that: ‘Social 
attitudes around violence have not changed. 
People do not have a positive attitude.’248  
The unpredictability of supplies and security 
post-CPA has made experiences of peace 
unsteady. Often respondents pointed out that 
their personal security was ‘better’ during 
wartimes, or rather more ‘predictable’. 
To gain an understanding of what defines life 
during peace as opposed to war, drawing 
competitions were held in several schools 
throughout the three states, asking children 
to draw their impressions of life before and 
after the CPA. In portrayals of life before the 
CPA, a common image is recruitment to 
fight with the SPLA, dilapidated, destroyed 
houses and aerial bombing. The exact 
breakdown of themes and depictions in the 
drawings can be seen on the next page:
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 The recurring themes in children’s views of 
life under the CPA serve as an illustration 
of what seems to be the most important 
elements of peace, or more precisely what 
people most expect as ‘peace dividends’ 
– for example, free movement, education, 
and better access to food and water. A 
dominant trend in images portraying life after 
the CPA concerned the increase in school 
attendance, probably unsurprising for a 
competition held among school children. 
Services and peace
Along the same lines, survey results indicate 
that aspects of life associated with peace 
concern personal security, and receiving 
aid are important aspects of peace. By 
correlating perceptions of personal security, 
memories of receiving aid and perceptions 
of peace, we gain an insight into how 
so-called peace times are experienced. 
The data indicate that Southern Sudanese 
experienced war as a time of increased food 
aid and assistance from the international 
community, and peace as a time of reduced 
assistance and food aid. The perception that 
food aid and assistance under the CPA fell 
below levels of the early war years – coupled 
with the lack of a peace dividend – does 
promote a sense that instability creates 
better aid delivery. 
The data in the chart on the previous 
page depicts the numbers of people who 
reported perceiving peace, feeling safe, and 
receiving food and other assistance along 
a timeline from 1972 to 2009. It depicts a 
high correlation between perceptions of 
peace and perceptions of personal security 
(r= .95). The number of respondents 
who perceived peace in Southern Sudan 
increased from 17 (p=17%) during the 
protracted wars years to 81 (p=83%) when 
the CPA was signed in 2005. The number of 
respondents who perceived an increase in 
their personal security also increased from 
14 (p=14%) during the protracted war years 
to 56 (p=57%) when the CPA was signed. 
After 2005, perceptions of both peace and 
personal security decreased, reflecting the 
rise in conflict in some areas. The correlation 
between perceptions of peace and 
perceptions of personal security is especially 
strong during the years since the CPA. 
The difference in the numbers of people 
who perceived peace in 2005 compared 
to personal security suggests that while 
people associate peace with the signing of 
the CPA (i.e. formal contracts at a national 
level), security is more intimately linked to 
the reality on the ground. This suggests that 
as a measure of lack of conflict, assessing 
personal security may be more accurate. It 
should be noted however that perceptions of 
peace may have influenced the increase in 
perceptions of personal security in 2005. 
It is clear from almost all interviews that 
better access to services is seen as a vital 
ingredient of peace. Lack of development 
in infrastructure impacts quality of life 
as it hinders trade and movement, but 
respondents pointed out that being 
connected by road symbolised more than a 
simple infrastructure requirement. In parts of 
EES, being able to travel along the road safely 
was the most remarkable aspect of being in 
peace,249 while in Raja County, one religious 
leader pointed out that the road was also 
the gateway for information and knowledge, 
both desperately needed by the Southern 
Sudanese to become informed citizens.250
Furthermore, groups tended to judge their 
own peace benefits in direct comparison 
to that of other groups, reinforcing an 
‘us versus them’ attitude. A sense of 
marginalisation – highlighted by the 
overwhelming sense of victimisation 
expressed in many interviews – was widely 
experienced and seen as connected to 
government policies that deliberately 
excluded some from benefiting from peace. 
For instance, the Lopit at Iboni in EES feel 
the government has ‘forgotten’ them or is 
intentionally performing politics of exclusion. 
Members of the peace committee argued 
that there is a clear bias towards other tribes 
within the government, and that NGOs and 
funds are being directed elsewhere:
Even the government says that to the Lopit 
they are blind. If the government knew we 
were his people, he would have divided the 
food and employment equally between all the 
tribes. We are forgotten from the government.
There are some communities who are 
saying that aid should not come to the 
Lopit. Do not listen to them. The nearest 
counties, the politicians and people working 
in government are telling NGOs not to be 
bringing development to the Lopit.251 
The direct relationship between perceptions 
of peace, services and lack of government 
credibility points to a larger problem 
within the building of Southern Sudan. 
The state-building framework dictates the 
strengthening of government institutions 
to deliver better services in the future; 
yet peace-building requires these better 
services now so that people can experience 
peace as a benefit and adjust violent 
behaviour. While people are hopeful for the 
future, at present the sentiment that GoSS is 
not meeting the expectations of the people 
of Southern Sudan is overwhelming. 
GoSS faces a serious challenge in 
addressing this credibility gap, particularly 
because currently the main strategy 
seems to be to pressure INGOs to fill the 
service vacuum; these are often reluctant 
to take it on due to the aim of building 
government capacity and avoiding a shift 
of accountability away from the domestic 
government to international actors. The 
situation warrants a close analysis of 
priorities, asking whether the priority 
should lie in building government capacity 
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or in delivering services through NGOs 
to establish peace benefits. Allowing the 
government to rely on other actors may 
currently be the price that needs to be paid 
for life saving services. 
International NGO staff pointed out that: ‘We 
as NGOs are basically state-building which 
is outside our normal mandate… and this 
means we are essentially providing what 
the GoSS should be providing in terms of 
service delivery in many locations, including 
very remote ones.’252 This perception 
ultimately situates NGOs as an alternative or 
additional government branch. Numerous 
respondents indicated a tendency to hold 
the international or the NGO-community 
more accountable for their welfare, which 
deflects accountability away from GoSS. 
This is particularly acute in Eastern Equatoria 
where for much of the war and the late 
1970s and early 1980s, INGOs, especially 
those of Norwegian origin, were the de 
facto governing body of that region. This 
could provide a stabilisation model for the 
region today, albeit a model that would 
require radical shifts in donor strategy. As 
such, frustration about the lack of services 
was directed towards NGOs – and even 
donors – and not the government. Donors 
acknowledged that there is a perception that 
GoSS is not providing for the community 
and stated that GoSS is keen to change 
this, but they also feel that GoSS’ priority 
is with streamlining payroll and accounting 
systems,253 implicitly underscoring the belief 
of many Southern Sudanese that GoSS is 
more self-serving than citizen-serving.
PEACE-building: A 
PAlliAtivE CuRE?
When dealing with complex and multi-
layered conflicts, it is often not obvious how 
‘peace-building’ works. At the moment, 
anything from family disputes to massacres 
is lumped together under one ‘conflict’ 
headline. In turn, various approaches 
to ‘peace-building’ also merge. This 
causes widely differing expectations of 
the outcomes of peace-building activities. 
Identifying an entry point for conflict 
resolutions, in terms of prioritising issues and 
actors is a quasi-insurmountable task. For 
many people who have experienced violence 
since the CPA, there is confusion over who 
the appropriate authorities should be. This 
was aptly summed up by the leader of a 
youth peace-building association in NBeG 
who stated that: ‘One root cause of conflict is 
that it is unclear who solves conflicts.’254 
Several respondents attribute the 
inadequacy of conflict resolution to the 
lack of analysis of the causes of violence. 
‘Conflict analysis is a tool’, said a Sudanese 
NGO leader – one that many felt was 
underutilized in an effort to provide conflict 
resolution. Yet with the confined CPA time 
frame of six years, there is pressure to show 
results rather than analysis and an extremely 
slow process.256  
There is a vague expectation that the 
government is in charge of providing both 
analysis and solutions, but this is made 
more complicated by the equally vague 
understanding of what government is. 
Five years after the signing of the CPA, 
lack of clarity, misinterpretation of conflict 
as mainly ‘tribal’ and the vague notion 
of what Southern Sudan might become, 
seem to have disempowered the conflict-
solving potential at every government 
level. ‘We have to teach people the use of 
government,’ one youth leader in WBeG 
emphasised: ‘When people know their role 
and duties, people cannot be confused 
easily.’ In addition, citizens have observed 
time and again that conflict resolution seems 
to be equated with ‘forgive and forget’, rather 
than bringing justice, or even more crucially 
in the Sudanese context, compensation 
for stolen property or lost lives, rather than 
a much more encompassing approach 
involving restitution, punishment, deterrence, 
tolerance and compensation.257 Ideally, it 
involves a strategy that gives each party to 
the conflict an incentive to solve the conflict.
CAsE study: stRAtEgiC 
PEACEMAKing bEtwEEn 
dinKA MAluAl And RizEigAt
Clashes between lifestyles are readily 
apparent on the north-south border where 
nomadic people venture south during dry 
season in search of pastures. The two 
nomadic groups who have been caught 
up in conflict are the Misseriya of southern 
Kordofan and the Rizeigat of south Darfur. 
The history between nomadic people and 
the residents of the border areas in Northern 
Bahr el-Ghazal and Unity State is long and 
diverse.258 Throughout long periods, nomadic 
cattle-keepers and settled residents co-
existed with agreed sharing of resources.259 
During the war, Misseriya and Rizeigat were 
named in the same breath, both as northern 
allies, yet recent years have seemingly 
seen increased political division between 
the two. During war years, the nomadic 
tribes abducted thousands of people from 
NBeG, Unity or from the Nuba. Many people 
remember massacres. Memories of the 
infamous ‘Wau Train’ are still strong:260 When 
Khartoum wanted to move the train along 
the tracks to Wau, they gave the Misseriya 
licence to kill or take anything they could find 
along the train lines.261 
Current conflict between the nomadic 
people and residents of the border – with 
a closer look here at Rizeigat and Dinka 
Malual – is about pastures and water, but 
just as much about the history of child 
abduction by nomadic people and a cycle 
of revenge. Currently, there is increased 
anxiety in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal because 
limited rains have decreased pastures 
and water supply. The ongoing problems 
draw on issues such as unclear border 
demarcation, failure to compensate and lack 
of reconciliation for families who have had a 
relative abducted or killed. Uncertainty about 
the origins of heavy weapons carried by 
the nomads and continued militarisation of 
groups adds to the confusion. 
Continuous peacemaking
With the long history of conflict between 
nomadic tribes and settled Dinka along the 
north-south border comes a long history of 
conflict resolution. Several peace conferences 
have been held since an outbreak of violence 
involving Misseriya in spring 2008 to re-
establish peaceful co-existence and sharing 
of resources. In addition to the very prominent 
peace meetings, local residents, NGO staff 
and government employees point out that 
there is something uniquely different in their 
attempts to prevent future clashes: each 
conference has been followed up through 
further initiatives to keep communication 
open. While communication is tentative and 
unreliable, local government officials also point 
out that in 2009 violence has been confined to 
isolated small incidents. 
Local officials, while admitting that 
fundamental issues have not yet been 
resolved, credit the ongoing process 
for relatively confined violence. An NGO 
employee involved in the Rizeigat-Dinka 
process explained how each side had 
formed a committee of 75 people to assure 
continuity in the dialogue, and a meeting of the 
committees took place in January 2010.262 The 
commissioner of Gok Machar explained how 
since he first opened dialogue with Rizeigat 
leaders unofficially in 2008, he has gradually 
built up communication, culminating in a first 
meeting in Darfur’s Nyala in autumn 2009. His 
approach is to underline that for people who 
rely on resources on both sides of the border, 
changed geopolitics could have a devastating 
effect unless local cross-border contacts are 
strong: ‘We are sharing water and grain…we 
want to assure we are not [the] enemy.’263 
Local NGO staff says that the combination of 
pushing for involvement of communities by 
using the two committees has been equally 
important as official strategies.264 Traditional 
leaders were involved, but not asked to be 
the main brokers of a peace deal, but given 
a very specific task of solving property 
issues resulting from cattle-raiding, so: ‘…
we do traditional courts with… ‘chiefs’ from 
Rizeigat and Dinka. Five ‘chiefs’ from Rizeigat 
came, five from Dinka.’ This was also seen as 
necessary in order to not alienate community 
members who felt that closing the border to 
nomadic movement would be the only way to 
prevent violence. 
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Shared strategic interests
Several respondents underlined the 
approach to peacemaking between Dinka 
and Rizeigat based on the concept that the 
two had more in common than divided them. 
Both sides need the water and open trade 
routes between north and south because, 
as a local peace-building officer state:, 
‘Khartoum is closer than Kampala.’266 While 
residents in Gok Machar were less than 
enthusiastic to facilitate more contact with 
the Rizeigat, on the government level the 
strategy for peace is to use the relationship 
between the groups and neutralise triggers 
for violence. The commissioner in Gok 
Machar explained that:
We want to divide Misseriya and Rizeigat. We 
are in dialogue with them and then we will 
divide them. How? We have tactics. Every 
human being has an interest. …the Rizeigat 
are poor people, like the people of NBeG. In 
our vision of SPLM, there are marginalized 
people in southern Darfur like Southern 
Sudan…they don’t have development in their 
area. So we should build our relationship as 
marginalized people…because the needs 
of Rizeigat are not the needs of Khartoum. 
They need water and grazing. This need can 
be used so I say I give you your need and 
security, so don’t come with gun…we are 
now challenging the mentality of people, this 
is our duty…And we train these to understand 
the benefits of peace.267 
In finding a shared ground – marginalisation 
through Khartoum and need for the same 
resources – local peacemaking attempts 
to shift political alliances by providing a 
seemingly more fruitful alliance. The political 
ambitions of this redefined relationship go 
even further: by finding common ground 
with Rizeigat, the SPLM of Gok Machar also 
aims to shift dynamics in the war in Darfur. 
Some Rizeigat clans have been deeply 
involved in the Darfur war, while others 
refused to fight on the government side, 
citing marginalisation as a reason. According 
to the SPLM, the alliance would strengthen a 
front against Khartoum by uniting groups in 
Southern Sudan and Darfur. 
A further incentive to stop violence and 
underlines official involvement for peaceful 
co-existence has been the recent taxation 
strategy used by the commissioner. The 
commissioner is allowing Rizeigat, who 
sometimes take their cattle across the 
border to evade taxation in northern Sudan, 
to graze cattle without paying taxes. 
Queried by the Ministry of Finance on this 
independent taxation policy, he explained 
that if he was: 
Taking taxes from cows, Rizeigat can cause 
problems for people in Gok Machar, not in 
Juba. So why bring trouble to Gok Machar to 
give money to Juba? I said give us good policy 
and peace and then [explain these policies at 
a] conference about good taxing.268 
While it would be premature to evaluate 
lasting success of peacemaking between 
Dinka Malual and Rizeigat, both local officials 
and residents generally seemed more 
hopeful than in other areas that solutions 
could be found to prevent future violence. 
Furthermore, given the lack of standardised 
efficient mechanisms for dealing with 
local level conflicts, these issues become 
a matter of personality politics – when a 
strong popular leader challenges the status 
quo and implements sound policies real 
advances, meaningful outcomes for local 
people can be achieved. 
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the meaning of peace-building
Though there exists a general perception 
among local communities and NGOs 
that Southern Sudan has witnessed a 
proliferation of peace-building activities, 
few NGOs interviewed implemented 
programmes specifically targeting conflict 
mitigation and peace-building. ‘Conflict-
sensitive’ programming is interpreted by 
most NGOs interviewed as attempting 
to distribute their services equally so as 
not to cause tensions. None of the NGOs 
interviewed, however, had done formal 
research into the potential effects of their 
interventions on conflict dynamics or into 
ways in which to mitigate them. These 
results resonate with what has been 
found in the Rift Valley baseline study of 
local peace processes in Sudan from 
1980-2006.269 The study addresses the 
lack of a shared understanding between 
donors and intended audiences over what 
peace-building projects are intending to 
achieve. This confusion remains. The lack 
of clarity within and between organisations 
about what ‘peace-building’ entails as 
well as the lack of common objectives 
among organisations supporting peace 
processes has damaging effects on 
governance infrastructure. This ultimately 
pulls Southern Sudan in different directions 
by simultaneously strengthening different 
authorities to perform identical tasks. 
NGO-sponsored peace-building activities 
could potentially usurp state roles and 
local efforts by exerting donor-driven 
agendas and controlling disbursement of 
funds according to formulaic and inorganic 
activities. Contrary to service-delivery NGOs, 
whose roles are rather different in bringing 
tangible benefits, these conditions have 
the potential to construct a ‘peace’ that is 
divorced from the realities and complexities 
on the ground.270 
The proliferation of peace activities has 
the potential to stifle creative alternatives in 
peace-building. According to a number of 
respondents, programming is undermining 
community-based conflict resolution by 
creating dependency on external actors to 
create ‘peace’. For example, the Buya in 
Budi County of Eastern Equatoria stated 
that although the conflict with the Logir had 
reached a dangerous level, there: ‘…is no 
budget for a peace meeting; we are waiting 
for funds for peace,’ while simultaneously 
exhibiting nostalgia for times when external 
actors did not ‘interfere’ in local conflicts.271  
Such contradictory statements about 
usefulness and uselessness of peace-
building activities underline the importance 
of abandoning standardised peace-building 
activities. This realisation is widely shared 
among interviewees, yet implementation is 
difficult when pressure to disperse funds 
and to be seen to ‘do something’ makes 
organising a public peace meeting the 
obvious choice. 
tAblE: PEACE MEEtings As 
A REsPOnsE tO COnFliCt 
The following schematic table presents 
findings on the perceived importance of 
peace meetings for resolving conflict. 
Out of 319 respondents,  
184 people report being attacked at 
least once (58%)
Of those who report being attacked, 
121 (66%) report being attacked 
since the signing of the CPA
Of those who reported being 
attacked since the CPA, 52 conflicts 
were followed by peace meetings
Only 17 respondents who had 
attended a peace meeting to 
resolve a conflict thought that the 
conflict would not come back
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‘talk about peace’-building
Peace activities, including peace 
conferences which focus on mediation, 
negotiation and dialogue, have gained 
wide currency within the vocabulary of 
even the most remote villages. For many 
respondents, ‘peace’, ‘conflict resolution’, 
‘peace conference’ and ‘peace-building’ 
are almost interchangeable terms. When 
agencies are under pressure to act – or 
indeed to spend money – the quickest and 
most visible way to do so is by organising 
visible peace meetings or ‘capacity  
building’ workshops. 
A number of NGO respondents exhibited 
a high level of self-awareness about the 
pitfalls of this approach. For example, one 
employee of an INGO that supported a peace 
conference in Western Bahr el-Ghazal said: 
It felt like we were almost funding conflict. 
The peace-building exercise was like a 
precursor to the conflict breaking out. There 
is too much rush to have a peace-building 
exercise without really understanding and 
doing appropriate analysis of why the conflict 
existed. In the end all the community got out 
of it were bikes and blankets. It is a bit of a 
fad because everyone else is doing it so we 
need to be seen doing it as well.272 
Descriptions of peace meetings emphasise 
centrality of dialogue, compromise, 
forgiveness and negotiation – an approach 
that creates disjointed peace efforts by 
excluding issues of governance, such 
as accountability, justice, restitution, law 
enforcement and broader national peace 
processes despite better knowledge 
that these are vital for a comprehensive 
process. In fact, a number of respondents 
felt that peace meetings undermine the 
establishment of a strong rule of law, 
especially conferences that assumed that 
people could reconcile without a justice 
or reparation component. In contrast, 
programmes that address the structural 
causes of conflict and include addressing 
shortages in resources or infrastructure are 
more positively received by communities 
and are deemed to have long-term 
meaningful outcomes in conflict mitigation 
programming. Yet finding resolutions to 
local problems is a complex give-and-take 
process between local actors, government 
and facilitating NGOs. It is clear from 
interviews that a key factor facilitating the 
successful implementation and follow-up 
of the resolutions would have been access 
to resources for longer-term engagement, 
resources that are often not available to the 
NGO itself. 
Local conflict resolution appears to provide 
positive results in communities where the 
chief remains a respected authority with 
a clear mandate and in cases of disputes 
that involve small groups of people.273 This 
was echoed in the survey response that 
showed that a majority of people turn to 
the chief to solve family disputes. A group 
of elders in Bisselia were adamant that 
local peace initiatives in their experience 
had worked best when not taken to 
government level. Giving the example of 
a conflict resolution between the Jur and 
Ndogo in November 2006, they argued that 
issues must be solved at the grassroots 
level and involve respected ‘chiefs’.274 
Others are not so sure that the elders can 
do much if a dispute crosses tribal lines. 
A group of Ndogo women was adamant 
that elders are powerless outside their own 
tribe and indeed they had seen the Jur – 
their perceived enemy – attacking their 
chief. Their expectation remains that the 
government needs to be in charge of solving 
all conflicts because: ‘ ‘Chiefs’ are powerless 
as they cannot give strong warnings and 
orders so people will always disobey.’275 The above chart depicts the mechanism 
respondents named as the best way to 
get peace. There is a wide distribution of 
responses reflecting a range of opinions on 
the best way to get peace. Despite the wide 
range, several results are of note. Although 
not forming a large portion, it is interesting 
to note that respondents were most likely 
to mention peace meetings as the best way 
to get peace (p=16%). A large number of 
respondents also thought that talking is the 
best way to get peace (p= 9%). The results 
indicate that people value face-to-face 
contact as a way to resolve conflict. However, 
this result is also very reminiscient of the 
outcome of the question of protection. When 
asked who do they go to for protection, most 
answered ‘police’, qualifying their answer 
by saying that the police, however, never 
did anything. The answer to this question 
was at times similar: ‘talking peace’ was 
the most readily available answer, but it was 
often qualified by saying that problems must 
be resolved for peace, such as access to 
water. The differences between the states 
regarding the best method to achieve peace 
reflect the different types of conflict that are 
being played out at the local level. In Eastern 
Equatoria, increased security (p=12%) was 
a priority for securing peace. In Greater Bahr 
el Ghazal, respondents perceived tribalism 
(p= 10%) as a major block to peace. In Upper 
Nile disarmament (p= 18%), unity (p=18%) 
and reconciliation were considered important 
factors in the peace-building process. 
ChARt: whAt is thE bEst wAy  
tO gEt PEACE?
Eastern Equatoria (n=139)
Upper Nile (n=44)
Greater Bahr el Ghazal (n=136)
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Peace talks
Unity/reconciliation
Disarmament
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Security/stop cattle raiding
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questioning the sustainability  
of peace meetings
Those who criticised the idea of peace 
meetings or conferences felt that they only 
provided a snapshot of a conflict situation 
and often lacked strategic aims or indeed 
rarely sought to address structural causes 
of local conflict. The short-term nature of 
resolutions is noted by numerous observers 
and participants in peace conferences, such 
as the head of the Toposa Development 
Association: ‘The peace will be there for six 
months to a year. Without anyone monitoring 
it, conflict will return.’276 Illustrating the 
connection of issues outlined in this 
report, just months after the January 2009 
ceremony handing the village of Wanding 
from the Lou Nuer back to the Jikany Nuer, 
Lou ‘chiefs’ at Akobo said: ‘We are not 
aware of any peace agreement between the 
Lou and Jikany that gives them Wanding. 
There was a reconciliation conference, but 
there was no demarcation of the borders.’277 
Others were even harsher in their criticisms: 
‘Nobody followed the resolutions of 
the conference. When you finish the 
conference, you go home…Sometimes you 
take a conference and the same day, you 
have conflict again. So you need to find 
another strategy,’ said the commissioner 
of Aweil North in NBeG, pointing out that 
it was often unclear who is responsible for 
implementation and follow-up.278 
Speaking about the ‘Bentiu conference for 
Kings, Chiefs and Traditional Leaders’ held in 
May 2009 with 1,400 leaders in attendance, 
one chief from Wau pointed out that results 
of the conference were still unclear to them 
despite the fact that a final communiqué had 
been passed. ‘What is the challenge for me is 
the result of the Bentiu conference. Because 
people meet, but they don’t establish 
mechanisms. When you come up with a 
resolution, you create a mechanism. If the 
CPA did not establish many mechanisms, we 
cannot achieve peace’.279 
In certain cases, peace meetings are 
believed to have resulted in renewed conflict 
as the meetings refresh memories about 
old grudges. Numerous meetings that one 
or more of the antagonists did not attend 
were highlighted during the research. 
Ultimately this can worsen relations between 
groups, a negative outcome that could have 
been avoided with adequate planning to 
either ensure that all parties attended or to 
postpone a meeting until it was clear that all 
key actors in the conflict would attend. One 
donor representative, after having funded 
and facilitated the drafting of numerous 
peace agreements, pointed out that in 
her experience, local peace agreements 
were: ‘…intangible and there are intangible 
benefits’ and that lack of follow-up was:  
‘…devastating to the whole project.’ 280 
Furthermore, many of the resolutions 
that communities agree on are related 
to the security situation and need to be 
implemented by government actors. 
In EES, the reluctance by some top-
level government officials to implement 
resolutions is believed by some to be a 
function of high-level involvement in the 
funding and instigating of cattle-raiding.
‘Our leaders try to knock communities’ 
heads together. This raiding does not end, 
because these leaders have cattle in villages 
and they are willing to give arms to grass 
roots to go and retrieve the cattle.’281  
(UNMIS staff)
 ‘I suspect that this raiding has become 
commercial, the cows from far away end up 
in the market here, how?’282 (EES politician)
Though there is widespread recognition 
that the outcomes of peace meetings 
have a history of becoming unsustainable, 
agencies were quite open that in most cases 
they have made few revisions to how the 
conferences are organised. ‘People talk all 
the time, but there is no implementation,’ 
said a local NGO worker, summing up a fairly 
typical reply.283  
CAsE study: A FRAgilE 
‘PEACE’ At lAuRO 
The conference held in Lauro in July 2009, 
in response to ‘the Lauro massacre’, is 
continually highlighted as an example of a 
successful peace conference which is meant 
to have brought the cessation of hostilities 
between the Buya, Didinga and Toposa. The 
conference lasted seven days and concluded 
with the resolution to re-establish the border 
between the Didinga and Toposa. According 
to the Didinga, Toposa from Kapoeta East 
had encouraged Toposa of Budi County to 
recognise the border and reach a compromise 
with the Didinga over access to grazing 
land during the dry season. The mediation 
and facilitation was provided by numerous 
peace actors, including members of Pact 
Sudan, officials from GoSS and administrative 
representatives. The conference culminated in 
the burial of ammunition as a symbolic act of 
all members’ commitment to peace. Notably, 
the task of monitoring implementation was 
handed to a committee with a wide base 
in the community: ‘chiefs’, police, the army, 
commissioner, women and youth. 
The positive reporting and official portrayal 
of the Lauro conference give credence to 
peace meetings and the power of dialogue, 
negotiation and compromise between 
communities pursuing harmonious relations. 
Although shortly after the conference there 
was an incident of Buya raiding Toposa,284 
the incidents of cattle-raiding are described 
as having drastically decreased after the 
peace meeting. Didinga explain that relations 
with their neighbours have vastly improved: 
‘Up until now, the Toposa are living 
peacefully; some of them even stay here.’285 
PACT programme manager states that since 
the conference, there has been no reported 
violence.286 The achievements of the peace 
conference must however be re-examined 
in light of the fact that raiding tends to be 
seasonal, with fewer raids occurring during 
rainy season and that there is now a strong 
army presence in the town. Upon closer 
analysis, it is clear that the peace conference 
was largely symbolic and took place during 
a period of seasonally low-raiding and after 
‘peace’ had been enforced by the presence 
of a law enforcement institution in the village, 
bringing into sharp focus the need to look 
at peace-building and law enforcement as 
complementary activities, emphasised by 
local responses:
If the soldiers were not here, the peace 
would not be here. The peace is just 
maintained because of the army. If the army 
is pulled out, and police and wild life come, 
then we might have peace.
If the army isn’t here, we wouldn’t come 
down from the mountain...If soldiers leave, 
we will run away. We know definitely the 
Toposa will come back and attack287 
(Didinga community leaders) 
Even so, the army barracks are no guarantee 
of dissuasion; as a number of attacks have 
been carried out on the soldiers, the presence 
of the army maintaining peace highlights the 
importance of the government establishing 
a monopoly of force in the south. The 
implementation of bye-laws, established by 
the two communities, codifies this peace as 
enforced by the presence of the army. In effect, 
the conference was a hat-tip to traditional 
adjudication of conflict and peace-building. 
The Lauro conference also highlights the 
neglected ‘politics of peace’. In a context where 
peace meetings are so embedded within the 
governance discourse it is not surprising that 
political wrangling occurs. The Speaker of 
the EES Interim Legislative Assembly spoke 
passionately about having been excluded from 
the Lauro Conference. As the highest ranking 
representative of the Didinga community in 
EES, she felt that the meeting was held at short 
notice in her absence. She believes this was a 
strategic action by the Chairman of the Peace 
Commission – a Toposa – to ensure that the 
peace meeting was not too demanding on 
members of his tribe in terms of concessions 
and potential reparations for the attack. The 
Speaker was scathing about the political 
manipulation of this issue and extended 
her criticism of the Peace Commission to a 
number of other peace initiatives that failed 
to involve Members of Parliament and the 
Parliamentary Committee on Peace, including 
the lack of representation of the legislative 
body in Toposa-Turkana conference scheduled 
for late 2009 and ultimately postponed.
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A look at local peace agreements 
More than 10 years ago, a journalist wrote: 
‘One problem that has bedevilled the peace 
process in the region is lack of follow up. 
Whenever peace pacts are concluded, 
there are no funds to facilitate follow-up 
meetings to ensure resolutions agreed on 
are implemented.’288 This points to two 
issues: firstly, a lack of clarity on whether it 
is the government that needs to follow-up, 
the parties to the agreement or the NGO 
that initiated the peace meeting. Secondly, 
for an NGO, follow-up might be hard to 
realise due to lack of resources and funding 
procedures that often do not allow for longer 
term presence and multi-sectorial funding 
required for this kind of programming. 
Compounding the problem of follow-up is 
the fact that the resolution ofen does not 
make clear what is agreed on and hence, 
what needs to be followed up. Resolutions 
tend to be broad-brushed. An example is 
Eastern Equatoria’s Kamuto Declaration 
(July 2004), which is very rich in rhetoric. 
Resolutions include: ‘Create and strengthen 
all institutions or activities that shall deepen 
the sentiments of unity and harmony 
amongst our respective communities.’ 
However there is no elaboration on whose 
responsibility this is or what institutions or 
activities might promote unity and harmony. 
A similar vagueness was apparent at the 
November 2009 conference in Torit where 
resolutions were added in an ad hoc manner 
with a familiar impetus toward containing 
common development jargon such as 
‘participation’, ‘ownership’ and ‘gender-
balance’. Indeed, towards the end of the 
resolution-writing session one attendee 
brought it to the attention of the room that 
nowhere in the resolutions had ‘human 
rights’ been mentioned. The resolutions 
were duly revised and a notion about 
adhering to ‘human rights’ slotted into an 
existing resolution. 
Nowhere in the document is there an 
elaboration of how these resolutions 
might be implemented. Calls by a female 
participant to explicitly outline who should be 
responsible for follow-up went unanswered. 
Without elaboration of mechanisms with the 
potential to make these ‘wish-lists’ a reality, 
the disconnection between resolutions and 
reality is not surprising. Many resolutions 
from peace conferences and meetings 
are: ‘…on the shelves’, said an INGO 
staff member in Kapoeta.289 They lack 
practical, implementable, and ‘grounded’ 
activities to ensure that resolutions are 
met and, importantly, this is believed to 
be particularly acute with resolutions that 
involve government intervention or threaten 
the activities of elites. 
In the resolutions of a conference held in 
Western Bahr el-Ghazal’s Mapel in 2005 a 
plan was laid out to form a joint committee, 
which would meet annually to monitor and 
settle border disputes. It was not specified 
who would make up the committee, how 
it would be connected to government 
institutions, whether it would use customary 
or judicial law and finally, who would fund 
such an endeavour. More critically, the 
committee was never mentioned as playing 
a role in resolving the border dispute at 
Mapel or Fongu River. Ultimately, the core 
weaknesses of the Mapel Peace Conference 
were the lack of an outline of how the 
resolutions would be achieved and the lack 
of a designated body responsible for the 
follow up. In fact most of the resolutions 
were about infrastructure, much of which 
depends on GoSS. As one elder at Mapel 
commented: ‘There is no peace without 
food and water, road, school and health 
service but we are only concentrating on 
peace and reconciliation.’290 As GoSS 
is unable or unwilling to provide these 
resources, peace conferences act as a 
superficial salve for deep wounds – or, 
strategically, can only be one component 
of a larger approach that absolutely has to 
involve development, justice and security. 
Currently, however, with many of the 
other components not in place, peace 
conferences seem to be counterproductive 
and taken out of context. 
Alternative approaches
How to achieve peace and peaceful 
co-existence of communities is the 
great challenge of Southern Sudan and 
approaches to peace need to be rethought. 
What became clear during this research is 
that peace is not a prize in itself; it needs to 
be connected with tangible benefits. Hence, 
peace-building activities need to move far 
beyond common approaches of talking 
about issues in an open forum and need to 
be tightly connected to bringing solutions 
to the problems that, without fail, each 
community underlined during the course of 
this research: ‘peace’ holds a meaning far 
beyond ‘peacefulness’ or simply ‘absence of 
conflict’ and for most respondents included 
better infrastructure, better resources, 
better opportunities, demarcated borders 
and reliable government structures. It also 
means tolerance and peaceful co-existence 
of different groups through an ongoing 
process, rather than an event.
For peace-building activities, this could 
mean changing the approach. Rather 
than making it a priority to bring together 
groups of people, priorities might need 
to shift towards tangible improvement of 
the living situation and anchoring long-
term processes on individual community 
members who can act as conduits. The 
concept of peace committees, which has 
been used intermittently in Sudan, has 
reflected this approach, assigning individual 
community members the task of peace 
making. Yet often the approach was not 
pursued with enough building of capacity 
of the individual appointed to the peace 
committee. Such individualised attempts 
at peace could, for example, include 
building individual connections between 
groups through long-term exchange 
programmes between members of different 
communities. This will not bring results 
quickly but build a sustainable base with 
capable individuals who can be drivers of 
long-term local processes. It is important 
to turn individualised peace-building into a 
different kind of ‘talking about peace’ and 
include such elements as learning common 
languages to make sure that communities 
are able to talk to each other without a 
problem. An example of such local exchange 
programmes to acquaint communities with 
each other is organised by the Don Bosco 
community in Tonj. The radio station of the 
mission broadcasts in five languages with 
simultaneous translation and the community 
facilitiate visits of Jur of Mapel in WBeG to 
‘Dinka country’ Tonj for football games. The 
Twic Olympics in Warrap State are seen as 
a great and continuous attempt to connect 
communities. Such kind of activities also 
make programming a lot more manageable 
and hand over positions of responsibility to 
individuals, which in turn creates a sense of 
opportunity and takes away the burden of 
peace-building from the ‘chiefs’.
In addition, coupling each peace-building 
activity with a tangible attempt at solving a 
problem is necessary. If thorough conflict 
analysis shows that competition over water 
is at the heart of local violence, a peace-
building activity has to address this with all 
its complications, even if it involves tackling 
such politically contentious issues as internal 
border demarcation. If revenge cattle-
raiding is at the heart of ongoing violence, 
compensation must be worked out. If a local 
peace agreement involves an element of 
problem solving, such as negotiating access 
to water points, it needs to be binding and 
reinforced. Without such a comprehensive 
approach, however, localised snapshot 
activities are doomed to fail. 
Peace can only be built through improved 
living situations, so pairing peace with 
infrastructure programming or enforceable 
local contracts over resources, creates the 
credible incentive structure that is needed 
to create a peaceful environment. This may 
mean that high-level political decisions are 
necessary, both on donor and GoSS level, on 
how services can best be delivered quickly 
in order to facilitate conditions for peace. 
Waiting with service delivery until security has 
arrived takes the wrong starting point. 
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‘ChiEFs’ And  
PEACE-building 
Many organisations working in peace-
building assign tremendous importance to 
‘chiefs’, utilising them as the primary entry 
point into the community, pointing out that 
working with ‘chiefs’ means having relatively 
transparent and respected partners. At the 
same time, many acknowledge that in reality, 
it is not clear whether using the ‘chiefs’ 
for peace-building has been a successful 
strategy. The impulse to rely on ‘chiefs’ 
as the primary peacemakers in a conflict 
partly stems from the inherited notion that 
‘chiefs’ are the most legitimate leaders in the 
community and can adequately represent 
the community’s needs. It also adds to the 
confusion of approaches. 
One issue is, for example, that the push 
to increase women’s representation in 
politics clashes with support to reinstate 
customary law held by ‘chiefs’, which often 
excludes women. Focusing on ‘chiefs’ 
also overlooks the realities and nuances of 
governing citizens, rather than administering 
subjects. The use of a network of ‘chiefs’, 
which is, with few exceptions, a highly 
patriarchal system, highlights that the focus 
on empowering women is in most respects 
mere rhetoric.291 In reality, government and 
NGOs need a representative or gate-keeper 
as a point of entry to communities, but the 
reinvigoration of a potentially outdated and 
patriarchal system, or indeed in some cases 
the creation of ‘tradition’, is not productive 
or progressive. This sentiment was echoed 
throughout all research sites with numerous 
respondents indicating that ‘chiefs’ 
should be elected, particularly as ideas of 
democratic representation are becoming 
more widely accepted. Undoubtedly, 
changing supposed ‘traditional’ structures 
will meet with resistance from those with 
vested interest in maintaining the status 
quo but it is a necessary development 
if Southern Sudan’s subjects are to be 
engaged meaningfully and democratically  
as citizens.
In theory, ‘chiefs’ are held in high esteem 
and respected; however, interviews 
and focus group discussions indicate 
that, currently, the position of ‘chiefs’ as 
mediators and enforcers of law and order 
is tenuous. For many, the war weakened 
the authority of ‘chiefs’ as too often their 
communities had to witness how the army 
abused or disobeyed the chief without 
fear of retribution.292 A youth in Bisselia 
described how the war weakened the ability 
of a chief to retain his status: ‘Before the 
peace, the chief would collect taxes in the 
form of food. During the war, the chief also 
suffered, people shared food with him and 
his family…now he is also a beneficiary of 
NGO programmes.’293 
A key area of authority, which was eroded 
during the war years, was the authority of 
the community leader to protect. During 
the war, previously respected ‘chiefs’ were 
often unable to protect their community 
and had to hand over protection-duty to 
the youth. Today, just over 20 per cent of 
survey respondents said they would turn 
to ‘chiefs’ if they felt unsafe. There was a 
general acknowledgement that, whatever 
the deficiencies of the police and local 
government, ‘chiefs’ were unable to  
offer protection. 
However, ‘chiefs’ still clearly have a role to play 
in their communities. Survey answers show 
that 46 per cent of respondents turn to their 
‘chiefs’ to solve disputes, particularly family 
disputes over dowries or neighbourhood 
arguments. Youth representatives in Mapel 
noted that the chief can: ‘unite the people’. 
‘The chief is there with his people’, said one 
youth leader,294 ‘the ‘chiefs’ cooperate with the 
people’, said another.295 
Thus, while the chief still commands authority 
in the area of local dispute resolution, an over-
reliance on ‘chiefs’ as peace-builders may 
be problematic. In fact, a reverse mechanism 
of establishing and using authority has set 
in: ‘chiefs’, rather than using their authority 
to disseminate a peace-building message, 
use the peace-building message – which is 
usually linked to an international agency – to 
legitimise the fragile authority that has been 
bestowed on them by the government and 
international actors.
 
Proliferation of chiefs
The term ‘chief’ is less clear in its meaning 
than it seems. While we use the term for 
ease of reading, it is important to keep in 
mind that it can describe very different 
kinds of power in different communities. 
One reason for that is that administrative 
divisions also create leadership divisions with 
a corresponding proliferation of ‘chiefs’.296  
The war confused roles by creating, in some 
areas, up to three sets of ‘chiefs’ for the 
same people: ‘chiefs’ who stayed at home 
in SPLA areas, ‘chiefs’ in IDP camps who 
represented the same community during 
displacement and ‘chiefs’ who were instated 
by the Khartoum government to control 
politics.297 In some payams, SPLM and NCP 
established parallel chieftainships, which 
creates tension. Given the already flexible 
understandings of their powers in many 
communities, this proliferation of ‘chiefs’ 
further obscures the distinction of roles and 
undermines authority. ‘These differences 
haven’t been resolved. Until that is sorted 
out, [the ‘chiefs’] will not have authority and 
they need to be given authority,’ said one 
UNMIS officer, emphasising that it is unsound 
for peace-building strategies to be the remit 
of ‘chiefs’, given that there is no systematic 
approach to deciding who of the many 
‘chiefs’ will be responsible.‘Often the three 
‘chiefs’ are cousins so all are legitimate. But 
just because one is SPLA doesn’t mean that 
he is the best guy. People somehow will have 
to decide who the best is but that will be 
a nightmare to sort out.’298 Representation 
of community interests is thus a major 
community challenge, but also one of the 
great challenges for those looking for an entry 
point into a community to build peace. 
 ‘There have been reports of traditional 
payam boundaries being changed,’ 
explained an international NGO employee, 
‘confusing the traditional leaders and 
ultimately weakening their legitimacy based 
on inheritance’.299 In some areas, ‘chiefs’ 
have been demoted in consultation with the 
community300 to solve the problem of the 
confusing multiplicity of ‘chiefs’. Khartoum’s 
policy of establishing civilian authority in 
controlled areas from 1994 onwards clashed 
with the existing traditional structures – 
which were themselves often an introduction 
of the condominium administration.  
These structures are now seen by some  
to have legitimacy, especially by those  
who benefit.301 
CAsE study: MonyoMIJI 
The age-set systems of greater Equatoria 
are deemed by some to be a traditional 
governance mechanism that could help 
bridge the divide between the government 
and the community.302 Engaging the 
monyomiji is an important endeavour 
as these young males, traditionally the 
community ‘warriors’, are alienated from 
government and indeed are usually the 
individuals carrying out the increasingly 
violent cattle-raiding discussed elsewhere. 
However, reinvigorating the monyomiji 
system and attempting to engage the entire 
community through them faces similar 
problems, as does relying on ‘chiefs’ to 
be community gatekeepers. Like ‘chiefs’, 
monyomiji systems vary in terms of scope 
of authority and legitimacy but most 
importantly they are systems based on the 
exclusion of large sections of communities, 
which further limits their representativeness 
and potentially entrenches undesirable 
power structures, such as patriarchy. 
Therefore, while engaging the monyomiji 
youth is important, engaging with them as 
monyomiji is simultaneously problematic 
as it revitalises an undemocratic and 
unrepresentative system. Instead of 
romanticising tradition, government bodies 
and organisations that want to engage with 
the youth who have traditionally comprised 
the monyomiji might engage with them as 
part of a broader hybrid structure that is 
representative of all community members. 
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tension between chiefs and  
government structures
While it is believed that ‘chiefs’ also have 
a judiciary role to play, it is unclear what 
role that might be, and where powers of 
‘chiefs’ and the judiciary intersect. There is 
consensus that customary law is important 
and needs to be refined or improved, but 
how exactly that should be done is less 
clear.303 It is also important to note, however, 
that in some areas the legal structures in 
which the ‘chiefs’ operate are not ‘traditions’ 
that have emerged organically over long 
periods of time but instead are rather 
new and perhaps a remnant of war-time 
leadership; in many places customary law 
was hardly practised in non-war times. The 
lack of clarity over the remit of ‘chiefs’ and 
the judiciary was often cited as an issue 
by respondents, particularly because it 
was felt that this lack of structure creates 
ambiguity, resulting in violence and mob 
justice when communities take justice into 
their own hands. A youth leader working on 
peace-building in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal 
explained how: 
Before the war [‘chiefs’] could make 
decisions at the level of the judge. Now 
people focus on modern judicial system 
and [‘chiefs’] get no salary. If they fine 
people before, they get a percentage of the 
fine as incentive, their families depend on 
them. But they lose socially and financially, 
with dialogue between the government 
and judiciary [about] what cases should 
be handled by ‘chiefs’. Citizens now lose 
confidence in ‘chiefs’, although through 
dialogue the judiciary system and ‘chiefs’ 
can decide which cases or serious offences 
should be judged by a judge. Domestic 
cases can be judged by chief, maybe small 
criminal cases like beating, but this needs to 
be identified through dialogue.304 
Several government-facilitated initiatives 
have sought to establish ‘chiefs’ as 
guardians of customary law and mediators 
of peace. One such initiative was the 
conference for all the traditional leaders 
of Southern Sudan held in Bentiu in May 
2009. The ‘chiefs’ collaborated extensively 
to produce a document detailing customary 
laws for which they should be responsible. 
GoSS subsequently failed to disseminate 
the document to ‘chiefs’. The lack of follow 
up and of respect for the ‘chiefs’ efforts 
undermined them in their respective 
communities. This issue was for many 
representative of the government’s true 
position on ‘chiefs’. One chief from Wau 
described his emasculating lack of power: ‘If 
someone comes to me, I am like a lady, I have 
no power. When a man comes with power, I 
am weak.’305 A sense of disillusionment and 
helplessness was palpable among many of 
the ‘chiefs’ interviewed. For example, when a 
group of ‘chiefs’ in Wau were asked what they 
can do about the problems they are facing, 
they responded: ‘This is your work; you came 
to let us know what the ‘chiefs’ can do... You 
the researcher, you talk to the government,’ 
adding that there was ‘nothing at all’ that the 
‘chiefs’ could do to bring about peace.306 
Such ambiguity is also problematic with 
regard to the political hierarchy of Southern 
Sudan, as both ‘chiefs’ and local politicians 
compete for the same political space. Many 
respondents acknowledged that the unclear 
dual structure creates additional conflict as 
‘chiefs’ try to maintain their grip on power 
by undermining local political positions or 
vice-versa. This collision of two loosely 
defined governance structures threatens 
both political and chief cohorts as well as 
credible decentralisation. For example, boma 
and payam administrators, installed by GoSS 
since the CPA, decrease the responsibilities 
and authority of the ‘chiefs’ who expressed 
during this research that they saw themselves 
as the last link in a centralised government 
chain needed to implement policies and 
directives specifically on community security, 
as a chief from Wau explained:
The president should bring the order to the 
governor and give security to the governor 
and also head of JIU and everyone. 
No governor should work without the 
president’s order, from his own law. Let 
the word come from Salva. This case [of 
community violence] needs to be brought to 
the president so he can give us [the ‘chiefs’] 
order. We ‘chiefs’ see what is going wrong in 
our community.307 
This ambiguity of remits has implications 
for attempts to establish peace. There was 
a strong sense in all research sites that 
political leaders use conflict as a means 
of rallying their constituency behind them, 
often conflating political identities with ethnic 
ones. Nonetheless political leaders are rarely 
invited to local peace talks. For example, in 
Upper Nile, one expat respondent explained 
how: ‘Local peace conferences have been 
somewhat helpful, but the problem is that 
these issues are political. If you just involve 
‘chiefs’ and not the politicians, you will have 
limited results.’308 
Aside from the focus on ‘chiefs’ detracting 
from the involvement of key government 
actors, the fetishisation of ‘chiefs’ has 
another more insidious side-effects with 
numerous respondents indicating that 
certain ‘chiefs’ can foment tensions to 
advance their own interests. Even a simple 
refusal to get involved can retard conflict 
resolution. This was reported by a group of 
youth in Raja County who felt that they had 
no way to solve problems of intermarriage 
between tribes because: ‘Their ‘chiefs’ 
also refuse to cooperate with our ‘chiefs’ 
in marriage related issues.’309 Numerous 
respondents felt that ‘chiefs’ were a problem 
as opposed to a solution and it is clear 
that with ill-defined roles, whether a ‘chief’ 
is a positive or negative force within the 
community is largely based on personality. 
Yet, this also means that the power assigned 
to ‘chiefs’ creates a space for capable 
individuals to maintain order. In some 
research areas where government-provided 
order was absent, it was acknowledged that 
the local conflict resolution done by the chief 
was one of few stabilizing factors for the 
community, as for example, pointed out by 
an SSRRC official in Wau: ‘ ‘Chiefs’ used to 
call all the parties to come and sit together 
to resolve the problem that arises. They are 
still doing it.’310  
The parallel structures of local leadership 
– chiefs and government administrators 
– pull in two different directions. There 
exist, however, models for hybrid systems 
that combine using local structures and 
government structures. An obvious place 
to look for inspiration for this approach is 
in neighbouring countries. The Ugandan 
local councils, for example, have been 
very effective and the Ugandan model was 
already used as inspiration for Southern 
Sudan following the SPLM civil society 
conference in the mid 90’s, but never 
implemented. Initially called ‘resistance 
councils’, these were introduced throughout 
Uganda in 1986. Each village elected its 
own council, which had to include women 
representatives. The village councils 
would then elect from among themselves 
representatives to articulate their views at 
county level. Subsequently, the councils 
were incorporated into the Ugandan civil 
service, but initially they were a parallel 
arrangement, and to some extent monitored 
and regulated local government officials – 
including ‘sub-chiefs’. Perhaps a system of 
local councils, with women’s representatives, 
could be created in Southern Sudan. Their 
chairmen and chairwomen could then sit 
with ‘chiefs’ as equals. This would certainly 
be a more representative and participatory 
way of accessing a community’s views  
than the current system of engagement  
through ‘chiefs’. 
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CAsE study: hybRid 
stRuCtuREs And thE 
lOCAl gOvERnMEnt ACt
The precise role of ‘chiefs’ needs scrutiny 
to find ways of supporting positive aspects 
of their role without overburdening them, 
exaggerating gendered hierarchies, 
or promoting the polarisation of ethnic 
identities. There is, in essence, a need 
for a hybrid structure. In theory, the Local 
Government Act (2009) outlines how 
this hybrid structure can be created by 
incorporating a Customary Law Council into 
Local Government. Leaving aside challenges 
of implementation, there are a number of 
issues that undermine the value of the Act. 
On paper, it seems that traditional or 
customary authority will continue to operate 
as a parallel system to ‘modern’ governance 
mechanisms. The Act states that traditional 
authorities will administer customary law, 
yet it is still unclear what does and does 
not fall under the category of ‘customary 
law’. Ultimately this is not a truly ‘hybrid’ 
system, but rather a new way of organizing 
and conceptualizing existing governance 
mechanisms. The Act, which could have 
been used as an opportunity to break with 
the patriarchal status quo with regard to 
male-dominated ‘chieftainships’, further 
institutionalises women’s marginalised 
position. While there are references to a 
25 per cent quota for women, the lowest 
level of traditional leader is described as 
the ‘headman’ upon whom the other levels 
are built. This is an intrinsically male system 
into which females will most likely be slotted 
to meet the quota. An inherently male-
dominated system accommodating women 
for image reasons does little to empower 
these women and those they represent. In 
this regard, it might have been beneficial 
to refer to ‘community representatives’ (or 
likewise) in a bid to move away from the 
language of ‘chiefs’ and ‘chieftainships’. 
The Act does little to address the 
weaknesses of relying on traditional 
authorities to govern certain aspects of life 
and resolve conflicts. The fact that members 
of the Customary Law Council are not able 
to hold positions on either of the other 
councils precluded ‘traditional’ leaders 
from engaging in legislative and executive 
affairs.311 This highlights the ambiguity of the 
Act. In fact, it becomes difficult to assert that 
the Act is a genuine and meaningful attempt 
to engage with traditional authorities in a 
‘hybrid’ governance system. 
POlitiCAl vOiCE
So far, Southern Sudan is failing to elevate 
most of its subjects to the status of 
citizens.312 The majority of the people are 
at best ‘vote casters’ without valid political 
voice or meaningful representation. The 
widespread criticism voiced against the 
conduct of the elections has made this point 
very clear.
The state’s failure to engage the population 
was perceived by a number of respondents 
to be in stark contrast to NGO activities 
and, when talking about taking on a role as 
a citizen – which includes making informed 
political choices, using political structures 
to voice grievances and having access to a 
reliable voting system – many respondents 
made it clear that NGOs were more helpful 
than the government because, as a group of 
women in Mapel explained: ‘They have been 
involved in capacity building’ and have thus 
taught people the tools of citizenship.313 This 
exposes the striking dissonance between 
the role of the state and the role of NGOs: 
the current situation is one in which the state 
is seen as a hindrance to citizenship, with 
NGOs seen by some to be facilitating this 
process. Being a citizen with rights vis-à-vis 
the state is inextricably linked in people’s 
minds with ‘peace’, thus the government’s 
reluctance to grant the population the status 
of citizen and the concomitant rights, means 
that some respondents saw the state as an 
impediment to a lasting peace. 
For some, the promise of peace had 
involved the promise of being elevated from 
the ‘poor’ to the level of citizen. However, 
the current situation is closer to a ‘military 
peace’ determined by military personnel and 
behaviour. Many members of civil society 
uphold a belief that: ‘The war was a war for 
participation in government’ as described 
by a Fertit elder. Yet the multi-layered power 
structures make it much harder for citizens to 
feel represented as both official and unofficial 
power is concentrated in the hands of few. 
One international NGO employee summed 
up a general sense that it is misleading to talk 
about civil society and grassroots: ‘…as if 
their views actually matter.’314 
Civil society’s political voice is weakened 
at the exact moment it should be 
strengthened. The connection between this 
lack of political voice and increasing violence 
was an obvious one for some interviewees, 
as, for example, explained by the Sudanese 
leader of a local NGO in Wau: ‘The nature 
of conflict is now becoming worse. Before, 
culturally, when people fight among the 
communities, the elderly people, the women, 
the children were not to be killed. The 
houses were not to be burnt,’ he explained. 
‘But now they are even killing elders and 
burning houses. That is the result of one 
community feeling that they have nobody 
representing them in government. Because 
of the bitterness they have in their heart, 
mainly young people, they do this.’315 
The almost ubiquitous failure of 
representation was highlighted with regard 
to local conflict resolution and reinforces the 
idea that the south is essentially creating 
its own enemies within. Respondents 
in all research sites expressed concern 
that they were not clear who represents 
them, so problems and grievances remain 
unaddressed. This lack of faith in the 
political system was re-emphasised by a 
group of ‘chiefs’ and elders in the same 
state who pointed out that in the current 
system whole groups of people have no 
meaningful political representation.316 The 
majority of respondents felt they were 
entitled to contribute to state-building 
beyond being a passive recipient of 
government programmes, based on their 
own contribution during the war. Women 
often point out that without their support, the 
soldiers would not have been able to fight. 
One man recalled his times as a student 
in Khartoum, when he was one of the first 
people to raise the SPLA flag in the capital. 
His experience is indicative of what those 
who see themselves as part of the non-
military educated elite experience:
When we came back, we were not 
accommodated in this new government. 
So now you are dividing people into 
classes – the people who were military are 
supported and the people who contributed 
in other ways are sidelined. But you need 
to give also other people positions; you 
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have a generation who understands the 
north better. But the SPLM decided to only 
give political positions to the military. This 
means you are creating your enemy within 
yourself.317 
Five years of limited peace and development, 
coupled with a controversial election has 
for many respondents voided the idea of 
‘government’. During the elections, widely 
reported intimidation through government 
security agents emphasised the current 
skewed interpretation of what ‘political voice’ 
means. Vast amounts of voters experienced 
the first expression of their political voice 
as a confusing, often coercive process. 
Those running for political office reported 
on campaigns of intimidation and abuse, 
rather than political discussion. The amount 
of complaints by independent or opposition 
party candidates underscores this and in 
some of the areas researched for this report, 
the elections and the immediate aftermath 
were extremely volatile, with position-holders 
threatening opponents with violence if their 
seat becomes contested. 
This real-life manifestation of the concept of 
‘political voice’ has created a limbo situation 
in which people have lost trust in the ability 
of their government – and with that in what 
Southern Sudan might become – while 
continuing to keep up the hope that change 
will come. Hope, however, has turned into 
either a paralysing factor, as people have 
resigned themselves to being subjects, or 
has contributed to an escalation of violence 
as people take law, order and violence into 
their own hands. Some point out that this is 
a temporary state until the government has 
the capacity to assume its duties, for others 
such a state seems wishful thinking. 
Access to news media
The geography of the south contributes to 
a deepening chasm between government 
and citizens. Rural isolation and a weak 
infrastructure often make it impossible for 
citizens to gain access to their leaders or 
vice versa. The government is physically 
disconnected from many of its citizens.318 
When asked about accessing information, a 
large number of those interviewed stated that 
they relied on the radio. An important rising 
trend in the use of radio is reflected in the 
graph on the next page.319 In the over 40 and 
under 25 age groups, the numbers of people 
listening to radio increased year on year 
following the signing of the CPA. In the 25 to 
39 age group, there is a substantial increase 
in radio listenership during 2005, the year 
the CPA was signed. Given the absence of 
newspapers, and what are thought to be very 
low levels of literacy in some areas, the radio 
is the most effective means of communicating 
with the population of Southern Sudan. It is 
from the radio that people will hear about 
matters such as immunisation campaigns 
and political events. 
ChARt: whEn did yOu listEn tO thE RAdiO  
FOR inFORMAtiOn?
ChARt: whiCh RAdiO stAtiOns dO yOu listEn tO?
23%
20%
13%
11%
18%
4%
6%
5%
Miraya FM
BBC World Service
Omdurman
Sudan Radio Service
FM Radio Stations
Torit FM
Juba Stations
Other Stations
40 and above (n=56)
Between 25 and 39 (n=91)
24 and under (n=30)
P
er
ce
til
e
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Ne
ve
r
Du
rin
g 
Ad
dis
 A
ba
da
 
Ag
re
em
en
t 1
97
2 
– 1
98
2
Ea
rly
 w
ar
 ye
ar
s 1
98
3 
– 1
98
8
Pr
ot
ra
cte
d 
wa
r y
ea
rs 
19
89
 – 
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
90 91
In terms of reported radio access, the data 
are promising. In some locations, there 
is quite a wide choice of stations. The 
following pie chart depicts a breakdown of 
the stations interviewees reported listening 
to. Choice of programme relates in part 
to another factor that limits access to 
broadcasted news media. Many of those 
who spent the war in Southern Sudan do 
not speak either English or Arabic. They may 
therefore listen to the radio for music and, 
where available, programmes in their own 
mother-tongue, such as Dinka.
It is likely that radio use will continue to rise 
in the coming years and be a key resource 
in mobilising the population to participate 
in political decisions. At present, access to 
key information via this medium is good for 
some people in some areas, but is far from 
universal. It is important to note that more 
than 25 per cent in all age groups stated that 
they never listened to radio. This is something 
that came up in focus group discussions, 
especially with women. To sit and listen to 
the radio is a sign of status in itself. Women 
would sometimes laugh when asked why 
they did not do so, even when there was a 
radio in the compound. They explained that 
they were too busy to listen or that they could 
not sit where men were sitting. Most stated 
that information came from their men-folk, the 
chief or public meetings. 
Not surprisingly, the issues facing women 
in accessing news via radio are similar with 
regard to television. Southern Sudan television 
news media is of a good standard, but sets are 
usually located in bars or places where men 
socialise, and are mainly used to show football 
or music videos. However, several examples of 
television being used for news were observed 
in the research sites. In Fangak, Upper 
Nile, news programmes were shown in the 
evening on a television at the commissioner’s 
residence. It was, however, behind a fence, 
and could only be watched by invited people – 
almost all of whom were senior men from the 
neighbourhood. They would then impart the 
information to others. 
Key issues that need to be considered in 
relation to the development of media in 
Southern Sudan include censorship and 
propaganda. Experience has shown the 
dangers of radio being used for propaganda, 
and a free press may not be acceptable to a 
ruling party.320 However, concerns about news 
media should not focus on press freedoms 
alone. Southern Sudan is politically fragile and 
the drive towards ethnic polarities is troubling. 
Unrestrained radio development, particularly in 
local languages, may be having destabilising 
effects. What is actually said on air will need 
to be monitored closely, and restrictions on 
certain kinds of inflammatory statements are 
essential. At present, no such monitoring is 
attempted and it is unclear who should do it.
thE EFFECtivEnEss  
OF AgEnCiEs: Funding, 
COORdinAting And 
tARgEting
The effectiveness of agencies – both 
UN and NGOs – in Southern Sudan is 
subject to divisive debate. In regards to UN 
agencies, this debate is primarily focussed 
on effectiveness as well as the strength 
of the mandate. NGOs have come under 
scrutiny for seemingly limited engagement 
with evidence-driven programming while 
showing limited progress. The debate 
is made even more complex by lack of 
structured information that in addition is 
often complex and contradictory, reflecting 
the contradictory realities. A donor 
representative stated that: 
The cost benefit analysis for projects is 
very low. Even taking into consideration 
how expensive goods and services are in 
the country, money isn’t being spent well. 
With all the funds being spent the human 
development index remains very low; 
NGOs still tout their achievements but are 
unable to show these results as there is little 
monitoring and evaluation.321 
Donors are equally responsible for the low 
levels or wrong kinds of monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E). Before 2007, standard 
M&E procedures were not required and 
credible M&E is currently impaired by short-
term funding for processes that do need 
long-term approaches.322 On the other hand, 
some NGOs say it is simply too difficult to 
quantify and show results, because baseline 
data needed for monitoring does not exist 
and carrying out necessary surveys is too 
expensive and too difficult.323 During the 
course of this research, it is evident that 
respondents display a certain assessment 
fatigue: the sentiment that NGOs only ever 
come to ask questions which do not lead to 
improvement was expressed in almost every 
interview. Indeed, difficulties in obtaining 
data and need for visible results are two 
reasons for the prioritisation of visible peace 
conferences over long-term engagement 
that might take years to produce tangible 
results. These can be conducted at the 
expense of joint planning and prioritisation 
of interventions, along with a more thorough 
analysis of a situation, including an analysis 
of risks and threats that come with short-
term approaches. 
Funding in an unforeseeable future
High levels of funding uncertainty make it 
extremely difficult to undertake long-term 
planning, as outlined in the GoSS aid strategy: 
On current estimates, donor funding is 
projected to decline by 62 per cent between 
2008 and 2011. This sharp decline in 
estimated funding up to 2011 reflects the 
continuing short-term nature of many donor 
commitments to Southern Sudan.324 
Agencies are drawing on future scenario 
mapping done by organisations like USIP325 
but ultimately – with ambiguity about the 
outcome of the referendum – planning is 
based on hypothetical predictions. Many 
key players in development aid cannot 
be factored into planning without making 
assumptions about the future. For example, 
a southern secession would alter the 
mode of engagement of the European 
Commission and the World Bank, which 
would vastly modify the ‘aid landscape’ of 
Southern Sudan’s development trajectory. 
The European Commission is unable to 
contribute further to Sudan as a whole, 
through its main bilateral funding instrument, 
as Sudan had not ratified the Revised 
Cotonou Agreement by the legal deadline of 
30 June 2009.326 This means the European 
Commission will not disburse the pledged 
300 million which was promised to Sudan 
between 2008 and 2013.327 The suspension 
of these further funds by the EC and the 
unforeseeable future affecting other donors’ 
aid strategies has therefore resulted in 
a decline in funds promised to Sudan 
until the referendum and beyond, which 
makes planning difficult. This uncertainty is 
exacerbated by the physical disconnection 
with donors, who are mainly based in 
Khartoum or visit only Juba when travelling 
to the south. 
Furthermore, several complaints about 
current funding conditions were expressed 
by NGOs because they exacerbate levels 
of uncertainty and undermine long-term 
programming: ‘It’s really discordant,’ said 
an international NGO representative. ‘When 
a bunch of instruments all play out of tune, 
that’s what it’s like.’328 The short-term 
nature of most funding is a source of great 
frustration for NGOs. Many respondents 
stated that longer-term funding would lend 
itself to more conflict-sensitive programming 
because staff spend prolonged time in the 
field, make better assessments and commit 
the time needed to do extremely time-
consuming conflict mitigation work which 
will only show results after considerable 
engagement. One INGO operations 
manager pointed out that:
INGOs are struggling to do this job [of 
service delivery] by patching together 
many small and large grants… and are 
handicapped by the short-term nature of 
these and the fact we are constantly looking 
for the next grant…until donors really decide 
to invest genuine large amount of money 
in Sudan long-term then these essential 
services and the corresponding peace 
dividends will be scanty.329 
In response to questioning on why funding 
cycles are so short, NGOs thought that donors 
did not want to invest large amounts over a 
long-term because the situation was volatile 
and in addition donors wanted the flexibility 
to change their position. In agreement with 
Wakabi, a main problem is the lack of, and 
unpredictable nature of, funding.330  
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CAsE study: thE Multi 
dOnOR tRust Fund (MdtF) 
One example of how agency work has 
been hindered by mechanisms established 
in the donor community is the MDTF. The 
MDTF is the largest of the pooled funding 
mechanisms in Southern Sudan.331 MDTF 
was set up to provide longer-term funds to 
facilitate effective donor co-ordination and 
harmonisation in providing support to the 
GoSS to develop and implement recovery 
programmes aimed at rebuilding and 
consolidating peace and development in 
Southern Sudan.332 The World Bank is the 
managing agent of the Multi-Donor Trust 
Fund (MDTF) while UN, government and 
non-governmental actors implement MDTF-
funded projects.333 
The UK Associate Parliamentary Group for 
Sudan reported that by the end of 2009: 
‘Only $181m of the $524m had been spent…
More than four years into the fund’s six-year 
lifespan, $343m has yet to be used. Last year 
donors diverted $181m that would have gone 
into the MDTF to three other funds under 
their control.’334 At the current trajectory of 
spending, all the funds pledged to the MDTF 
are unlikely to be used before the planned 
referendum, which has repercussions for 
NGO planning. This failure to disperse funds 
is believed to be partly a result of the MDTF 
not having any senior staff based in Juba. 
Staff had little experience of post-conflict 
countries, which meant that projects were 
simply not approved quickly enough. 
In addition, procurement and compliance 
obligations are deemed to be too stringent 
with little support to GoSS to meet these 
obligations. Donors are beginning to realise 
that putting a majority of their funds in one 
mechanism is not optimal and therefore in 
some cases are not providing their planned 
funds to the MDTF from 2010. On the 
other hand, NGOs have found that MDTF 
procedures were designed to accommodate 
private sector contractors. As such, they 
are not compatible with NGO mandates 
and ways of working, posing a barrier to 
accessing timely funds for basic service 
delivery. As a result, few international NGOs 
have succeeded in accessing MDTF funding 
directly and the majority of national NGOs 
have little hope of doing so.335  
When the MDTF failed to deliver, many 
NGOs were forced to continue to use 
short-term humanitarian funding, which is ill-
suited to support service delivery and other 
multi-year recovery activities.336 To these 
criticisms the World Bank has commented 
that: ‘The design of the Trust Fund does not 
take sufficient account of poor counterpart 
implementation in a fragile environment like 
that of Southern Sudan but in defence of 
the Bank, the main implementer, GoSS, can 
do more to keep funds moving. In addition, 
due to the decrease in matched funding 
contributed from GoSS due to decreased oil 
revenues, less donor funds were also spent 
which resulted in an overall decrease in 
MDTF expenditure.’337  
Importantly, there has been a concerted 
effort from the World Bank to take 
these criticisms on board and improve 
its performance. However, the general 
consensus among contributing donor and 
NGO respondents continues to be ‘too 
little, too late’. How MDTF will improve its 
operations and disperse much-needed 
funds is to be seen. If the situation 
arises where Southern Sudan became 
independent, there is a question mark over 
whether GoSS should allow the World Bank 
to establish a large fund, e.g. the Afghanistan 
model post-succession, as donors, NGOs, 
and GoSS are all disillusioned with how it 
managed the MDTF.338 
Ensuring accountability 
The disappearance of millions of Sudanese 
pounds of donor funding, which came 
to light in 2008, placed the issue of 
accountability at centre stage.339 This was 
addressed in the Juba Compact (June 2009) 
whereby GoSS made a verbal commitment 
to tackle corruption GoSS committed to 
appointing an auditor general and to carry 
out investigations of any allegations. There 
was a sense among donors that for now 
they must give GoSS the benefit of the doubt 
but it remains to be seen if any changes will 
take place. Regardless of all the concerns 
there is a feeling that some progress is 
being made, as explained by a donor 
representative: ‘The glass is absolutely half 
full, rather than half empty. Southern Sudan 
has come a long way’340 
Another major concern of NGOs was the 
ever-increasing donor bureaucracy. While it 
was understood that process is important 
for accountability, burdensome red-tape 
is impeding the delivery of services. The 
tendering to distribution process for the 
present drug-allocation through the MDTF 
took two years.341 A staff member from a 
medical INGO said that to ensure that the 
supply of drugs are uninterrupted past 
the referendum, it is vitally important that 
decisions are made immediately on who, 
how and where drugs will be procured 
and who is managing and paying for 
the next distributions. At the moment, 
indecision – as donors wait to see what 
the future aid architecture will look like in 
light of the referendum result – coupled 
with technocratic donors’ overemphasis 
on getting the funding process and 
mechanisms right – could disrupt the 
supply.342 This bureaucracy, aimed at 
safeguarding against fraud, only adds to  
the perception that widespread corruption  
in the region cannot be fought with 
paperwork alone.
Coordination challenges
Theoretically, NGO activity is coordinated by 
the SSRRC. From the NGO’s point of view, 
this can add to the already great challenges 
in implementing programmes. Rather than 
ensuring that activities are pursuing an 
overarching objective and complementing 
one another while not overlooking vulnerable 
populations, NGOs feel that with ever-
increasing programming, demand on the 
SSRRC is simply unmanageable. As a result, 
coordination and communication is frustrating 
for the SSRRC, NGOs and GoSS. The 
notable lack of coordination between actors 
planning and implementing projects might 
be typical for the aid industry, yet in a fragile 
environment operating under a certain time 
pressure, this can be even more damaging.343 
At the local government level, lack 
of cooperation in planning and NGO 
advocacy were also identified as a problem. 
Water projects, for example, tend to 
be donor driven rather than based on 
needs assessments. This has dotted the 
countryside with ‘monuments’. ‘No one 
knows how many bore holes there are, 
whether they are working,’ explained one 
international NGO worker. ‘There is no 
inventory; no knowledge of what each other 
is doing and lots of chaos.’344 With water 
being most commonly mentioned as a 
reason for conflict, the implications of this 
are far-reaching. 
Both the international community and 
GoSS recognize that more can be done to 
streamline development efforts. There will 
be an increased effort to approve donor 
projects through the GoSS Interministerial 
Appraisal Committee to ensure that all parties 
are more informed and involved in proposed 
projects. These projects will also be compiled 
in the compilation of a yearly ‘Donor Book’ 
managed by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning with the help of donors 
and NGOs to enable better reporting on donor 
projects in operation.345 Donors and NGO 
representatives are also involved in Budget 
Sector Working Groups and Quarterly Donor 
Forums to ensure that all are involved in GoSS’ 
planning and prioritisation. The Southern 
Sudanese NGO Forum346 aims to represent 
over 200 indigenous and international NGOs 
to increase information flows and coordinate 
efforts among the NGO community while 
prioritising improved engagement with GoSS. 
However, with the realisation that local violence 
is caused by an intricate combination of 
processes, targeting programming that will 
directly mitigate local conflict is extremely 
92
94 95
challenging for all actors involved as they 
decide on appropriate entry points.
thE POlitiCs OF thE 
dEvElOPMEnt sECtOR 
local partnerships and appropriate  
entry points
The choice of partners for development 
projects is wrought with political tension 
that often passes unnoticed. Tensions 
between groups over access to resources 
are described by the administration in 
Magwi in Eastern Equatoria, for example, 
as being exacerbated by pre-planned 
NGO interventions that do not consult local 
governments, are not sensitive to local 
issues or engage with ‘chiefs’ that act as 
gatekeepers, rather than entry points.
A similar misunderstanding might be at play 
with regard to the position of the payam 
administrator. In NGO head offices, often 
the importance of the payam administrators 
was stressed, which in reality underlines a 
common disconnection between agency 
policy and the realities of implementation. 
Locally, payam administrators seemed to 
play no significant part in the community’s 
perception of agencies. Paradoxically, 
despite such emphasis on the payam 
administrator and ‘chiefs’ as agents of 
change, NGO respondents also named 
‘chiefs’ and payam/boma administrators as 
the biggest impediment to change, based 
on a lack of capacity, pursuit of personal 
agendas and bias, as explained for example 
by an international field coordinator in NBeG: 
‘ “Chiefs” only want things to be done their 
way and if it’s done another way they will 
complain that their authority is eroding or 
being challenged.’347
the politics of hiring
The tension within the government/NGO 
relationship is further exacerbated by 
the composition of personnel. Broadly 
speaking, the parallel structures of NGO and 
government are divided along educational, 
ethnic and geographical lines with each side 
having had a very different experience of the 
war and a different sense of entitlement of 
the peace. Government officials tend to be 
individuals who remained in the south during 
the war, often fought in the SPLA, or have a 
very close affiliation with the SPLA. In many 
cases, education – both in English or Arabic 
– was sacrificed for fighting. In general, this 
makes government staff more likely to be 
Dinka or Nuer. 
NGOs tend to employ Sudanese with good 
English and a solid education and these 
are more likely to be Equatorians because 
more Equatorians than Dinka or Nuer went 
to school in Kenya or Uganda. The division 
is well known and was outlined by a donor 
representative: ‘[Dinka] government staff 
and communities call [those who did not 
stay in Sudan during the war] ‘kawajas’, they 
are said to be foreigners not having stayed 
during the war and therefore are not part of 
Southern Sudan. For some Equatorians this 
makes it difficult to work.’348 
Politics of uneasy partnerships
Although there is a clear recognition of the 
Sudanese Non-governmental Organisations’ 
(SNGOs) role in development, tension 
in the partnership between SNGOs and 
INGOs exists. One can argue that the 
international community and GoSS make 
assumptions about the political motivations 
and capabilities of local development actors. 
An international employee of an INGO 
discussed how they often avoid working 
with local organisations because: ‘SNGOs 
have often been misappropriating money 
for their own gains.’349 This was repeated 
in a UN Habitat assessment: ‘SNGOs face 
considerable credibility challenges, one of 
which is the perception held by INGOs that 
SNGOs have politically motivated links that 
may compromise their operating principles of 
neutrality and partiality.’350 The combination 
of mistrust of SNGOs with their perceived 
lack of organisational capacity means that 
donors often fund INGOs directly, or in the 
attempt to ‘build local civil society’s capacity’ 
while limiting potential ‘risks’, provide SNGOs 
with funding through INGOs. As a result, 
many SNGOs feel that they are unequal 
partners in the development of their own 
country. Moore (2009) discusses how 
SNGOs are eager for INGOs to engage with 
them as equal partners albeit in the form 
of capacity building.351 Hilhorst and van 
Leeuwen (2005) argue that international 
actors need to be realistic and conscious of 
how the external and internal political, social, 
economic, and historical strains can pull and 
push CBOs’ or SNGOs’ growth process.352 
They find that it is of paramount importance 
that the international community does not 
simply take the easy route and broadly brush 
off CBOs and SNGOs as being marred by 
political tensions.  
In both instances political tensions are 
not understood in-depth and groups are 
generalised under the same terms. INGOs 
and GoSS often reduce the risks of working 
with SNGOs by carrying out capacity 
assessments of local organisations or by 
assessing the local context However, the 
political will and funds needed for these time-
consuming activities are often lacking. 
the pitfalls of capacity building
The activities of NGOs within a post-conflict 
situation inevitably involve capacity building. 
It is widely believed that capacity building 
is necessary and interviewees had strong 
opinions of which institutions should be 
responsible for this. However, they did not 
always agree and many feel that not enough 
progress has been made, as was stressed 
in a recent report: ‘There is still no strategy 
for increasing involvement and no common 
understanding of the role NGOs can and 
should play in the recovery and development 
of Southern Sudan.’353  
Many interviewees from international NGOs 
believed that the responsibility of building the 
capacity of GoSS at national and state level 
should largely lie with the UN. In congruence 
with this perception, UNDP viewed their role 
as building state institutional capacity to 
prepare the field for NGOs to deliver services 
and monitor programmes. Other NGOs 
felt that although NGOs might not have the 
resources, they have the responsibility to 
build the capacity of county level government 
staff simply because the UN does not 
operate at that level.
While there is a sense amongst NGO and 
donor-respondents that with international 
state-building support GoSS has advanced 
impressively within four years, the progress 
is still too slow. There has been criticism 
from NGOs, expressed here by the country 
director of an INGO, that UNDP’s state-
building efforts – even after five years of the 
CPA – have been: ‘…mainly providing assets 
and capital rather than building skills.’354 
Few donors believe that the state has been 
adequately built.
The main criticism levelled at NGOs by GoSS, 
donors, and the UN is that some NGOs are 
not doing enough to build capacity of either 
government staff or local organisations. 
This is reflected in the funding approach 
of donors where some NGOs are being 
actively pushed to integrate capacity building 
components into their programming. On the 
other hand, NGOs feel that the short-term 
nature of their project funding, usually 12 
to 18 months, is not conducive to credible 
capacity building. In reality it leads to local 
partnerships that fulfil the capacity building 
component on paper only. NGOs feel that 
there is a trade-off between provision of 
quality services and building capacity of 
GoSS and local organisations and that donors 
are undecided how much trade-off they 
will accept, as outlined by an INGO country 
director: ‘If they want us to build capacity then 
they need to be prepared for us to deliver 
less and deliver it more slowly.’355 Whether 
that is acceptable is entirely dependent 
on how donors ultimately define their own 
strategies. Some NGOs are reluctant to work 
with government institutions, particularly on 
lower level, as they are perceived to be an 
impediment to programming. High turnover of 
staff in state and local government results in 
weak institutional memory, thus necessitating 
continued and costly ‘capacity building’ with 
few tangible programming results, as an INGO 
staff member explains: ‘Government have 
a high staff turnover so when you build their 
capacity they leave or immediately become 
managers leaving no lower and middle rung 
administrators.’356 However, the risk that the 
newly capacity-built government staff will 
take on better paid positions in an INGO is an 
inherent problem in a country where skilled 
workers are desperately needed.
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At first sight, increased local violence in 
Southern Sudan might appear to be a 
problem caused by centrally managed 
manipulation by Khartoum, or that local 
clashes are based on entrenched ‘tribal’ 
hatred and are thus impossible to avoid. 
However, a closer look and in-depth 
interviews with a vast range of actors and 
civilians, reveals a different, yet no less 
challenging reality. Local violence is in many 
ways intricately connected to broader issues 
that are being played out at the local, state, 
GoSS or indeed the donor level. 
The ambition to build institutions of a state 
– as put forward by GoSS and donors – 
and the acknowledgement of time needed 
to embed these institutions, is in stark 
contrast with the immediate need to put 
strong measures into place that control local 
violence. More importantly, perhaps, is a 
stark contrast that exists between the theory 
of some of the development programming 
and the reality. Decentralisation is a 
poignant example: while acknowledged 
to be the only viable path to accountable 
and representative government, it currently 
supports division along ethnic lines because 
access to resources is limited and various 
unaccountable power structures are  
being entrenched. 
This report has shown that a wide range of 
factors have an impact on local conflicts and 
can turn them violent. This realisation is vital 
in the coming months as Southern Sudan 
moves towards the moment of referendum. 
A clear realisation and expression of the 
intricacy of issues and the need to address 
even seemingly less urgent matters, such as 
local borders, needs to be pursued instead of 
a misplaced emphasis on the referendum as 
‘decision day’ after which all other points can 
be addressed. Expectations for improvement 
of local conflicts immediately after the 
referendum and the change it will bring run 
high. They are bound to be disappointed. 
There is still time to avoid such 
disappointment, but action is required. 
There is an urgent need for clarification 
of development and government goals. 
That will require a more robust and better 
informed engagement with local realities, 
including a rethink of current peace-building 
initiatives. An honest stock-taking and 
assessment of capacity is needed – by 
the GoSS, by donors and by implementing 
agencies. Crucially, there is a requirement to 
plan beyond the referendum. The moment to 
do that is now. 
REsEARCh ChAllEngEs
This report outlines the weaknesses of 
engaging communities through certain 
structures but often these were the same 
structures used by the researchers to 
access communities, highlighting both the 
lack of alternatives and the self-perpetuating 
nature of such structures. While criticising 
NGOs for working through ‘chiefs’, this 
research is also guilty of accessing 
community members through ‘chiefs’. All 
attempts were made to reduce bias in 
the questionnaires, however the sample 
is not representative and all results are 
presented with the caveat that rather than 
representing the outcome of a statistically 
robust quantitative study, they are instead 
an additional method used to support the 
qualitative findings of this research. That 
said, the researchers are satisfied with the 
veracity of these results and feel they are 
a fair representation of common views, as 
much as they exist, in the research sites. 
Working through translators presents 
challenges in terms of obtaining verbatim 
translations and not translators’ interpretations. 
This can be particularly challenging in areas 
where translators are known to respondents 
and try to ‘help’ them. A certain amount 
of reluctance was encountered among 
government officials about the research. 
To some extent this was to be expected, 
given that elections were due to be held and 
elected officials did not want conflicts – ipso 
facto, governance failures -highlighted in 
their constituencies. In addition, one official 
alluded to the hubris of a research team 
spending just four weeks in the State, being 
able to understand conflict dynamics and 
make recommendations to ameliorate existing 
conflicts or prevent future ones:
We have tried our best, we use peace 
agreements, the hostility does not stop, we 
use voluntary disarmament, it doesn’t stop, 
we then go beyond and use force, and still 
it is not stopping...your recommendations 
will have to be magic...and who then will 
implement these magic ‘recommendations’?
One of the major difficulties faced by 
the research teams was trying to speak 
to people about often unfamiliar and 
intangible concepts such as elections 
and referendum during a period of what is 
being described locally as famine. Many 
respondents became frustrated with the line 
of questioning when it became apparent 
that the research was not focusing on their 
primary concern – hunger. 
As with much primary research of this 
nature it was not possible to establish 
the veracity of many of the statements 
herein or to establish how well-founded 
the opinions of respondents were, but to a 
certain extent that is not relevant as what 
is most important is that these statements 
and opinions reflect local perceptions 
of situations. For these people, these 
perceptions are reality and much hearsay is 
repeated as fact, particularly in the absence 
of formal channels of communication. 
Word of mouth is one of the most powerful 
forms of communication, however under 
circumstances where formal channels of 
communication are weak or non-existent a 
nefarious form of word of mouth – rumour 
-can supplant fact with concomitant 
negative outcomes, thus unsubstantiated 
information should not be neglected. 
Often respondents referred to ‘other areas’ 
as being most marginalised, neglected or, 
for example, not counted in the census. 
While all three teams travelled extensively 
throughout their research sites, the research 
teams faced the same problems as other 
actors – NGOs, government, etc – in 
reaching the most marginal communities.
CONCLUSION APPENDIx: METHODOLOGY AND 
INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH SITES
Women participating in a ranking excercise
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Results from the ranking exercises are 
displayed as graphs with text-based tables 
for more detailed illustration of the answers.
University seminars
At the University of Western Bahr el-Ghazal, 
the researchers conducted a workshop 
with undergraduate students of different 
disciplines on border issues. Students and 
faculty at Upper Nile University discussed 
issues of peace and international justice with 
the lead researcher.
Questionnaire
A total of 354 questionnaire-based surveys 
were conducted across the three research 
sites, often by locally-recruited researchers. 
Attempts were made to randomly sample 
in the research sites. Questions, which 
had been developed during a workshop 
in Juba, intended to solicit answers about 
perceptions of safety over time and whether 
or not people felt as if their views were 
represented at a variety of government 
levels. The best way of soliciting information 
pertinent to the assessment, it seemed, 
was to ask a series of questions under a 
‘time-line’ of Sudanese events, broken down 
into six-month periods for the time since the 
signing of the CPA. The answers from the 
questionnaires were coded into a database 
and analysed using quantitative graphs.
questionnaire questions
When was Southern Sudan in peace?
When were you safe?
Who do you turn to if you feel unsafe?
Who do you go to when you have  
other problems?
Who is your member of parliament? 
When did he/she come to speak? 
About what? 
Will Southern Sudan become an 
independent country? 
Will you vote for unity or independence?
What will the government look like?
What would you like the government  
to look like?
Were you counted in the census?
Will there be another war with the north?
Will there be wars within the south?
Do you have enemies? 
When were you attacked? 
By whom?
When did it start?
How was it resolved?
Did you have a peace meeting? 
What happened afterwards?
Will the conflict come back? 
What is the best way to get peace?
When did you go hungry?
When did you receive food aid? 
From whom? 
When have you received assistance from an 
aid agency? 
What kind of assistance?
When did your children go to school? 
When did you listen to a radio  
for information?
Which station do you listen to?
When did you have the best leaders? 
Who were they?
NGOs
A total of 11 NGOs were interviewed in Juba 
and 13 outside of Juba. 80 per cent of these 
NGOs were international while 20 per cent 
were SNGOs or CBOs. Six donors were 
interviewed, all located in Juba. 
FiEldwORK MEthOdOlOgy
Research was conducted over the course 
of seven weeks in October and November 
2009. During the first two weeks the team 
worked in Juba conducting preliminary key 
informant interviews. During two workshops, 
one before and one after the field work, 
the research team presented preliminary 
research findings to members of the NGO 
community and government staff. 
Three teams then spent a total of four weeks 
in Eastern Equatoria; Upper Nile and Jonglei; 
and Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Northern Bahr 
el-Ghazal, Lakes State and Warrap State. 
Additional research was carried out by the 
project director during the elections.
Qualitative interviews
In total, the three research teams conducted 
272 qualitative interviews with key informants 
across the three sites. Interactions with key 
informants were usually in English or Arabic 
with translation from Sudanese researchers. 
Some interviews were conducted in local 
languages and translated by locally hired 
research assistants and translators. Key 
informants included inter alia governors, 
commissioners, NGO-workers, religious 
leaders, community leaders, youth and 
women’s representatives. Interviews 
were typically open-ended and lasted 
between 20-200 minutes. The rationale and 
background of the research was explained 
at the beginning of the interview, with the 
opportunity for respondent questions at the 
end. Focus group discussions were also 
conducted in all research sites, primarily 
with community leaders (‘chiefs’), women’s 
groups and youth groups. 
School drawing exercises
In all three sites, the research teams ran 
drawing competitions, visiting 18 schools in 
total. Children were asked to draw a picture 
representing life before and after the CPA, 
before and after the referendum, or of their 
immediate surroundings. 
Ranking
In various group settings, the research 
teams carried out ranking exercises. These 
were usually conducted on the ground with 
pieces of paper with the choices placed on 
the soil. Each participant was given a pebble 
to cast their vote by placing it on the paper. 
Questions asked during ranking  
exercises were:
1) Who protects you the best? Suggested 
categories: SPLA, Police, UNMIS, 
Community Police, Chief, Relatives, nobody.
2) Who is the best at bringing peace? 
Suggested categories: GoSS, GoS, 
GoNU, Governor, Commissioner, Payam 
Administrator, Chief, Peace Commission, 
Parliamentary Committee on Peace, UN, 
NGOs, Relatives.
3) What would be the best future for 
Southern Sudan? Suggested categories: 
Living under GoSS, Living under GoNU, 
Divide Sudan into many parts, UN 
Administration/Peace-keeping, War 
4) Who has been of most help to you? 
Suggested categories: GoSS, GoS, 
GoNU, Governor, Commissioner, Payam 
Administrator, Chief, Peace Commission, 
Parliamentary Committee on Peace, UN, 
NGOs, Relatives.
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